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

BY

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Author's Preface to the Third Volume

When the "Philosophical Currents of the Present Day" appeared, I was Ordinary Professor of Philosophy and Sociology in Bern. Then the translator of the book wrote to me in Bern that he was engaged in bringing out an English edition of my work and he sent me some samples of his translation. Then followed my migration to Berlin, where I undertook the charge of the political magazine, "Nord und Sud" and worked as the political editor of the "Vossische Zeitung." When the world-war broke out in 1914, I had to choose between returning to my native land Switzerland and conducting from there the "Archiv für Philosophie" which had already appeared from Berlin, and remaining in Berlin as a neutral and watching the world-war from the side of Germany. As a philosopher and a sociologist, I have never repented for a moment my decision to remain in Berlin. As a thinker who with Spinoza is in the habit of looking at all events, even the most powerful, from the standpoint of the eternal (*sub specie alternitatis*), I have learnt incomparably more from history as personally experienced than from history as written.

When the world-war came to an end, I received from Dr. Shishirkumar Maitra of Calcutta the first two volumes of his translation of my "Philosophical Currents of the Present Day" which appeared to me and my colleagues in Berlin somewhat like Noah's dove with the green leaf after the Flood. The philosophers who have to reflect upon space and time and who in consequence, have to incline to the relativity-theory of Einstein, showed themselves even during the war as over-temporal and over-spatial, that is, as true neutrals. I preserved my neutrality during the war in Berlin and Shishirkumar Maitra his in Calcutta. Philosophy is and will always

remain the queen of all the sciences, for this reason that it can hold its breath for thousands of years.

As in the winter of 1923-24, at the invitation of the great American Universities, I had to deliver lectures on philosophy and sociology at about twenty American Universities, I found the two volumes of my friend's translation very handy. I have made much use of his translation and propose to do this again in my book, "Evolutionary Optimism" which contains my lectures delivered in America. I am extremely grateful to my English translator for this, that he has made the first attempt to make my philosophy accessible to the English-speaking world. While in America, I regretted very much that this third volume of my "Philosophical Currents of the Present Day" had not appeared, for as the chapter on Authority which forms the key-stone of my philosophy and which is contained in this volume, was not present before me in an English form, I had to work out an altogether new translation myself for the sake of my lecture on Authority before the New York University, which appeared in the July number of the leading American magazine, "Contemporary Review." It is my bounden duty to express my heartiest thanks publicly to the translator of this work, because he had the courage to take up, in the midst of the war, the work of a Swiss written in German.

And so in concluding my introductory remarks for the third volume of my book, I wish to express the same thought which I expressed in the introduction to the fourth edition of my "Social Question in the Light of Philosophy," which was dedicated to Lord D'Abernon, the English ambassador in Berlin: "Between the first edition of this work and the present lies the world-war with its revolutionary sequelæ. Then, it was a very risky thing to try to estimate the essence of the social question from a German chair. To-day, after the revolution, it is going against the popular current to judge the dominant socialism so dispassionately and critically as

was done in this book a generation ago with regard to capitalism." As, however, in the entire course of my scientific life, I have never joined any political party and have vindicated my right as a philosopher and a sociologist to think and act according to my own laws, so I have throughout my life never turned to the right or to the left. I have tried to give as much measure of objective truth in my handling of the social question as it is in my power and knowledge to give. For this reason I have given a comparative-historical basis to my sociology and employed the biological method of a Comte or Spencer only here and there as a support for my sociological structure.

The unsettling, nay, revolutionary events of the post-war years have not shaken me from the standpoint of social optimism represented by me in this book. Obstacles and zigzag paths are inevitable in history. The upward path which is represented by my social optimism, in opposition to the views of Oswald Spengler, is not a straight line; it rather moves spirally, according to the motto of Leibniz, the philosopher of optimism: *Inclinata resurget.* The spiral bends only to rise higher.

BERLIN:
December 8, 1924.

LUDWIG STEIN.

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CONTENTS

Chapter XI

The Problem of Knowledge

Sensuous reality and logical truth. Mean position between genetic and critical methods. Nature of religious truths. Where does faith begin? Hume's psychology of religion. Stumpf's contrast between "appearance" and "function." Religious and Scientific truths. Mathematical axioms are over-personal truths. Previous stages of the religious conception. The problem of religious philosophy of to-day. Science is not the last word but the last word but one. Confessions are to religion what language is to logic. Relation between belief and knowledge. Naturalistic ethics. In history, unlike nature, everything is conditionally necessary.

pp. 395-426

Chapter XII

The Problem of Religion

"In the beginning there was Spirit." The concept of God cannot be derived from feeling-values. God can only be conceived through the understanding. Eternal civilizing plan of History. We spiritualise the universe with our unity. Monism as a logical necessity. Two fundamental religious types: pessimism and optimism. Buddhism and Zoroastrianism. The mechanical and the teleological conception. Religious pessimism leads to quietism and pietism. God is the eternal world-order. Welfare of the human race lies *before* not *behind* us ... ... pp. 427-451

CHAPTER XIII

The Sociological Problem

Instead of the poetic, we have now the scientific politician. The Labour Conferences in Berlin and Bern. Human society is the main problem of the present day. Social differences must always exist. Transvaluation of social values. The degradation-theory and those who challenge it. Legal socialism. Sociology as a Science. Foundation of folk-psychology by Lazarus. Lazarus's problem of the "total spirit." Ratzenhofer's "Sociology." "Harmony of the political impulse." Ratzenhofer's monism. Ratzenhofer's formula: "adhering interest." Ratzenhofer as an energist and voluntarist. Ratzenhofer's metaphysics. The Sociological Methods. Ratzenhofer's posthumous "Sociology." The English Sociologists. History of the Darwin-Spencerian formula. Spencer and the Ionian Nature-philosophers. The "Cycle of Life." Spencer perfects the evolutionism of Heraclitus. The military and the industrial type. Spencer's horror of Socialism. "The Social State" of the future ... ... pp. 452-503

CHAPTER XIV

The Problem of Toleration

Toleration as a sociological problem. Essence of Toleration. Opposition between Society and the State. The kingdom of laws and the kingdom of ends. Education of the human race. Man as the copyist of Nature. Symbiosis. The eternal cycle of matter. "Adhering interest" as the basis of solidarity. The well-defined boundary between man and beast. Training in toleration by means of history. The "third kingdom" is being gradually built up. Trade as a

factor in the growth of toleration. Connexion between professions and the social instinct. Theoretical tolerationists (Locke). Toleration problem of the 20th century.

pp. 504-36

CHAPTER XV

The Problem of Authority

Nature of the problem of authority. Authorities as obstructive or helping organs of our will. Without authority the human race cannot be educated. The need of authority as a will-economy. Race-experiences as "representative feelings." Interpretation of authority from the standpoint of will-economy. Fichte and the principle of authority. Authority as a reflex movement in the domain of will. Authority signifies the race. Authority as a sociological category. Historical emblems of authority. Authority, like truth or justice, is a relational concept. Authorities make use of mass-suggestion. The necessary symbols of unity of authority.

pp. 537-565

CHAPTER XVI

The Problem of History

Astronomical predictions and political prognoses. In history, there is only probability but never certainty. Historical predictions give no knowledge but rest upon belief. Personal "destiny" is transformed into "Nature." Teleological interpretations of History. Condorcet's "historical law." Windelband and others on human group-actions. Lamprecht and Breysig on historical uniformity. History shows only tendencies, not laws. In 'must' we act heteronomously, in 'should' autonomously. Historical categories as generic concepts of human action. Why we deny the existence of

historical laws. Political prognoses and medical diagnoses. Prognoses are the privilege of the political genius. Human collective actions exhibit the social rhythm. Politics as a Science ... ... pp. 566-597
Index of Names 598
Index of Topics 610

CHAPTER XI

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

We call that branch of philosophical discipline the theory of knowledge which has to investigate the range and limits of human knowledge, examine the nature and degree of our judgments of validity, balance probability and certainty against each other, in short, determine the criteria of human truth. The grades of validity of human judgments manifest themselves in speaking and thinking, in grammar and logic. In logic we come to know different grades of certainty of our assertions. We have in formal logic judgments of perception which rest upon direct experience; they are naturally valid only *here* and *now*. Further, there are judgments of memory which refer to former experience; their validity is fixed in time. Finally, we have conceptual judgments (for instance, the judgment that virtue makes happiness) which have a timeless validity. Our judgment is assertory ("so it is"), when it refers to a determinate experience of the senses, and this we call reality. The *ratio sensitiva*, the evidence of the senses, which, though vivid and clear, is casual and unconnected, because it is confined only to momentary experiences or impression-atoms, is for this reason characterised by great rationalists, like Descartes and Spinoza, as dark and confused, and therefore placed on the lowest stage of knowledge. Universality can therefore only belong to a judgment of majority or the so-called plural judgment, and never to an individual judgment. Even if this individual judgment be a conceptual one, still strict universality can never be predicated

of it. Only plural judgments, like *Many Germans are blond*, *All men are mortal*, *All bodies are extended*, can lay any claim to necessary validity. It is in the plural judgments that we have the beginnings of inductive generalisation as well as of scientific classification, and it is in these judgments that we have to look for the source of those universally valid principles of mathematics which rest upon the formal identical equation: A=A or ego=ego. Apodictic validity belongs to the formal-identical judgments in mathematics and logic, and not to the real-identical ones in physics and chemistry. In this Hume is right against Kant. Of every experienced reality (Hume's matter of fact) the opposite is possible, so far as it does not contain any inner logical contradiction, although this opposite is inadmissible in a special case of the experienced phenomenon. Every single experience, phenomenon or occurrence, has thus a character of *reality* but no necessary character of *truth*. Our judgment, again, is a problematic one, when it has for its contents not the real or actual but only the possible ("it could, it might be so"). All hypothetical judgments possess therefore only a probability-value in their assertions. What is possible has naturally never that grade of certainty which belongs to an actually experienced phenomenon, certainly not that unquestionability which belongs to the laws of nature or to the logico-mathematical (so-called) eternal truths (vérités de raison). Only in apodictic judgment which we assert unconditionally, which thus is not joined to any 'if' or 'but,' is the degree of certainty of our assertions categorical ("it must be so, it cannot be otherwise"). Renan treats in one place of the differences between certitude, probability and dream. The three kinds (modalities) of assertion, beginning from the certainty of reality and the weak certainty of probability and terminating in the absolute trustworthiness of necessity and universality, such as in found only in conceptual judgments, we will illustrate by an example from our

everyday sensuous experience. If I say "The sun shines," there belongs to this judgment only the value of reality and not the value of necessity. It is an assertory proposition. "The sun shines" means that he does so, now and here, for me at this moment. This experienced phenomenon is a singular one, and as such, *reality* but no *logical truth* because it awakens no feeling of expectation of the future. In other places and at other times, it has no value. If I say, however, "The sun might break through the clouds to morrow," then my assertion will have the weak certainty of a problematic judgment. It is possible, nay, even probable (according to the reading of the barometer), according to laws of meteorology, resting upon calculations of probability. Problematic judgments have the guiding value of weather prognostications which advise us, by a calculation of probability, as to how we should dress or equip ourselves. Universalisations of experience of our forefathers which are set down in the race-memory ("mneme") lead to concepts which guide us in great measure. If I say, however, "The sun shines," in the sense of a permanent property, when I represent the physical process by which the sun's body functions, *i.e.*, sends out light, heat or electricity, then in this proposition the shining of the sun is not a momentary but an eternal phenomenon, no accidental but a necessary experience, no individual but a universal judgment, and thus neither an assertory nor a problematical but an apodictic assertion. For this proposition is true not only *here* and *now*, but *for ever* and *everywhere*; it is thus not only real or simply possible, but it is necessary and universal. The three grades of certainty, namely, reality, possibility and necessity, are related to one another, somewhat as the readings of the thermometer, which shows the present temperature and therefore reality, are related to those of the barometer which makes possible an anticipation of the coming temperature. There is a rise in the scale of certainty from these to the

thoroughly reliable compass or the announced solar eclipse of the astronomers whose predictions not simply *can* be correct and are in fact in eighty per cent. of cases correct, but claim the high degree of hundred per cent. certainty, and thus extend and satisfy our feelings of anticipation in the highest degree, because in scientific experience, up to the present day, no case has ever been observed which has falsified the calculations of astronomers. The observed individual reality teaches us about what *is*, the hypothetical judgments about the future indicate to us what *might*, according to calculations of probability, appear, the apodictic propositions or "laws" of the astronomers, physicists, chemists and biologists inform us with infallible accuracy, *i.e.*, categorically, about what will or *must* happen.

We represent in epistemology the standpoint of evolutionary criticism. We are empiricists, so far as the origin of our universal concepts is concerned, but *a priorists* or logicists, so far as their validity is concerned. That our concrete concepts, regard being had to their origin, rest upon sensuous experiences which have frequently repeated themselves, and in consequence, have become associated with one another, we unhesitatingly concede to Mach and Ostwald. The identical experiences stand in the relation of associational order to one another. They coagulate, however, with the help of the "mneme" into conceptual complexes. This "process of ordering" gives us the possibility of "bringing connexions into the totality of our experience" (Ostwald, *Grundriss der Naturphilosophie*, 1908 p. 94). We proceed only one step further. Even in the "theory of chain-reflexes" put forward by Jacques Loeb, upon which Richard Wahle (*Ueber den Mechanismus des geistigen Lebens*) (Vienna, 1906) has constructed his strict and methodically developed psychological monism, we see no sufficient justification for pronouncing a scientific anathema. The "chain-reflexes", as stored up memory-images condensed into complexes, will care

as little for the contradictions of the logicists, if they lose really that mist of hypothesis which surrounds them to-day, as the Copernican system did for Joshua's order "Sun, stay still at Gibeon." If Loeb's theories have proved their worth when tested in the fire of physiological criticism, then the logicists will have one day to compromise with them, much as the Church had at last to tolerate or rather accommodate itself to the Copernican doctrine. Our standpoint of evolutionary criticism is not at all affected by Loeb and Wahle. If we appropriate to ourselves their results, nay, if we must recognise Flechsig's thought-centres or association-centres, even then our intermediate position between Hume and Kant, between genetic and critical methods, will remain unaffected. We can genetically guide ourselves by "chain-reflexes" and "association-centres," and notwithstanding all this, remain *a priorists*, so far as the validity of our intuitively known logico-mathematical truths is concerned.

For the experiential knowledge which has condensed our race-memory into concepts or sensation-complexes, fits in only inadequately with reality, whilst our artistic, human "postulates" in geometry or arithmetic, by which we "posit" or "demand" points, lines, surfaces, quadrilaterals, circles, numbers and their proportions, give back the eternal order of nature, the logico-mathematical conformity of the world-whole to law, with unattainable precision. The logical and mathematical axioms are our posited things; they are analytical truths, purely intuitive knowledge. In our "positings," however, we are supreme and are not to be contradicted by any experience. Thus, even if the origin of all forms of knowledge is to be traced empirico-genetically, the *validity* of our axiomatically fixed logical and mathematical truths is over-empirical. Reality teaches us only the present, possibility gives us directions for explaining the past and reading the future; necessity, lastly, gives us strong, fixed measuring-

rods for the future which must occur. This necessity arises from ouselves; it is the timeless necessity of thought which takes its rise from the unity of the self. The "must" is removed from the sphere of belief and belongs to the undisputed domain of science, especially, natural science. The feeling of anticipation which attaches itself to a previously calculated solar eclipse is one of certainty. If the question at issue between Kant and Hume be still fought out, the question, namely, whether the limits of belief lie behind mathematics and logic or behind physics, chemistry and biology, there is still in one point at least full agreement between them, the point, namely, that mathematico-logical truths, the opposite of which is unthinkable, because it leads to a logical contradiction, must fall under the domain of knowledge, and thus can no longer be an object of belief. So far now as the world surrounding us is capable of being enumerated and measured, universal judgments or apodictic assertions about that which exists, as well as about that which appears necessarily, are formulated and to these categorical judgments, we give, so far as there is agreement among the recognised masters with regard to the value of this universal formula, the name of a law of nature, or, more correctly, we invest them with the dignity of a law of nature to which we attribute necessary and universal validity. The "feeling of evidence," on which in the last analysis the proper criterion of truth rests (the Stoic καταληπτικη φαντασια), appears only where the "feeling of refusal" is entirely out of the question.

Can, after all, a religious truth ever attain the grade of certainty of a scientific truth? The eternal truths of logic and mathematics have the great guarantee of the unthinkableness, the logical impossibility, of the opposite, and thus the guarantee of the "feeling of evidence." The physico-chemical principles give at least the great guarantee that in our experience so far no case has been observed which contradicts this or that physical or biological law. Moreover,

every experience contradicting the law annuls the validity of the law which is only a generalisation of experience. How different is religious truth, whether it is revealed or posited by the necessity of feeling !

Here the question is not, as one thinks, of knowledge, of apodictic principles, in short, of a *must*, but at best only of a *shall*. Religious truth, it is usually said, has not, like our natural knowledge, for its contents the existing world, the portion of the universe which can be represented by mass, weight and number, but the higher, purely human world of values and ends. In the world of existence or in nature man himself is included as a part of the indispensable causal chain and thus strictly determined, but in the world of values and ends, which he builds himself, man is no more the slave but the lord of nature, not its will-less machinery but its law-giver. So far as we men, therefore, belong to the kingdom of nature in our mechanism and chemism, in our bio-chemical processes and physiological actions, in which we, like other living beings, are subject to the unchangeable laws of life—no matter whence these laws arise and with what right they maintain themselves—science has the final word to say and not religion. The three testaments of monotheistic religions are therefore, seen in this light, as Spinoza has proved once for all in his "Theologico-political tract," no systems of knowledge but only sources of inspiration. How heaven and earth have arisen—this we have to learn not from religious books, but from astrophysical or geophysical works. And if the great religious records of the human race offered also cosmogonies which suited the scientific view of that age to which they belonged, then these legends of the origin of the earth which, moreover, generally belong to perfectly definite epic cycles, possess the value of an historical tradition for the past, but no directing or binding knowledge-value for the understanding of the present day. The monotheistic

religions surely refer to a criterion of religious truth, and indeed, to revelations, illuminations, inspirations, which have fallen to the lot of their founders in direct communion with God. He who rests upon, and confines himself to these crass anthropomorphic representations, which belong to an abandoned phase of religious evolution, belongs with his thinking and feeling to what is long past and not to the present. For this external revelation would break through the natural order, as science formulates it, in favour of a miracle, and would at the same time completely dissolve it. Truth, however, is "agreement of thought with experience (Raoul Richter)." Here, on the contrary, there is no experience. If religious certainty had no other criterion of truth than an uncontrollable act of revelation accepted blindly through faith, which act of revelation in divers ways fell to the lot of Moses, Jesus and Muhammad, then the enduring contents of truth of monotheistic religions, as well as of all the remaining faiths and cults, will suffer terribly. In this case the negative criticism of the Sophists and the Epicureans, the Renaissance-atheists and modern materialists would be right. For all these champions of the illusion theory of religious philosophy see always in every type of religion nothing "but an evidence of scientific fancy, a product of fear and hope, a political-purposive institution and establishment" (Tröltsch). This is the standpoint of the infamous book *De tribus impostoribus*. The father of the Church and the Scholastics have, moreover, in the doctrine of double truth sought the relation of knowledge and belief, of the *lumen naturale* and the *lumen supernaturale* in innumerable variations. Only, they maintained the superiority, the logical primacy, of the "supernatural" light (or revelation). Faith has for them a higher grade of certainty than the logico-mathematical knowledge with the help of the "natural light." Exquisitely has Raoul Richter remarked [*Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophie und seine*

Ueberwindung (Scepticism in philosophy and its refutation), Leipzig, Dürr, 1908 p. 509ff] that "faith" meant knowledge with the fathers of the Church and "did not represent a much lower grade of knowledge than reasoned knowledge." Whilst in every-day speech (with Locke and Hume) faith means something probable, and knowledge, on the contrary, something certain, faith is, with the Church teachers, "at least as certain as, if not more certain than, knowledge with regard to the contents of what is believed."... "The objects of faith are metaphysico-religious propositions and the way in which faith conceives them is either direct intuition, incapable of demonstration, not needing any proof, because lent by grace, that is, *inner revelation*, or it is the conviction of an external revelation contained in written documents and oral tradition."

If religious certainty holds fast in a combative spirit to the position that its contents of truth can only be revealed by the gracious act of revelation through intuition or only through an historical act of external revelation, which also lays claim to infallibility even when the scientific certainty of these days not only does not fit in with it but wholly contradicts it, then the great historical religions are irretrievably doomed. The religious crisis into which we have fallen since the days of the Renaissance would then be only a transitional stage and the prophet of atheism with his blaspheming prophecy would be right, according to whom there *was* once religion. It was fortunate for the historic religions that external revelation with its proud historical claim always fell into the background in order to make room for an inner revelation in human consciousness. In place of a revealed theology there has appeared, since the time of Hume, a psychology of religion. Religion has ceased to be a purely historical category which refers to an historical act, the supernatural revelation, and in which the adherents of monotheistic religions have as much blind faith, as the revilers of Church doctrines, the age of Enlightenment, especially, Voltaire, exhibit a fanatical unbelief.

Ever since the appearance of Hume's posthumous "Dialogues on natural religion" which have become classic, the deeper thinkers have arrived at the view that religion is a psychological necessity. Everything which only happens in history is limited in time and space, is in the eternal flux of becoming and has thus a relative and no absolute validity. For everything which has happened is completely subject to the process of becoming, change and transformation, to ups and downs, growth and decay. What can only show an historical and no psychological or logical justification has only a temporal and spatial, but no timeless, spaceless, *i.e.*, logical or eternal value. If, along with religious certainty, scientific truth is to exhibit an eternal value, it must raise itself, like the primitive type of all science, mathematics, from a temporal-spatial reality to a timeless and spaceless truth. The primitive doctrine of double truth which had its origin in Avicenna appears, from the days of Hume, in a wholly new light. The primitive type of this double truth is Parmenides's division of words into words of "truth" and words of "opinion," as well as the parallel division in Democritus into two types of knowledge. The *clare et distincte percipere* of Descartes and his school is only another form of that logical truth which Parmenides and Democritus had in view. The tendency towards unity which ran in the blood of all the Hylozoists receives in Xenophanes and the Jews a theological expression, and in Parmenides a logical one. This is exactly what happened during the Renaissance. Just because the unity of the organisation of the Catholic Church tended to break down on account of the Reformation, this unity has been transferred to the inside, since the time of Descartes: sum cogitans, logical unity, substance, vérité éternelle. There are logical truths which rest upon an impulse of thought and these manifest themselves in mathematics; there are, again, psychological truths which arise from an impulse of perception, and on these are based not only the descriptive or exact sciences but also the timeless

religious forms, the so-called religion of the understanding which in Hume finds its deeper psychological foundation in this, that the existence of the external world is, according to him, no more a matter of knowledge but simply of faith. Only the logico-mathematical truths give incontestable knowledge with a hundred per cent certainty, and this alone Hume calls unconditional knowledge. Hence his proud words, "Commit to the flames whatever contains neither mathematical inquiries nor observations of facts and reality." Mathematical aud logical axioms, analytical truths, have, therefore, the highest degree of certainty, the "feeling of evidence," the unthinkableness of the opposite or the absolute "feeling of expectation" of the future, because the validity of these axioms would be absolute, *i.e.*, timeless and spaceless, even if their origin was at first an empirical one, as, long before Holmholtz and Mill, the Renaissance philosopher Bernandino Telesio had maintained. For experience gives only *contents* to the concepts of objects, properties and circumstances, whereas the concepts of relation, like substantiality, causality, space, time, number, etc., represent only the pure *form* of thought. "The given" are still at most only things, properties and conditions but never their relations to one another which we rather place, with the help of our absolutely essential function of unity, in the midst of the plurality of phenomena. We introject our unity of self into every unity of thing. For every "object," every "thing" possesses already the "setting" of our unity through which the 'thing,' notwithstanding the plurality of its characteristics, appears as "a" thing. We feel already *our* unity in the "object," especially, in the relations of objects, properties and conditions to one another. Relation, however, is purely and exclusively a function of the unity of our self, and thus a pure form which we ourselves impress upon objects, properties and conditions. Consequently, Herbart could say, "We live in relations and require nothing further." So also

Herbert Spencer thought, "We think in relations." Since the prevalence of relational thought which began with Leibniz and Hume (see my *Sinn des Daseins* (Meaning of Existence), 1904, p. 122 ff), one has come to understand the true value of the intuitive knowledge of mathematico-logical axioms. If relations are only pure *forms* of thought, then our axiomatic "propositions" are not to be established by experience, still less to be shaken by new experience. In relational thought one abstracts from the "contents" which are derived from "experience" and only the form by which we connect these contents of experience appears. And thus, as Kant says, experience gives us the contents; the unity of the self, however, the "transcendental unity of apperception," supplies, with the help of pure relational thought (categories of substantiality and causality), the form of combination. So long, however, as our "positing" self "posits" points, lines, circles, triangles, "demands" portions of time, "constructs" numbers and their proportions, "sets up" a causal connexion between the contents of experience, it remains in its own sphere in which its right cannot bo disputed. In the logico-mathematical truths, the validity of which is over-empirical, the understanding has only to do with its own functions and operations (Principle of Identity, Principle of Contradiction and Principle of Excluded Middle, the "fourfold root" of the Principle of Sufficient Reason) and there it can project into the world its *hoc volo sic jubeo* without running the risk of being accused of telling a lie by the best sensuous experience. Goethe once said that the whole certainty of mathematics was nothing more than identity. As we have, to quote the words of Raoul Richter (*Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophie und seine Ueberwindung*, 1908, p. 506), an identically organised reason and identical experiences which rest upon an identical reality, it is no wonder that between our forms of thought and "reality" there steps in the parallelism maintained by Spinoza or the revived "occasionalism" of Lotze. In the same line lies Stumpf's

distinction between appearances and psychical functions. In a booklet issued by the Prussian Academy of Sciences in the year 1906 which bears the same title, Stumpf places himself on the side of those psychologists who believe in original "functions," "acts" or "conditions" of knowledge, which we bring into connexion with "pictures," "impressions," "experiences," "sensations," in short, "objects" or "things," such as are exhibited by our sense-apparatus in colours and tones. The "pictures themselves" which the senses give us, Stumpf calls "appearances"; the working out of these pictures with the help of the unifying function of consciousness, Stumpf calls "function." One should reflect here that Mach likewise resolves the causal concept into a functional one. As examples of such functions, Stumpf indicates observation, the act of comprehension, conceptual formation, the function of judgment, and lastly, affections and will-acts. Our functions are always naturally our property. With their help we "posit" or "create" "eternal truths."

By the side of these unquestionable sources of eternal, *i.e.*, timeless truths, as they appear in mathematics and logic, Hume knows a second, less reliable, but equally indispensable source of thought, namely, the impulse of perception resting upon the laws of association which we owe to the categories of substantiality and causality. Here we have no more the unerring certainty of logico-mathematical truths, the contradictory of which is inconceivable, but a second-grade certainty, the certainty, namely, that in human experience no case has ever been observed which contradicts this truth. Physical and chemical laws are valid, according to Hume, only provisionally and are subject to recantation by new experience: for practical life the certainty that up to the present day no contradictory case has been known, is fully sufficient. But what is interesting in Hume is that we obtain from him for the first time a psychology of religion. Thereby, religious certainty comes into the direct, extremely welcome,

neighbourhood of physics, chemistry and biology. No doubt the great types of religion offer no unimpeachable knowledge, as mathematics does, but they demand faith in the religious truths made known by them. On what does this demand rest? If we say with the believers in supernatural revelation that it rests upon an historical act of external revelation, then the requirement of the recognition of this alleged historical act has only a spatial-temporal validity. Nobody can compel us to believe in such an historical act. The compelling power of religious commands and prohibitions resting upon external revelation fails, therefore, for every one who refuses to believe in this pretended or presumed historical act. Things wear a different look if we see in timeless religion, as it develops itself along parallel lines in all historical nations, no arbitrary historical process but an inner spiritual impulse, a necessary product of universal human life. Then the *fable convenue* of the atheists and despisers of religion who smell in every religion either pure illusions or a king's lie or a priest's deceit, loses every logical right to exist. If one, that is, bases religions with Hume on psychological, instead of on historical categories, then the belief in the supernatural order of the world, in which that natural order of the world which science makes conceivable for us, represents only a link in the chain of phenomena, is psychologically as necessary as the belief in the existence of the external world or the belief in the validity of the physico-chemical laws of nature. If in all directions of civilisation, a common belief in a rational order of the world is formed, then religion in this higher sense is an inseparable characteristic of every civilised man. If one thus takes his stand with Hume upon a psychology of religion, and therefore sees in belief in the cosmic reason which grows with every advance of science and civilisation, in belief in the intelligence and plan of the world, in method and system in the universe, in the order and connexion of the

whole structure of Nature, a necessary product in the evolution of the human spirit itself, then religion becomes a fixed and indispensable portion of the cultivated human spirit, as Chamberlain and Count H. Keyserling have emphasised regarding the "primitive myths" common to all religions.

Religious truths are essentially distinguished from scientific by their greater subjectivity. Scientific truths, the logico-mathematical laws, the "mathematics of nature," as the Romanticists call them, have a trans-subjective value, although, as Kant believes, they are only subjective conditions. The laws of nature are examples of scientific truth which man has not made but only discovered. Before there were men in our planet, these laws had been going on unerringly with their work. It is otherwise with religious certainty; it has its value in man and for man. The laws of nature are earlier than the human race which, indeed, came into existence in accordance with these laws and had the direction of its evolution fixed by these. Religion, however, is a comparatively late product of human consciousness. For our semi-savage forefathers remained thousands of years without any religion, and even to-day things are in such a state that a considerable portion of the human race is always without religion in the higher sense. Religion and culture are rather as manifold and changeable, have as many forms and are as capable of evolution as families of languages or dialects. There are innumerable idioms, nay, if correctly seen, every cultured individual has his own personal language as he writes in his own style. As little as there are, according to a celebrated illustration which was first current among the Scholastics and later made popular by Euler, two leaves in the world which resemble each other in all respects, so little are there two cultured men who have exactly the same ideas with regard to God. To every one God manifests Himself in an individual way which is suited to his power of comprehension and his mental quality. And consequently,

religion is not only *a* private thing, as a political party dogmatically says, but *the* most private thing, the most holy thing of ourselves, the most intimately personal thing that we know of. Bouffon's word "Le style c'est l'homme" is doubly and trebly true in the variation: La religion c'est l'homme. As in language and style, so in the ordering of human relations with regard to the over-sensual or divine, the deepest essence of human personality finds the most remarkable expression.

Does this mean that religious truth, the inner manifestation, the God in the human breast, is individual in the sense that no general element of the religious total conviction is present? Manifestly not: For whether every cultivated man speaks his own personally tinged language or writes in his own characteristic style he has still to follow the rules of grammar, he has still to be subject to the phonetic and semasiologic laws, especially the laws of formal logic. What grammar is for a language, namely, a directing principle which sets limits to the arbitrariness of the individual, ceremonials and cults are for the individual religious confessions—the common bond, the connecting principle, the unity of the external cult in the manifoldness of individual shades of belief. Cult-prescriptions and ceremonials are, like manners and customs in sociology, as it were, the grammar of religious thought and they are related to religion, as speech is related to thought, as a sound-picture is related to a thought-picture. A cult-compulsion has only the meaning of a conventional rule, like greeting, shaking of hands or any other polite action sanctioned by silent agreement. It is an external command of decorum, manners, usage, family traditions, but not at all any inner necessity, like the religious conviction of an all-powerful rational principle in nature and history. There are many languages, but only one logic for all men, nay, even for animals (animal logic), because we have all an identically organised cerebral system with identical

experiences. The same concept (for instance, house) has many phonetic symbols; it has a different name in every language. The axioms, on the other hand, are logical eternal truths resting upon the principle of identity, because they have a timeless and spaceless validity. Their opposite is unthinkable.

In the logico-mathematical truths there is no room for the play of individuality as in languages, forms of law, moral prescriptions, Church doctrines. A Euclidean axiom is not a bit more true for a mathematician than for a layman in mathematics. Such an impersonal truth which is true for every thinking being without any exception, which leaves no room for any change or evolution, lastly, which neither requires for its justification any experience nor can be replaced or invalidated by any conceivable experience, we call objective, that is, trans-subjective truth which is bound to no condition, no time, no people, and lastly, to no individual. With the senses we conceive reality, with the understanding, probability, with intuition, truth; the former offer sensuous, the latter logical certainty. The senses show us only the present; the comparing, differentiating, connecting understanding teaches us, on the one hand, to know and understand the past, on the other hand, to guess the future, or even, as in the case of astronomical predictions, to foretell with infallible certainty. In its highest faculty, reason, the *ratio intuitiva*, which does not construct the whole out of its parts but posits or requires it as the indispensable logical postulate, so that the whole precedes its parts—in this intuitive knowledge alone there is an *everywhere* and *always*, something necessary and universal. Here we first meet with an "eternal truth."

Is there now a timeless religion, as there is a timeless science? Can religious truth attain that grade of over-personal and therefore trans-subjective reality which mathematics has brought into perfection for space, time and number in that part of its work which is called "mathematics of nature."

Can religious certainty which rests upon an impulse of intuition be brought in the neighbourhood of logico-mathematical certainty which owes its legitimacy to an inevitable impulse of thought? And here again the relation of speech to thought gives us much guidance. Even speech is not pure arbitrariness, but is, as we know, subject to the rules of grammar and also to fundamental phonetic laws. But grammatically correct language has only the character of a conventional rule, but no legislative power. There are many men who speak ungrammatically without ceasing to be men, as there are many believers in a faith who do not follow the prescribed ceremonial and yet do not cease to be reckoned among the followers of the faith in question. Ceremonials, like all conventional rules, are only questions of etiquette of the confession. Not so in logic. Here the individual will is very soon eliminated. A small error of thought is perhaps more easily pardoned in daily intercourse than a syntactical blunder. But he who constantly commits errors of thought, whose thinking faculty does not act logically, is excluded from our midst as mentally deranged. As we punish crimes against life and property with imprisonment and jail, so we punish a corresponding offence against logic with a lunatic asylum. He who speaks ungrammatically has his name struck out of the list of educated men; he, however, who talks at random, that is, loses his logical function, is violently removed from the society of healthy men. Now the psychological truth which genetically goes back to the impulse of intuition and the impulse of association has grown naturally (φυ'σις), the logical truth, on the other hand, is a human "proposition" (θε'σις). The psychologists explain to us the *genesis*, the criticists or logicists, the *validity* of our logical general concepts. Only in our estimate, as opposed to that of ancient times, the θε'σις stands higher than the φυ'σις.

How, however, have all men as well as the higher animal world without any mutual agreement, come to that logic, the

laws of which claim a timeless, *i.e.*, impersonal validity? The answer of the idealists of the type of Hegel or Cohen runs thus: The logical truths are for this reason common to all men and beasts, that they represent timeless ideas of the world-reason, and thus precede the creation of the world, so that our permanent world is built and constructed according to that plan which was preconceived in these ideas or eternal truths. The ideas of God precede nature, nay, nature and its laws are nothing else than self-realisations or forms of manifestation of the Divine Idea. Whether one calls them ideas with Plato or eternal truths with Leibniz, or, lastly, logos with Hegel, it is the same: they are timeless, ante-mundane, sufficient grounds for the origin of nature, according to eternal laws. Then one also understands why there is only one logic but several languages, in the last analysis, only one religion, though several confessions. It is—so Hegel would speak somewhat in the terminology of our age—the same Divine spirit or the same ante-mundane Idea which in the form of the laws of nature or the "mathematics of nature" has become associated with matter, which has expressed itself in a higher stage of evolution of nature, in the transition from dead matter to living organism, in the germ plasm, in the living cell, in the animal cerebral system, and above all, in the central nervous system of the human race.

The previous stages of the religious conception, like animism and fetishism, the all-soul-theory and nature-worship, all flow in maturer forms of thought and feeling into a more or less clearly conceived monotheism, because this appears the most acceptable theory to meet the need of human nature for unity; the more so, as it serves the principle of the economy of force which rules nature. The one God takes upon himself, as I have elsewhere said, all the functions of the previous innumerable gods or natural forces, fetishes and spirits. A single concept does duty for all, for which the worshippers of fetishism have brought into requisition millions

of beings and, Greek polytheism even a great multitude of symbolised natural forces. A single principle is conceived now as the sufficient ground of all order in nature and spirit, as the source of all regularity of causal connexions in inorganic nature and all purposiveness in the forms of revelation of history. Family gods and tribal gods which had a spatial and temporal character are gradually absorbed by that God who with the help of the economy of force brings into the clearest (because unrivalled) expression the process of manifestation of unity. The historical fact that our West-European-American culture system has accepted this belief in God may always be a support for the validity of this belief, but this *consensus gentium* is not yet a strict proof of its logical admissibility. For the agreement even among the advanced nations of ancient times with regard to superstition was no less great than the agreement to-day in regard to belief in a rational world-government. The commonsense theory which measures the reliability of a criterion of truth by the number of people who believe in it, has suffered a logical shipwreck. If the belief in God had no deeper logical basis than the agreement of those who are capable of thinking and have mature thoughts, it would always be assailable.

Is it then possible to ascribe to religious certainty, notwithstanding its subjective origin, that timeless logical value which belongs to mathematical principles? Can God really be demonstrated *more geometrico*, as Spinoza once tried? Is the existence of God an arbitrary article of faith which one can accept but can also refuse to accept, as one can believe or refuse to believe in a story, or is the existence of God to be proved as a logical necessity, the opposite of which is unthinkable? Is the requirement which must be fulfilled by all thinking men, of seeking the ground of all order of the world in a single ordering principle, only an historical necessity or a pure necessity of feeling, or is this requirement an

BCU 2235

indispensable necessity of thought? This is the problem of the philosophy of religion in these days, so far as to-day the philosophy of religion has the problem of knowledge for its province.

Every claim to exclusiveness, selectness, uniqueness and incomparableness made by the individual positive religions must, so far as the comparative-historical view is concerned, either wholly fall to the ground or be reduced to a substitute thinned down to a weak symbol. World-empires which seemed to be eternally fixed have fallen to pieces. Peoples and nations who once dictated their imperial will to the whole known world and trampled under foot the subjugated nations, have disappeared. World-languages which once prevailed among the inhabitants of the whole of the basin of the Mediterranean Sea have lost their vitality and lead to-day only a languid mummified existence in grammars, encyclopaedias and lexicons. And in the presence of these languages and manners which have fallen into this huge necropolis, of extinct doctrines and faiths, institutions and traditions, in the presence of these ruins of buried hopes and shattered illusions, will science have the courage, in dogma-cramped self-certainty, to hurl at men an imperial-apodictic "So it is" or even a despotic-categorical "So must it be?"

Proudly may science point to the results achieved by it. It has made an inventory and catalogue of the nature accessible to us, as well as to the planetary system; it has widened and enriched, day after day, the range of knowledge with the untiring patience of the investigator; it has snatched from the sphinx one mystery after another with the help of a sensitive apparatus, with wonderfully perfected instruments and methods of work. The unknowable, which, according to Spencer and Kant, lies behind all manifestations of the world which is accessible to our senses, is forced by the constant researches of our greatest thinkers to reveal always

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new sides of its essence which were hidden from our forefathers by the veil of Mâyâ. The great world-secret is forced to yield through unceasing struggle one mystery after another. Out of the twilight of present times and visions, which satisfies augurs and prophets, out of that "primitive mythos" which has charmed our neo-romanticists, mystery is rescued and is placed in the clear daylight of experiment, and in place of prophecies, there appear mathematical formulae. As once the prophets proclaimed the will of the only God, so the priests of science prophesy to us what lies in the womb of futurity. Not priests but scientists awaken in us to-day "anticipations of the future." They announce to us, on the strength of astrophysical calculations, the solar and lunar eclipses; they formulate for us the laws of nature which, according to Ernst Mach, mean nothing else than "the limits which we set to our expectation under the guidance of experience." As prophecies in the religious, so the laws of nature in the scientific domain are only the expression of the feeling of anticipation of the future. He who believes in the word of the prophet has, in his expectations, faith in the prophecy, and he who believes in the law of nature is convinced that God manifests His eternal will through this law. Every new insight into the wonderful movement and structure of nature, every new glimpse into the strictly organised and causally connected evolution of natural phenomena and historical connexions, confirms the men of science in the view that the universe is no blind arbitrary play of the atoms or corpuscles floating accidentally in the world-space, but that rather, there must be a plan and meaning, method and system, order and connexion, in the structure of this world-machine, as Newton calls it, or this world-organism, as Schelling conceives it.

With the just pride of science in what it has already achieved, there is combined great modesty with regard to what is to be attained or perhaps is never to be attained. The bold dream of the unhistorically thinking eighteenth century

which opposed to the stiff dogma of the Church an equally stiff rationalistic dogma of reason, must be abandoned by the historically guided nineteenth century. What the Encyclopaedists and free thinkers once thought and publicly announced, namely, that they had succeeded in revealing the "system of nature," in reducing all the riddles of existence to mathematics, physics and chemistry, in resolving everything organic, everything living, nay, even, the historico-social life, into a pure mechanics of atoms—in short, all the materialistico-naturalistic clinking of cymbals and phraseological childish clattering—has revealed itself, with regard to historical and sociological inquiries of the nineteenth century, as a fantastic "dream of a ghost-seer." Materialism as a world-view is dead and gone, and the rational necrology which Friedrich Albert Lange has dedicated to it, describes to us the history of the dialectical tragedy. In the twentieth century science has no longer that bold, rash spirit born of success, that naïve extreme foolhardiness which the pre-Kantian Enlightenment exhibited, which blindly passed by the problems of history. The nineteenth century which has, above all, placed two provinces of science, namely, history and biology (especially, biochemistry), in the centre of human inquiry has taught modesty to the historically and biologically trained mankind.

We can feel to-day after a hundred years what our great men, Kant and Fichte, Schelling and Hegel announced so clearly, that Science is not the last word but even in the most favourable case, the last word but one. Whilst our thirst for knowledge is unquenchable, we create sea water, the saline contents of which not only do not quench our thirst but quicken it anew. It seemed that science ought to succeed in seeking the unseekable, fathoming the unfathomable, exhausting the inexhaustible. In the end, it is still the old vessel of the Danaïdes. "Au dessus de dieu il y a le divin," cries Ernst Renan. The sum world does not go without a remainder in physics and chemistry. A residue remains,

something whose origin cannot be found, something inexplicable, which the romanticists in mystical excess of feeling, try to comprehend through intuitive vision. We reject this dialectical somersault, although we are capable of comprehending the psychological motives of the romanticists, as we believe we have already shown, in order that we may escape the danger of losing through soft-heartedness, or wholly abandoning, positions which the human understanding, in its struggle with the crushing authority of the Church in Humanism, Renaissance and Reformation, has with great pains acquired. Of the triumphs of the intellect over the down-trodden mediaeval view of the world we cannot abandon a single one in favour of romantic sentimentalism. With regard to the undeniable fact that scientific theories and systems change from day to day, succeed and supplant, complete and perfect, one another, honesty demands that we reject the thought of an only holy science as an intellectual hybrid, as science itself has mercilessly opposed the claims of an only holy Church or nationality. Beyond the world of facts which science demonstrates to us and the range of which it extends everyday, lies the powerful untrodden kingdom: behind the real there is the true world. I do not say, with Du Bois-Reymond, the world of *ignorabimus* but, with Virchow, the world of *ignoramus*, and therefore not with Spencer, the unknowable. We conceive the unexplored country of the super-sensual reality, not as unknowable but as unknown, as unattainable with the methods of inquiry that have up to now prevailed, and thereby we believe the advancing human spirit to be capable of, especially, we ascribe to its metaphysical need the capacity of, gradually deciphering the unknown with the help of our methods of inquiry. Of this unknown itself, however, there is no knowledge, but only a belief in its existence. The belief in a rational world-ground of which our own human reason is only an emanation, is called religion. This religion branches off into different confessions, is rendered sensible with the help of symbols and made

perceptible by means of rites. Confessions, as we know already, are related to religion in our sense, as the different languages are related to logic.

Science in the strict sense, as our greatest teachers and inquirers teach us, is only present where mathematics is applicable. Beyond the relatively narrow province of logico-mathematical truths lies the kingdom of the pure sciences of experience (Hume's matter of fact). Here faith begins. Whilst Kant placed the physico-chemical laws in the strict region of the knowable, and thus, in that of the necessary and universal, the so-called sceptic Hume denies the strict character, as law, of physics and chemistry which are constructed out of experience and out of the causal law derived from experience. Here occurs a strange *qui pro quo*. The critical destroyer of scepticism, Kant, has examined the limits of knowledge more extensively and thoroughly than his epistemological opponent Hume. According to Hume, the province of belief is just behind mathematics, so that physics and chemistry, nay, the whole existence of the external world, are no longer matters of knowledge, like the analytical propositions of mathematics, but only matters of belief, based upon practice and custom. Physical laws of nature are, consequently, as Mach conceives them, only well-grounded feelings of anticipation of the future. To our master Kant, however, all *a priori* laws of thought (categories) are as knowable as the mathematico-logical propositions. Physics and chemistry are as strict sciences, possessing an inviolable legal character, as mathematics. The existing world, nature, is enclosed in the perceptual forms of space, time (and also number, according to Zeller) and in the conceptual forms (categories), especially, in those of causality, and because in the existing world everything is causally linked and bound, we can, with the help of our thought-form of causality, derive mechanico-causally the whole nature-process and make it completely conceivable. The existence of an external world, the reality of the thing-in-itself,

is thus not a matter of pure belief, as it is with Hume, but a matter of knowledge. For substantiality is for Kant precisely such a thought-form as causality. With the same logical (conceptual) necessity and universality, therefore, which obliges the scientist to trace the origin of the connexions in the phenomena of nature, according to the axiom *causa aequat effectum*, the scientist must also know the existence (reality, existentiality, substantiality) of things and that as strict contents of knowledge and not as a pure postulate of belief. Belief begins with Kant rather where being ceases for him, namely, in practical reason, in the world of *shall*, of actions. The world of being and happening, which is subject to the causal principle, we know as the province of knowledge, the limits of which have been examined in the Critique of Pure Reason. The world of action and duty, however, the problems of which have been investigated in the Critique of Practical Reason, is the kingdom of faith. And Kant was fully aware of the primacy of practical over theoretical reason, as he, according to his own statement, set limits to knowledge, in order to make room for faith.

In my work *Anfänge der menschlichen Kultur* (Beginnings of human culture) (Leipzig, Teubner, 1906), I have examined the origin and the civilising power of religion. There I have shown in the appearance of the feeling of shame the transition from the visible world of the senses to invisible forces, as religions teach us. With the acceptance of an invisible world man steps into the kingdom of the highest abstraction. The numerical relations and propositions of space, in which the highest form of scientific exactness and reliability manifests itself, are invisible, exactly as the invisible gods or the imaginary supersensual *Beyond*. But belief in invisible powers which prophets, augurs and priests give us, awakens and sharpens in us the belief in that invisible and yet undoubted regularity of measure and number which geometers and astronomers, physicists and chemists try to teach us. The

belief in religious transcendence was perhaps the model which awakened and strengthened the belief in scientific transcendence, in mathematical functions and astro-physical formulæ The religious creed was formerly, and is even now, the precursor of the scientific. That we have learnt to walk with the help of the crutches of religious mythology intellectually and morally, even he who no longer has any need of it, cannot overlook. In this direction Chamberlain's book on Kant has worked in a clear and illuminating manner.

Belief and knowledge are arch-enemies only in their caricatures. Their conflict reminds one, as Spencer once said, of two knights who fight for the colour of the shield without noticing that each sees only one side of the shield. The extreme of belief is fanaticism, that of unbelief, atheism. *Peccatur intra muros et extra.* Apostles of unbelief are no less offensive than apostles of funeral pyres or inquisitions. He who probes deeply into the sociological relation of belief and knowledge soon notices that belief is the path-clearer of knowledge. Religious conceptions of the world precede everywhere in time the scientific and philosophical. And even in the peaks of thought, in Hume and Kant, in Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, faith and knowledge are complementary halves. Their fight is the fight between two brothers. In the beginning faith cleared the path for knowledge. Knowledge became, thanks to the previous work of faith, stronger and stronger, and it acquired and made serviceable one province after another. In this way, the province of faith became narrower, still at the periphery of knowledge the boundary-posts of faith remain. We may extend the kingdom of knowledge as far as possible. We may try to enter the firm land of the demonstrable world of facts and reach the most distant thinkable ends of the knowable. On the thin edge of the knowable the waves of belief will always break upon us. Knowledge is our firm ground, faith the world-ocean encircling this intellectual continent. Slime and sea-weed of superstition, like the

chalk-formations of the geologists, have been deposited on the shores of knowledge and the extent of the firm land is daily increasing. But the greater the territory of knowledge becomes, the more clearly do we perceive how contemptible is the kingdom of the knowable and how boundless, how infinite the world-ocean of faith is and will always remain. The more we know, the more we become modest: a solved riddle will seem to leave behind it thousands of new, unsolved riddles which we could not even guess before. Thus, the most recent physical discoveries, the Röntgen and Becquerel rays, helium and radium, the theory of ions and electrons have revealed new secrets to the astonished eye, but as a consequence, old theories which seemed from eternity to stand like granite rocks have been seriously shaken.

Hume was right against Kant with regard to the great crisis which our physics has still to get over. Even physical laws are anticipations of the future; they have a provisional value and are true so long as they are not contradicted. So long as our experiences fit completely and easily with the asserted laws which represent their generalisation, the generalisation is logically correct and the expectation attached to it, namely, that the future process will resemble the past, is well-founded. If, however, there appears a single experience which, like the discovery of radium, cannot in any way be brought under the prevailing theories, the fact remains undisputed and the theory or law must fall. Only mathematical truths which, according to Hume, are of an analytical nature, so that understanding always remains in its own domain, are unconcerned about new experiences. No experience is thinkable which can shake a Euclidean axiom or question the correctness of the equation $2 \times 2 = 4$. Of every fact of experience, however, the opposite is generally possible. Consequently, mathematics with its fixed line limits for Hume all knowledge, whereas, according to Kant, the whole of natural science is included in the realm of the exactly knowable and the

province of faith is only then trodden when one reaches the final principles through the inner contradictions of thought (antinomies).

Still the two opposite champions of the criticism of knowledge, Kant and Hume, agree at least in this, that all our knowledge is limited to the existing world, to nature manifesting itself in space, time and number. Along with this existence of things, there is for us men, however, a second, a higher, an incomparably more important world, namely, the world of action or deed. Whether the ultimate elements of the universe are called atoms, corpuscles or energies can be of little moment to us, as our personal good and evil are not at all affected by a conclusive answer to this question. We are, however, to the last fibre of our life interested in the question: How shall we act? What shall we do? What is the meaning of the world and how can we adapt our actions to it? Here, for every one, *tua res agitur*. Is there now such a strict, mathematically exact knowledge of human actions, as there is of natural occurrences? Is Comte's formula *voir pour prévoir* true of human action, as it is of the existence of nature? Can human fate or even the destiny of nations be predicted with such astronomical accuracy as solar and lunar eclipses?

The ethical naturalists answer with a loud "yes." The laws of pressure and collision, the mechanical causality, are as true of being as of acting. For action is a kind or moment of being. (It is just the reverse with the dynamists, especially, with Fichte.) The mechanics of atoms constitutes the outer cosmos, the mechanics of representations rules the inner cosmos, the human consciousness or faculty of knowledge; the mechanics of motives or will-acts, lastly, regulates the social cosmos, the State. The laws of mechanics are thus at the same time psychological and sociological laws. Pressure and collision alone rule the world, the spiritual as well as the social. This is the ethical standpoint of materialism (Hobbes), of naturalism (Spinoza, Spencer), of atheism (Holbach's "Système de la nature").

With it arises naturally, strict determinism, nay, stiff fatalism, as it expresses itself in the Church doctrine of predestination, in the symbol of the fall of Man, in Romish fate, in Muhammadan *kismet*, in the Calvinistic denial of all human freedom. In individual tendencies this fatalism appears in Schopenhauer's doctrine of the unchangeable intelligible character, in his formula *Operari sequitur es-e*, taken from the Scholastics. Still more coarse is this naturalistic formula in Machiavelli, Buckle and Taine, the radical representatives of the theory of "milieu." Consequently, "race," "the world around us" and "faculté maîtresse" form and mould the whole man, nay, whole nations. Out of these three components proceed human actions as parts of the total nature with absolute necessity "as vitriol and sugar are absolutely subject to the chemical laws constituting them."

Here, however, the great thinkers of all ages have pronounced an emphatic 'no.' The actions of men, they say, are not amenable to mathematical treatment and thus mathematics and mechanics are inapplicable to ethics. Numbers, measures and weights have value only for being and not for doing, only for physico-chemical occurrences and not for the moral *ought*. Science explains to us only what we are and what we must accomplish according to the laws of nature; it explains to us our mechanism, chemism, our anatomico-histological structure and our biological functions. In the domain of action, however, Science which has only to do with causal explanations, is *au bout de son latin*. How we should shape our lives, what meaning we should give to our existence, what end we ought to strive after, what ideal we ought to realise in our lives, what problems of life we ought to set before ourselves—in these weightiest and most important questions of life—Science fails completely. However sufficient Science may be for an explanation of being or happening, it shows itself absolutely inadequate, when we come to the incomparably more important questions

of the significance of the world and the end of personality. In human consciousness there are imponderables which refuse to lend themselves to any mechanical causality. The sum 'I' does not go without a reminder in a bundle of ganglions or a complex of sensations. There remains an unsolved or perhaps insoluble residue in this 'I,' in the spiritual personality which does not passively stand in the world as Daguerre's plate in the *camera obscura*. The 'I' is spontaneous, creative, self-forming. The 'I' has its own causality; it opens out of itself a whole series of events. In moments of inspiration or intuition, such as poets and thinkers have in their fortunate creative hours, man ceases to be a passive medium of the world; he rather raises himself to the rank of a *causa sui*, to Divine self-activity, to creative energy, to freedom. Nature is the kingdom of necessity, in which mechanical causality continues unabated; the human spirit, however, as it reveals itself, especially, in historical life, does not belong to the mechanical causality of action and reaction, of cause and effect, but to the teleological causality of motive and action, of end and means. In nature everything is unconditionally necessary; in history, on the other hand, everything is only conditionally necessary. What must appear unconditionally I need not *believe*: I shall certainly *experience* it. But in fate, in the destiny of the individual man or whole nations, one can only *believe*. Our historical prophecies have at most the value which calculations of probability have and never the grade of certainty of predictions in the province of astrophysics. In historical life, therefore, in the forms of manifestation of the objective spirit (Hegel), such as, for example, morals and laws, speech and technique, religion and ethics, art and science, social organisation and State institutions, there holds good not a mechanical but only a teleological causality. As history is made by men who possess a spiritual life and consciousness and freedom from causality (autonomy), so it is no mere continuation of nature, as Herder or

Spencer will have it, but a world in-and-for-itself, in which not laws but certain tendencies rule. Laws can be formulated with perfect accuracy: tendencies, however, are capable of having several meanings. Here limits are set to our knowledge. The "mathematics of nature" we *know*; "in the logic of history" we *believe*. The assertions of mathematicians have an apodictic, those of the investigators of nature an assertory, and those of the sociologists and philosophers of history only an hypothetical, character.

CHAPTER XII

THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM

To the two spiritual halves of our being, feeling and will on the one hand, and understanding on the other, there correspond those two great justifications of religious certainty in the domain of the philosophy of religion which appear as irrationalism in Schleiermacher and Feuerbach and as rationalism in Descartes and Hegel. The spiritual roots of the belief in God lie, according to Feuerbach and Schleiermacher, in the mind, in feeling, and finally, in the will. Schleiermacher sees in religion an emotional comprehension of our connexion with the universe, the feeling of our dependence upon the universal order of things. The specifically religious formation of ideas, like the religious *a priori*, is, according to Schleiermacher, no rational necessity, but a necessity of feeling, the feeling, namely, of the union of the finite and the infinite. As now, however, all feeling or temperament is a purely human property with which we never endow the remaining living beings, or even dead things, every religious experience is a purely subjective phenomenon of the human race.

In this irrationalistic fundamental conception of religious certainty, according to which the psychological source as well as the sufficient logical ground of the belief in God is to be sought in the human feeling of dependence upon powers standing above us, Feuerbach is at one with Schleiermacher. The primitive phenomenon of all religion is for Feuerbach, as for Schleiermacher, wonder. Only, Feuerbach goes deeper than Schleiermacher. In the sense of Schiller's words, "In his gods man portrays himself" to which the Eleatic

Xenophanes gave the first, somewhat clumsy form. Feuerbach follows up the primitive religious phenomenon to its finest spiritual ramifications. Man, says Feuerbach, can conceive out of himself nature, and finally, God. Every world-view is loaded with an anthropomorphic tendency. Only phenomena and tendencies which we men observe in our own selves, only feelings and temperaments which belong to the very nature of man, can we lend to external things by a kind of self-duplication. The Protagorean saying, "Man is the measure of all things" receives in Feuerbach the deeper meaning that we by virtue of our human original nature must necessarily ascribe to all external things which affect our senses such characteristics as we have observed in our own interior. Consequently, every well-conceived world-view is an absolute human duplication, a projection of human properties into the outer world. Francis Bacon looks upon this tendency towards anthropomorphism which is fixed in human nature, as an "idola tribus," the removal of which he demands energetically but in vain. To animate nature, as the fetishistic religions have done, is nothing else than rendering it human. Human imagination creates such a kind of double kingdom as led Aristotle once to object against Plato that the Ideas of the latter are nothing but duplications, that is, that the real world is thought again in the forms of the Ideas. Only, this duplication is in Feuerbach no arbitrary work of imagination, "born of fear and hope, pushed by the irrelinquishable human impulse towards happiness," but a process lying unconscious in the deepest spiritual grounds which he once called "the instinct of religion." If we conceive Feuerbach's concept of God with the help of the most concise formula, then God is for him nothing but the human impulse towards happiness realised in imagination, and consequently, a pure embodiment of what one desires. God is for him a "man born of the religious instinct and transformed into a real being." God is the personification of what is longed for,

the ideal projected into the endless. Or, as the mystic Sebastian Franck in cheerful agreement with Feuerbach says, "God is an inexpressible sigh fixed in the soil of the soul." This explains the several types of pantheism. The æsthetic pantheism of the hylozoists is primitive macrocosmism, that is, a transference of the human race-properties to God; mystico-religious pantheism is the projection of longings and desires into God. Logico-mathematical pantheism, finally, is the ascription of human 'ratio' to the essence of God.

The rationalists maintain with Hegel and Spinoza that God is no pure embodiment of our desires, no fantastic illusion, no product of a pure feeling of dependence, no creation of an uncontrollable religious instinct, in short, that God is no pure necessity of feeling, but an indispensable necessity of thought. God is no product of a psychologico-subjective factor in human consciousness, but according to Hegel, the result of an indispensable logico-subjective process realising itself in history. If religion be only a matter of feeling—as Hegel once objected against Schleiermacher—it fades away gradually into the representationless and actionless, and loses all determinate contents. If feeling, and thus subjective temperament were the source, and consequently, the justification of religious truth, then it could not be understood why people found it necessary to give to the belief in God a higher degree of logical value than to the magic of fetishism. Out of the necessity of feeling a necessity of being can never arise; one must then accept the principle of the philosopher of feeling whose doctrine can be pressed into the form: In the beginning there was feeling, or as Frohschammer, the philosopher of the world-fantasy, has done, into the form: In the beginning there was imagination.

I myself take my stand upon the proposition—In the beginning there was spirit. Not temperament or whim, not feeling or arbitrary will lies at the root of the world-process, but Divine world-intelligence, the logos, is the prime

ground of all things. That out of reason as world-rule and world-law sometimes not-reason—called chance—can arise as an exception, as the problem of Theodicy tells us a thousand times, can be understood, but we cannot conceive how out of the original not-reason, whether it be the unconscious of Hartmann or the blind-will of Schopenhauer, harmony and beauty, rhythm and consonance, order and regularity in the universe can arise. Reason as the rule and not-reason as the exception we can understand, but the reverse we cannot comprehend. For what are the laws of nature but the logical principles of nature which are visible in the apparently blind mechanism? Otherwise expressed, as much regularity is found in nature as there is spirit, world-reason in it. What the romanticists called "mathematics of nature," that is, over-spatial and ante-temporal regularity of the world-whole, is in the last analysis only the logic of nature. It is certain that we carry our forms of thought into the interpretation of nature; but the identically organised reason which only knows a logic would not have these thought-forms if they had not already proceeded from nature which preceded the advent of man in point of time, nay, with the help of the laws of which the advent of man became possible and was brought about. The process of nature takes place according to strict mathematical principles—*more geometrico*, as Spinoza would say. Mathematics itself, however, is nothing else than logic applied to space, time and number. It abstracts from all contents of thought; it has therefore only to do with the forms or conditions of thought. Every mathematical operation can, when closely examined, be traced to a logical process.

What is important now is to create a logical basis for the existence of God in the face of the objections of Kant. The historical basis, the reference to external manifestation, or the argument from the agreement of men of all climes and times who are capable of thinking, on the question of the meaning

and plan of the universe, may be a welcome ornament -- to me, it is even a valuable pillar in the monument of monistic world-views—but the structure stands on loose soil so long as it does not rest upon the solid logical ground which is the source of the certainty of mathematics and all exact sciences built upon it. The tracing of the origin of religious certainty to the emotional element, such as, the feeling of dependence in Schleiermacher and Feuerbach's personified and outwards projected (and in this way, doubled) desire and longing, and lastly, to the requirements of the blind will of Schopenhauer, raised to the level of intellect—all this leads to error. Out of feeling-values and judgments of taste which oppose all universalisation, and further, out of subjective religious instincts, no necessities of thought can be derived logically, and consequently, justified. He who proves his God through vague feeling and not because he conceives Him clearly and can demonstrate Him to be a strict requirement of logic, to be an indispensable necessity of thought, cannot say anything to his neighbour when he says, " What you feel is a matter for you and not for me. Your feelings change in yourself. To-morrow, nay, the next hour, you will feel something quite the reverse. How will you lead me to believe in God or compel me to accept Him when you only feel God and thus only guess Him vaguely and that, too, in a way which is inaccessible to experimental investigation, when you cannot even guarantee to yourself that you will not feel to-morrow or even during the next hour wholly differently from, if not in a way just the reverse of, this?" Feelings are not, like ideas, general-subjective, that is, equally illuminating to all men in all ages, as are the logico-mathematical truths, concerning which there cannot be two views; but feelings are individual-subjective ; they have value only for the man and for the moment; they are highly personal, like language. For feeling the Protagorean word does not hold good in the general form, *Man is the*

measure of all things, but in the social form, *The man is the measure of all things*. To base the thought-necessity of God on the feeling-necessity of dependence on desire or hope, is to substantialise whim or arbitrariness, to raise temperament, the thing which exists only once, the irrepeatable, the casual, the momentary, in short, caprice, to the rank of a world-principle.

We reject therefore the theory of faith as the *only* source of the concept of God in the Schleiermacherian-Feuerbachian sense and try rather a logical basis in place of an historical or psychological ground. We will give the thought of God the same criterion of truth and certainty as that on which the mathematico-exact sciences would base their title to certainty and absolute credibility. We will show that exactly analogous motives led the people of ancient times through different languages to an identically organised reason, with its rules of logic which are valid for all thinking beings, including the higher animals, which embrace all highly organised beings, and that they later brought civilised men gradually to an indispensable conception of God above all confessional divisions and ritualistic manifoldness, through the education of the human race which took place in the course of history. The existence of God should be conceived as a logical and not as a purely psychological or historical truth, that is, not as a sensible reality. In this we distinguish with Helmholtz between reality which the senses show us, and truth which the understanding only teaches us. God is no reality which we can perceive through the senses. All human characteristics which we project into the conception of God, such as, personality, love, goodness, understanding, affections, are coarse anthropomorphisms. A God whom we could see would no more be a God. God we can rather either feel with Schleiermacher or conceive with Hegel through the understanding. Philosophy teaches precisely the same God in the form of the higher concept which the undeveloped religions

symbolically bring into consciousness in the form of sensuous representation. If one thus makes God speak, act, think, be angry, punish, suffer, reward, these are all conceptual accommodations to the usages of language and to the imagination of children, as it exhibits itself in the awakening logical consciousness. God is not real, in the sense of being perceptible and comprehensible, but true in the sense of logical conceivability. The idea of God is not created out of experience, although it has ripened gradually in the course of everyday experience, but it is an intuitive knowledge, like the logical axiom of the principle of ideality, and it goes beyond all sensuous experience, as the eternal truths of mathematics do as applied logic. For all sensuous experience which reveals reality to us is valid only for a *now* and *here*, but is never true always and everywhere. Sensuous experience, however, is not the true criterion of certainty. Moreover, we know that colours, tones and smells do not at all exist in the outer world but only represent modes of reaction of our own selves. Besides, every reality observed by the senses has value only for the observer at the moment of observation and thus only for the momentary present. Knowledge, however, is not isolated momentary consciousness but an insight into lasting connexions. Perfectly unifying knowledge, especially, such as philosophy, according to Comte, Spencer and Wundt, has to offer, does not consist in isolated pressure-atoms, in casual experiential reality, but in lasting connexions or eternal relations. Sensuous experience has value, therefore, at most for the immediate present with its contents of experience, and only in a weak degree, for the past. Where the question, however, is of future events, of prediction, where, especially, the ideal of all scientific philosophy, to which Comte has given the form *savoir pour prevoir*, is in question, sensuous experience deserts us. If God had only the certainty of a sensuous experience, then his existence would have been an extremely doubtful matter. For sensuous experience

brings us a thousand times sense-deceptions, chimeras, fantasies, hallucinations and illusions which do not stand the strict test of the logically trained understanding. Thomas Campanella distinguishes very well between the *codex vivus* and the *codex scriptus*. For him nature and revelation stand opposed to each other, whereas we understand by *codex vivus* the course of nature, as the physicists disclose it through experience, and by *codex scriptus* we conceive those logico-mathematical or "eternal truths" which we do not construct slowly and partially, but "place" or "advance" with the necessity of thought above all experience as "eternal truths."

He who symbolises his God in wood or stone acts undoubtedly in a human manner; he, however, who identifies this God with his sensible symbol acts in a manner unworthy of man. He, again, who places behind the visible symbol, and thus behind the real, perceptible God, the true God, who is simply thought, who exists only for the understanding and is conceivable through intuitive comprehension as an indispensable requirement of thought, acts in a superhuman way, that is, in a timeless and spaceless manner. Moreover, time and space are, as Schopenhauer says, only principles of individuation.

As a logical requirement the existence of God appears to me then most justified when we strike the opposite path which Feuerbach showed us. Feuerbach once said of the evolution of his own self, "God is my first, the world, my second, and Man is my third and last thought." Consequently, for him all philosophy is finally resolved into anthropomorphism. We shall, on the other hand, take our standpoint in man, in order to reach God as our end. The spiritual origin of our concepts of God and the world out of the need for humanisation is also admitted by us. And in our eyes men create their gods according to their own images. What is called in religion animism or spiritualisation of nature, we call in philosophy, with Lipps, "in-feeling." Only we see

in this psychological process of God-seeking and God-creation through "in-feeling" which proceeds directly from the anarchical arbitrariness of fetishism to the constitutionally governed universal monarchy of monotheism, no confusing chaos of opinions, no wild heap of meaningless conjectures, but a well-regulated gradation, a logical process of evolution, realising itself in the world-history. Just as all men, in spite of their differences of language, accept *one* logic, so precisely do different confessions, in spite of their differences of faith, accept *one* God and in philosophy, *one* substance. The transition from fetishism, animism, totemism, Shamanism and polytheism to monotheism is certainly not an arbitrary process, but a purposive, straight, inevitable line of evolution of the same unifying human nature which has led all men, in spite of the differences of blood, race, tradition, customs, laws and languages, by virtue of an identically organised reason with its identical experiences, finally to one and the same logic. This is the eternal civilizing plan of history of which Lessing, Herder and Schiller speak. The tendency towards unity, the indispensable striving of human nature after "perfectly unified knowledge," suits exactly that system of economy of force which orders us to obtain a maximum of result with a minimum of work. We feel in the universe our own unity of self. Unification is the same as order and if one brings a unifying order under the particular sciences, then a philosophical world-view or system is the result. The investigator of nature, consequently, traces all laws of nature to a single, highest principle of order, namely, the law of the conservation of force. The philosophers try to prove that all sciences, the natural sciences as well as the mental, represent a single united system. The astrophysicists teach us that in the whole planetary system precisely the same forces are at work and the same laws are in force as in our own planet. The tendency towards unity is also common to the social and political institutions. Out of thousands and thousands of

symptoms this irresistible tendency towards unity reveals itself historically. The logic of history announces to us the prophetic words: *Mankind will become one.*

Whence arises, however, this indestructible tendency of human nature towards unity which everywhere places a unity of thought in place of manifest plurality? It is always the same process of subsumption by order or connexion, that is, the subordination of the plurality of characters to the conceived unity of the bearer of these characters, and the higher the human spirit is developed, the more perfect is its capacity for subsuming, generalising and abstracting. What is this capacity which is daily growing stronger among civilised people, but skilful unification? One's own unity is the primitive picture, the world-unity or Divine unity, the felt reflexion of this prime picture. We animate the universe with our own unity. Where the eye sees a plurality of objects that can hardly be ignored, there the understanding puts first a unity of object and then a unity of concept. To think abstractly is, in the language of commonsense, nothing else than to unite artistically, to condense the manifoldness of impressions in experience with the help of our functions of the understanding into the unity of the concept binding this plurality. This unifying necessity, this projection or "in-feeling" of the ego into the "surrounding world" belongs to the fundamental nature of man. It will always remain undecided whether this "transcendental unity of apperception," as Kant calls it, has been from eternity a gift of nature attached *a priori* to us men, or whether it is to be regarded as a property, obtained through heredity, of an associational impulse of our brain that has become mechanical, as Spencer says, who has constructed this theory in the sense of Hume. Also a third possibility, which recently Mach and Avenarius have placed in the arena of philosophical fight, can be thought, the possibility, namely, that this tendency towards unity is only a result of an economy of thought

which, on its side again, is a special case of the universal law of the least expenditure of force. Consequently, the race-experience of everything injurious or useful has been condensed into a race-memory ("mneme") working on sharp associational lines. All these explanations are, however true only of the spiritual origin of this impulse towards unity, not, however, of the range of its validity. This impulse towards unity, or this in-feeling tendency (introjection of Avenarius), which has led in natural science to the unity of the laws of the world (in the energism of these days), in history, to the political union of the leading States, in philosophy, to the concept of substance or to a system of perfectly unified knowledge, in religion, lastly, to a God, is an undeniable fact of the whole human consciousness, no matter what cause, what spiritual source lies at the bottom of this fact. With this fact of the "in-feeling" or "introjecting" impulse towards unity, we have to reckon unconditionally; for to this highest disposing principle of unity we owe all science, all culture. What we, however, must represent to ourselves as real and objective, the philosopher of religion Lipsius says, is for us true; another truth, which would not be a truth for us, remains an empty sophistry, a shadow and a chimera. Every truth, including the logical—and this especially—is a truth for us. *Esse est percipii*—so it has been said from the time of Berkeley. A truth which is true for only one man we call an individual-subjective truth; a truth, however, which holds good for the whole race is general-subjective or a timeless logical truth. The "eternal truths" in logic and mathematics are general-subjective truths of this nature, for they are not arbitrarily true for a single individual but necessarily true for all living beings who have the same logical functions. Particular experience has value therefore only for the individual; eternal truth holds good for the race or the total human consciousness which, as we know, has an identically organised

reason and, as a consequence of this, only *one* logic. This general-subjective fits in, above all, with that which one is wont to call logico-objective. Objective truth is therefore a truth which is removed from the whim of the individual, as it has a binding value for the whole of the human race. However right Feuerbach may be that all concepts of God, even the monotheistic ones, owe their psychological existence to a doubling and projection of the human ego, this does not in the least disconcert us. We admit that the unity of the ego which man finds in his own consciousness as a unity which binds myriads of impressions, no matter whether with logical right, as Kant maintains, or wrongly, as Hume tries to represent, is the eternal model of the unity of God. If we project our indispensable principle of order within, there results self-consciousness; if we project it outside, there arises the consciousness of God. The fetishistic in-feeling in the individual thing belongs to the stage of childhood of the human race, the pantheistic reading of the unity of self into the unity of God belongs to the period when the human race attains, with monotheism, majority. The source of the world, whether this is called nature or God, is for us men a reflexion of our own selves. Always it is the unity, taken as at rest, of our ego which we lend to the hypostatised unity of the external world, of the world-ground or God. As the millions of sensations, seen from within, which every man experiences in himself, are related to the unity of his consciousness which works and controls all these sensations, so the trillions of objects lying outside human consciousness are related to the unity of the universe or God. This ascent of human consciousness from reality to truth, from the stage of fact to that of cause, from chance to necessity, from the manifoldness of sensuous impressions to the unifying logical function of the understanding, in short, from the apparently self-contradictory facts to their final logical relations and hidden motives, is manifestly a logical impulse, the φαντασία

καταληπτική of the human race-consciousness, which exists even if one is inclined to hold with Hume that this spiritual impulse is, so far as its origin is concerned, a product of custom and the laws of association, as Spencer tried to make us understand. The impulse exists; it is a fact of unquestionable authenticity. Through this impulse are clearly explained both the fact *that* and the reason *why*, the tendency towards unity is so deeply ingrained in all science, all religion and all philosophy, that monism has become a logical requirement of thought in which the great types of religion and systems of philosophy meet. The *consensus gentium* with regard to a monistic explanation may not in itself have the force of a demonstration but it acquires value when it refers to logical roots. Consequently, the great founders of religion and system-builders, agreeing in all essential points, reach a Substance or a God, because this significant unity lies in the well-ordered logical line of evolution of the human race-consciousness. Even the dualist incarnate, H. St. Chamberlain, perceives in his book on Kant, (p. 617), why logicists, like Plotinus and Hegel, and mathematicians like Spinoza are monists. For Chamberlain, (p. 79) on the other hand, dualism is "no theory but a fact."

The historical continuity, from fetishism and polytheism to monotheism, points in the last analysis to a logical continuity in the unitary evolution of human race-consciousness. And as Descartes gave Anselm's ontological proof of God's existence the following turn:—an absolutely real being we not only *can* but *must* conceive, so that the existence of God is based on the necessity of human race-consciousness —so we maintain against Feuerbach that the process of a doubling projection of the unity of the ego from within into the unity of God outside, is no play of chance, no arbitrary product, no historical fact that may be other than it is, but a logical compelling force, a necessity of thought, a necessary conclusion from given premises. God is the logical premise of

the world. Without the unity of God there can be no unity of self which, being a projecting self-duplication, makes us acquainted with the unity of the world, the cosmos, where our fetishistic forefathers saw only chaos. Man doubles himself necessarily and irresistibly; he doubles himself in his highest generalisations, in his concept of the world as well as in his concept of God. And thus, one will understand the fact that, and the reason why, the spirit of man becomes the lawgiver of nature, or, as Kant says, natural laws are in the last analysis laws of thought. Man builds with his spirit the constitution of the universe and must consider the world-empire a unity because he finds himself compelled logically to carry the unity of the ego which creates order in his head, over to a Divine unity which brings order into the whole universe. The enormous importance for the education of the human race of such unifying functions lies in this, that the guidance of the human race with the help of this self-created ideal of unity is a unitary guidance. For the formation of the human will, this is of immense importance. The concept of God brings the human capacity for abstraction to its highest, most complete, and consequently, final expression. That all nations press towards a logic, as also that all mature culture-systems always strike a last ground of unity, whether they call it God, Substance or Nature, is no whimsical occurrence which one can arbitrarily rule out. It is rather an irresistible compulsion of thought which reveals itself gradually in history by virtue of the identically organised reason with its identical experiences, so that maturity of thought cannot but accrue to it in the long run. Man's impulse towards unity presses unceasingly forward towards an unconditional unification of the world-ground or God. God not only *can* be thought but he *must* be thought, whilst we must refer the pyramid of laws and ends in the world to a highest principle of order—called God. This monism is not only the deepest meaning of the historical

religions but also the last word of logic. God's necessity of being has its unquestionable certainty, its logical security in His necessity of thought. For only that which we must think all together and indeed inevitably—not as individuals but as species of the human race—is for us, the highest truth. Being means the necessity of being thought. With the senses we see the changeful external world; with the understanding (not with feeling and will) we comprehend the laws of nature; with intuition the unchangeable essence of the world, that is, God. To believe in God means, thus, when seen in the light of epistemology, nothing else than a recognition of eternal truth, a comprehension of the mathematics of nature and a respect for the laws of logic.

In Greek pantheism Zeus could command in one way, Apollo in another. The individual moved helplessly to and fro between command and counter-command. In monotheism or modern pantheism, on the other hand, there is only one command, namely, the will of God in nature, and one virtue, namely, obedience to this command. Or, as Spinoza in his theologico-ethical tract (Vol. XIV of *Belief*) says, this worship of God and obedience to Him consists only in righteousness and in love or charity. All who obey God in this life are holy. Through obedience and faith alone men become happy—this is the deepest and final conviction of Spinoza. The intellectual love of God is the alpha and omega of the world-view of his philosophy of religion.

To the leading religious world-views there run parallel from the beginning of authentic history similar metaphysical world-views. Two fundamental religious types govern the great culture-systems of historical nations—religious pessimism and religious optimism. Two "primeval myths" stand hopelessly opposed to each other. The catchword of the one is *It is* and the catchword of the other, *It will be*. The religious primordial myth of Brahminism feeds on *plus quam perfectum*, that of Zoroastrianism feeds on *plus quam futurum*.

For the religious pessimism of the Buddhists the ideal of perfection, undivided unity, the holy rest of non-being and nirvâna stood at the beginning of the world-process. This primitive perfection was in course of time lost. Whether this happened through faults and atonements (Anaximander), through desires and impulses (conatus, impetus), through resistance (Fichte) or contradiction (Hegel) is more a question of mythology and allegory than of principle. All religious pessimists agree in this, that the movement of the universe goes backwards (ὁδὸς χάτω of Heraclitus), that we are in the midst of a process of dissolution and dissipation. Their religious hypothesis says that cosmos has fallen to pieces. For we sit on a falling branch. The ideal of perfection, the blameless state in paradise, the essence of a perfect state is irretrievably lost. The world is, consequently, a continuous descent from pure primordial fire or fine ether to coarse earth (Heraclitus), from the world of being to the world of appearance (Parmenides), from the eternal ideas to their gross copies (Plato), from the pure thought of God (αὐτὸς ἄρα ἑαυτὸν θεάσεται) to the fleeting processes of nature (Aristotle), from the highest perfection or God to its coarse emanations in natural events (Neo-Platonists). The mythological parallel of this metaphysical pessimism is the legend, spread all over the world, of the Golden Age, which has been succeeded by the silver and the copper. The transition from the primitive perfection to constantly increasing imperfection is here expressed, as it were, in the scale of values, that is, in its economic, cash value. To this conception there corresponds, on the Church side, the doctrine of the fall through original sin and on the social side, the Cynic-Stoic cry of poverty which Rousseau raised with a piercing tongue in the 18th century in the form *Let us go back to nature*. To conceive civilisation as a descent, fall, symptom of natural decay is nothing else than a special case of the Christian doctrine of the fall of man: it is indeed the social doctrine of the fall of man.

This pessimistic estimate of world and life, which finds in Buddhism a religious, and in Neo-Platonism a most compact philosophical expression, stands from time immemorial opposed to the Iranian-Zoroastrian religion of light which projects the ideal of perfection not backwards into the remote past, but forwards into the distant future. The world is not a descent from the perfect to the imperfect, but on the other hand, an ascent from the imperfect to the perfect. The path of the universe does not lead backwards but forwards, and the human race, in particular, proceeds not downwards from the angel to the devil, but upwards from anthropoids and cannibals to civilization and culture. We are not fallen angels but improved beasts. Nature and history are no processes of degeneration but an ascending staircase of perfection—a pyramid of higher ends and self-realising values. The religious view of the religions of light is not directed backwards but forwards. They do not delight in painting what is past or irretrievably lost (nirvâna, paradise), but in holding out the promise of the future, in presenting before us the apocalyptic adoration of perfection "at the end of the days" (eschatology). Prophecies, Bacchic auguries and Orphic sayings, Sibylline books and Chiliastic dreams, announce to us—and this announcement is echoed a thousand times—the millenium, the coming happiness. The prophets prophesy the future perfection of the human race in the form peculiar to them. The earth is full of knowledge, as the sea is full of water. The harbingers of the millenium announce the approach of the thousand-year kingdom. Philosophers of the period of transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth and from the nineteenth to the twentieth century advance the doctrine of the three stages (in Fichte, in *Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*, five phases) in which the ascent of history from the beastly to the human state completes itself. Nietzsche brings to us Zarathustra, the prophet of the religion of light, the coming overman, the eternal thought of

return, that is, he puts before us the "essence of the Zarathustra doctrine, the highest formula of assertion which can be attained." With Grillparzer we seek to-day "the golden fleece," with Ibsen "the third estate," with Tolstoi "God's kingdom on earth," with Comte the last stage of pure altruism, and lastly, with Herbert Spencer, "the ideal social State." And the same thing is said by Clausius in the realm of physics: the entropy of the world tends towards a maximum. Consequently, the state of equilibrium, at which the universe, according to Spencer also, aims, is not irretrievably lost, like the doctrine of *nirvâna* or the theory of the fall of man, but the transformation of heat into molar energy should lead finally to perfect equilibrium, that is, to a state of rest of the cosmic process. Here we are brought to the outermost limits of human knowledge. Whether the world is getting older or remains eternally young, or whether an eternal circle, the "return of all equals," takes place, as the prime myth says, we cannot, and never shall be able to say with certainty; we can only believe in it. Where science shows its weakness, there faith makes us feel its power. Where science finds its limit, there the religious hypothesis makes its appearance.

Faith, that is, the religious hypothesis, is, however, not only older in point of time than science which was born in its lap, but educationally more effective, more compelling, more comprehensive than science. It is not in vain that numerous thinkers from Augustin to Lessing have seen in religion the eminent "educator of the human race." What do we owe to historical religions and their mythological predecessors? Everything. They have united, cultivated, domesticated the "*bête humaine*". The differences among historical confessions are of a temporal and spatial nature, having a local colouring and varying shades of tradition. Confessions are, as we have already indicated, as it were, only dialects of the world-language of a religion embracing all confessions.

This world-religion underlying all confessions branches off into two educational systems, into a pessimistic and an optimistic method. Both attempt at the purification, classification, emancipation and further development of the type *man*. Nirvâna religion and the religion of prophets follow the same object, namely, the moral perfection of the human race. Only, the retrograde forms of religion, the romanticists among the philosophers of religion, the champions of the doctrine of the fall of man and lost paradise, follow the educational method of making men more willing, more resigned, more humble, as much with regard to the world-destiny as with regard to their own personal fate, so that they may hold fast to the view which looks upon the course of events in the world as a regression from eternity to eternity. The will of the individual is crippled and mutilated in order that the will of the universe or God may be absolutely and unconditionally placed above him. This happens as well in the Buddhistic doctrine as in the theory of ἀ'μαρμέ'νη and πρό'νοια of the Greeks, in the *fatum* of the Romans, in the doctrine of pre-ordained disposition towards sin, held by the Mediæval Church, in the *kismet* of the Mahomedans, in the frigid atonement theory of Calvin, as also in the logical fate of Spinoza and the materialistic world-view of Holbach's "Système de la nature," in the milieu theory of Taine and lastly, and especially, in the strictly determined unfolding of the world-will in Schopenhauer.

What predestination or atonement means for religion we call, in the language of philosophy, mechanical causality. Every great religious world-conception has a metaphysical significance. As the optimistic and pessimistic conceptions of religion have been opposed to each other since the time of Buddhism and Zoroastrianism, so, as we have already seen, since the time of Democritus and Anaxagoras, mechanism and teleology have been opposed to each other. The mechanical conception of the world leads all events *backwards* to the final cause; the teleologico-organic conception leads, on the other

hand, all events *forwards* to the final end. There, the ground of all evolution lies behind, here, before. The former traces all events to the past, to the unchangeable natural law or the will of God, the latter to the future, to the meaning and plan of the whole, to the self-realising object of creation. There, life is only a determinate form of existence of matter, here, on the contrary, matter is only a determinate form of existence of life. If one sees in a dead piece of matter, whether it is called atom, corpuscle, molecule or electron, the primitive form of all things, then there arises the mechanico-materialistic view of the world. If one sees, on the other hand, with Leibniz, who has discovered the infinitesimal, the principle of the infinitely small, in all rest only an infinitely small motion, in all apparent matter only a product of forces, in every material atom a spiritual monad, in everything inorganic and dead, only an infinitely small life, there arises that dynamic and organic view of the world which our really great men, Fichte and Schelling, Hegel and Herbart, Lotze and Fechner, have accepted. The old hylozoists who regarded substance, the "world-stuff," as living were right. And the old religions which believe in a living God who works the world-whole, not through mechanico-causal necessity but according to eternal laws of ends, stand nearest to the oldest form of philosophy, hylozoism. Here the dynamical pantheism of Leibniz comes into contact with the æsthetic pantheism of the hylozoists.

The last word of the mechanico-causal explanation of the world has been said by Newton. He conceives the world-structure *instar machinae*. The world-machine, the universe, is the most perfect work of art, which directly points to a world-architect, a demiurge, and on account of its wonderful harmony, even to that "prime mover" of Aristotle who constructs this world-machine and has given it the first impact. The stereotyped picture of a machine, to which the current "comparison with a watch" of the Cartesians and occasionalists

conceptually comes near, gives an impulse to the mechanico-causal explanation of the world. For in a machine, as in every artifice, the parts come first and then the whole, the cause, precedes and the effect follows, and the axiom *causa aequat effectum* means that in the effect there cannot be any more reality than in the cause. Consequently, every event becomes an inevitable product of a preceding endless series of causes, the last point or final part of which is the final cause, God. Even this we call logical fate. This belief in the unavoidableness of all events, whether it is owing to the inviolability of the natural laws, as the materialists teach us, or the result of the unalterable Divine decision, as the pessimistically inclined religions interpret, makes man humble, weary, calm and resigned. If we are brought irresistibly to an indifferent law of nature, if we are pure "witnesses," if we are only mute spectators, as Geulincx teaches us, why should energy be manifested, forces exhibited, the highest capacity for work developed in us? If everything happens unerringly in the way prescribed by the eternal laws of nature which rule even history, or is decreed by the Holy Divine will, what can that tiny dust of the world called man do against it? If we men are a small tooth in the millions of wheels of that world-machine behind which God stands as the eternally directing agent, how can we dare put spokes in the wheel of this world-machine, cry halt to the course of history, shape the course of civilization, direct the progress of the human race? If people had been guided for thousands of years by such a retrograde religious fancy, then they surely would have been in course of time spiritually inert, degenerate in character and would have become in stupid inertness, pietists or quietists. And this is maintained also by the leader of this quietistic, world-weary, doctrine of resignation, Arnold Geulincx, who says: *Nos spectatores sumus.* Men have on the stage of the world-theatre only the dumb rôle of a spectator. *Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis.* Where you *can* do nothing, there you

should do nothing. As you cannot interfere with the machinery of the universe, let things take their course; submit and bend, bow and stoop before it. Submission, resignation, humility, inertness, death-like resignation and renunciation of the world are the inevitable consequences of an education of the human spirit to the pietistic-ascetic ideals which Nietzsche has brought out in his sharp contrast of the Apollonian with the Dionysian spirit. From this philosophical quietism the religious mystics and romanticists draw their chief nourishment.

To this pessimistic type of religion there have stood in fundamental opposition, since the days of Zarathustra, the Messianic optimistic religions and the dynamico-organic systems of philosophy. These represent a world-view in which the momentary present is not ruled by the past but by the future. Their stock metaphor, their vivid picture, is not the dead atom, but life, still more correctly, the living cell, not the machine, the parts of which precede the whole, but the living organism, in the cells of which the whole is already portrayed, planned and pre-arranged, so that the whole, the plan, precedes and the parts follow, so far as the individual parts, the colour of the skin, the colour of the hair, the colour of the eyes, temperament and character are developed in the plan which is already completely foreshadowed in the germ-plasm. The whole is known intuitively, the parts discursively. In the organism, thus, every phenomenon, like growth, digestion, absorption, assimilation, reproduction, occurs, not backwards, not by combining the parts into the whole, but forwards, with an eye to the future, to the end which the parts have to fulfil, to the plan of the whole in which the parts develop according to biological laws.

Which religious hypothesis, now, works more instructively, more helpingly and more happily, the pessimistic or the optimistic? That man portrays himself in his gods has been a commonplace ever since the time of Zenophon. That we carry our own properties over to the All

through necessary anthropomorphism, "in-feeling," "introjection," or "in-putting," that we thus project our microcosm into the macrocosm, is a fact about which there is no difference of opinion among serious thinkers. The question only amounts to this: Which part of our existence should we project and double, our muscular system or our nervous system, our coarse structure of joints, or our fine central nervous system, our coarse life or our soul, our mechanism and chemism or our spiritual functions? The materialists say it is the body which evolves itself according to mechanico-causal laws, the dualists assert both the body and the soul, the idealists say it is the spirit which acts according to teleologico-causal laws, that is, according to ends and means.

Here the religious hypothesis has to step in. It must decide in favour of *one* of these great world-conceptions. Either the projection into the past or the projection into the future; either an eternal state of rest (πα'ντα ομου) or eternal progress (πα'ντα ρα). There, the momentary present is ruled by fixed unalterable causal succession—natural laws, as it is called by the physicists, predestination by the Church doctrinarians—here, by the future, the world-plan, the world-meaning and the world-end. The biologist J. v. Uexküll (*Leitfaden in das Studium der experimentellen Biologie*—Introduction to the Study of Experimental Biology) defines the essence of life as "the flow of phenomena according to a plan" (p. 11). "It is, in fact, the clearest definition of death," he continues at p. 67, "if we say of an organism that its processes do not any more take place according to a purpose but only causally." In every purposive action, plan and end occur first and then the action. Seen in this light, God becomes, as Fichte says, an *ordo ordinans*, a Divine world-order. God does not *exist*, but he *develops* Himself in us, through us, with us. We are no mere passive spectators but players; our talents and genius are actors, partly, even heroes and heroines, in the world-drama.

They have that "heroic taint" which Giordano Bruno claimed. Our actions are not forced upon us from outside (heteronomous), whether by the causal law or the Divine command, but they have a free self-legislative character (autonomous). We are co-constituents of the world-process. The universe is no despotic monarchy the commands of which come from above, but a democratic republic the commands of which issue from below. In the laws or categories of nature, that portion of the order is set down which is absolutely necessary to the unity and connexion of the cosmos ("Mathematics of Nature"); in history, on the other hand, that purposive rhythm, that tendency, manifests itself which men aim at in the formation of their ideals. Nature proceeds according to causes, history, according to motives.

Every optimistically inclined religion shares, therefore, whether willingly or unwillingly, the fundamental assumptions of organic-aesthetic pantheism. In the world-process not only blind conformity to law or justice, like the δίκη of Heraclitus, but beauty and goodness shows itself, as we see from the fact that Socrates put the Hellenic ideal of calocagathy into the world of gods, and as in Plato the highest Idea or God coincided with the Idea of goodness. The Messianism of the religions of light, lastly, places the spatial *beyond*, the paradise, in the temporal world, at "the end of the days," in "the third kingdom," and cries out in a prophetic mood, *The day will come.* And exactly in the same way, does the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer demand an eternal upward movement of the universe, till the state of absolute equilibrium is attained or till the entropy of the world attains its maximum.

In all these final questions concerning the prime ground of all being, thought and action, science leaves us in the lurch and the religious hypothesis appears in its true place. Whether Kant regards the thing-in-itself as a thing that cannot be known or Herbert Spencer conceives substance as unknowable,

or Eduard v. Hartmann asserts it to be unconscious, matters little. The question is: Which belief makes one more holy, more happy, more bold—the belief in a "lost paradise" or in a "God's kingdom on earth," Buddhism or Messianism, the sighing and elegiac backward glance of the romanticists with their benumbing "It was," or the bold hosanna of the religions of progress with their Messianic-psalmodic "It will be" and the exhortation "Serve the Lord in joy"?

Which educative system has succeeded better in the market of history, the pessimistic or the optimistic religious hypothesis, the Muhammadan fatalism or the Kantian doctrine of freedom, the Buddhistic doctrine of *nirvana* which depresses and cripples, or the energism which conceives the world as force, energy, work, act? According to this last, God himself is the *monas monadum*, the world-energy on a huge scale, while we men ourselves represent the world-energy on a small scale. Every monad is pregnant with the future (*gros de l'avenir*). Every man carries in himself his own world-formula, his life-melody: this is his spiritual backbone, his moral stay, his ethical conscience, his religious ideal. The world is not *given* to us but *surrendered*, says Fichte; it is not the kingdom of *is* but of *ought*, of problems to be solved, of duties to be performed. Men or nations without ideals, without problems, without an end or purpose of life, without a plan of life and without a meaning in their lives are like roving atoms in the world-space, guided by gravitation and the laws of falling bodies. Ideas and ideals we can only strive after, and not attain; we can believe in them but we cannot realize them. But whilst we believe in them, we are in the state of realizing them gradually. For the welfare of the human race does not lie *behind* us but *before* us.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEM

As the individual fates of men sometimes are more full of incidents, more dramatical than the inventive spirit of the novelist can shape them, so in the destinies of nations, reality frequently exceeds the fantastic dreams of the Utopian Social Theorists. But the Utopian theorists are nothing else than novelists in the domain of the destinies of nations. The Utopian thought of a social "World-State" goes back to the most remote past. Begun by the Cynics, passing through Stoicism for half a century, the dream of a World-citizenship flows into the "Monologues" of the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius. The formula of this cosmopolitan universalistic ideal runs: All men know themselves as citizens of a State and feel like a herd under the same common laws of reason.

The "Sibylline Oracles" announce that the earth will be the same for all. And the heavenly oracles gave the earth as the common property of all. Anabaptists and Chiliasts sing the life-melody of the dreamers and visionaries in a thousand-fold variation in modern times, till the motive for this is completely sunk in the melody of the lyre. The "no home" of the English Chancellor Thomas More, the "Sunstate" of the Calabrian Dominican monk Thomas Campanella, and in recent times Bellamy's "A View of the Year 2000" bring again into prominence the vanished motives and try to adapt them to the temperaments of their respective ages.

Our age has its own way of fading away. The philanthropic phase of social politics is now over. The protection of the

labouring classes against an inadmissible expenditure of their working powers, against substances prejudicial to health in their work, against prolonging the periods of work beyond the point sanctioned by society, against massing of the labouring classes in hygienically unsound localities, against injuries to the coming generation in the form of child-labour and the labour of woman—all these just requirements of society have to-day, thanks to our sharp social sensibility, come to be generally accepted. In this general acceptance of the above-mentioned requirements I see the greatest advance of our own socially-feeling age over all preceding ages. For every socio-political platitude is at first an acquisition. Where the previous generation has put its highest pathos, these international unions place their insipid deliberations, comparative statistical materials and professional expert reports. Instead of the poetic there has appeared the scientific politician. The social politics in these days has been wrested from the hands of the Utopian theorists, rescuers of society, believers in the millennium and reformers of the world and placed in the hands of the statistician and the national economist, the trained professional writer and the technically trained specialist. The age of the socio-political apprenticeship is gone. The subject is no more discussed in a haphazard fashion but is systematically arranged and organised with an end in view. The socio-political questions, such as those which Diderot has discussed in his letters on the blind and the deaf and the dumb, are to-day removed from the artistic language of the saloon. It is a long way, surely, from the socio-political Utopian theorists of the type of Diderot and Rousseau to the second International Conference for the protection of the labouring classes which met in May, 1905. This is the typical fate of all great ideas. They begin at the writing-table of philosophers and poets, proceed to the streets and markets, to political gatherings and clubs of agitators, to the press and the platform, make their way to the pulpit and

parliament, till they finally receive the crowning sanction of socio-politically combined powers.

A world-parliament in miniature was the second International Conference for the protection of the labouring classes at Bern, composed only of delegates from States. Fifteen Sovereign States, among them all the great States of Europe, with the exception of Russia, sent the representatives of their Government to Bern in order to decide here two concrete questions relating to the protection of labour which were ripe for an international solution through common agreement. Surely, the conference for the protection of the labouring classes which was called through the initiative of the young and strong-willed Kaiser in the year 1890 had a great effect. Without this bold stroke probably neither the Hague Peace Conference inspired by Zaren nor the Bern Conference for the protection of the labouring classes would have been possible. In international politics, as elsewhere, the French saying holds good: " Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte." The ice was broken. The preconceived idea of the impossibility of an international understanding with regard to the humanitarian questions was removed by the actual fact of the occurrence of this first Conference for the protection of the labouring classes. The path was now cleared for positive constructions.

The first Conference for the protection of the labouring classes had naturally, an informatory, purely academic, not to say Platonic, character. Concrete questions which awaited an immediate solution were not taken up, much less fully answered. Prince Bismarck had the right feeling. The time was not yet ripe for the Conference. He could not openly veto the energetic wish of the young Kaiser but he made the wise assertion that the socio-political problems had not yet attained the state of receiving an international solution and gave this first Conference for the protection of the labouring classes a primarily decorative character. People learned to know and respect one another. Men exchanged ideas and feelings in courteous

words but in a loose form; people held, so to speak, an international socio-political review of troops. There was revealed an all-round desire to exhibit with ostentation the good socio-political will before the whole moral world as well as to conceal with universal timidity the disposition for action. And it was well that it was so. For the questions of an international protection of the labouring classes must be ripe, must be examined by experts, carefully prepared and investigated by the comparative and statistical methods before one could proceed to a binding understanding.

Switzerland enjoys not only the geographical advantage of a central position and the political advantage of neutrality, but along with, and over and above these, the privilege of giving the West-European and American culture-systems a socio-political field for experiment. In this political microcosm, where advanced technical arts, advanced methods of public instruction and free institutions constitute a formless paradigm for the civilized nations as to how far one may proceed with socio-political institutions without endangering the safety or stability of the State, such experiments can be made. What is here possible and admissible may not, however, be used as a precedent or guide in other lands with different traditions and divergent conditions of culture, but the representatives of the Governments can observe with perfect clearness what is right here and what takes place in this remarkable corporate political body.

Through the positive participation of the socialistic delegates whom the French Government wisely sent, it was obvious that the Conference was above all party distinctions. Elementary principles of Socialism were not only sanctioned by the representatives of all parties in principle but were subscribed to under an authorisation from their Governments. What is theoretically right and practicable in the attempts of the socialists should be carried out by all civilised nations, whether in conjunction with the socialists or in opposition to them.

Of universal import is the bringing about of an international agreement with regard to the prohibition of the work of women at night. Even this small thing was, like every international agreement, the result of a compromise. One can hardly recognise in the printed reports how much work in the committees had to be done for this, how much one had to toil before the final form was discovered which fifteen States sanction morally to-day and shall do so legally within a reasonably short period of time. Every inch of concession had to be won by fight.

The result acquires additional importance because it is intelligible, precise and compact. A bold step forward in the direction of an international peaceful understanding is made. The life and health of many labourers have been secured; rest, freshness, strength and cheerfulness have been secured to the mothers, the preservers of the human race, in our zone of civilization. Very few words were said but much solid work was done. Little cry but much wool, no momentary inspiration but the enduring, life-giving warmth of healthy (because practicable), social reforms.

The theoretical interest yields, as I have elsewhere shown, everywhere to the practical. Philosophy cannot resist this tendency of the age. The modern man will not only learn from philosophy what forms of relation govern the cosmos (Metaphysics) or what forms of relation rule the inner world (Epistemology) but also and principally, what forms of relation determine the united action of men and thus, as it were, constitute the social cosmos (Sociology).

The problem of human society has arrived at an acute stage. It peeps through every door and awakens even the most dreamy speculative visionary from his reverie. People are waiting impatiently for an answer. Philosophy cannot hesitate to give an answer, if it does not like to run the risk of being never again asked. And thus it manifestly reforms itself in the beginning of our century. Man is finally brought

back after two centuries to himself, to philosophical inquiry, to the elucidation and strictly scientific—not purely religious, nor even purely ethical—formulation of his relations to the social world, to his fellow-creatures. We experience at the present moment a renaissance of anthropocentrism. Only in the philosophy of to-day, man no more stands in the centre of the universe as he did in the ancient anthropomorphic view of the world, but in the centre of the philosophical interest. Not the world but the human society becomes, if all indications do not deceive us, the central problem of the philosophically "modern" or "recent." The twentieth century has begun under the auspices of a completely revolutionised philosophy. For the rising generation of thinkers the centre of gravity of the dialectical inquiry has been shifted. The question is no more of the world but of man. In a word we stand under the sign of social and culture-philosophy. I have tried in a series of works to lay down the principles of a social and culture-philosophy (especially, in the work *Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*—The social question in the light of philosophy, Encke, Stuttgart, 2nd Ed., 1903).

The sciences of order or of nature, I say, rest upon the causal relation of cause and effect, make inferences mechanically and are conceived by the human brain through the causal relation of ground and consequence: they are therefore valid logically. The sciences of experience or history, or the sciences which are now-a-days called culture-sciences, on the other hand, are based on the causal relation of end and means. The causality of the mental sciences is therefore, neither an absolutely mechanical nor a strictly logical one, but one which is in great measure teleological. The culture-sciences show us the end of the human race and give us the teleologically proved means, in order to make us gradually come near this highest end with the help of the most perfect means conceivable.

If I take from "Culture-philosophy" the final result, I arrive at a deeper basis of social optimism. What the mechanically

working nature has done unintelligently, in many respects unconsciously, in setting up useful institutions, what the remaining culture-systems have brought about spasmodically and semiconsciously in the shape of valuable institutions and achievements that have advanced mankind, our culture-system that has come of age has advanced and built with full consciousness. In the struggle for existence our brain creates especially such ideas as facilitate it. The history of our continually ascending culture-systems teaches us that the functions of our brain always make their organ, the intellect, more and more perfect, less, indeed, in its height and depth than in its breadth. We possess no *greater* intelligence than we did in ancient times but incomparably *more* intelligence. Intelligence which has proved itself to be the most useful weapon in the preservation of our existence, has gradually been democratised. It has ceased in our culture-system to be the privilege of the select few, of the people favoured by God, or the upper five hundred of the human race. Since the invention of the art of printing, it has gradually succeeded in providing all with spiritual arms. We are thus pre-eminently equipped with intelligence and wisdom, with armaments, as it were, and have introduced universal compulsory service. Now there follows necessarily from this the socialisation of institutions. This happens, according to the formula: Socialism of institutions but individualism of persons. In the structure of associations of men I believe I can see that liberating principle which is called upon to smooth the beaten track of our social life. Put in the most compact form, this social synthesis is *the creation of an aristocracy of the labouring classes* (An der Wende des Jahrhunderts. Tübingen, Mohr, p. 402). The more our public-legal institutions are democratised, the more clearly do personalities differentiate themselves.

Without an aristocracy our culture-system cannot manifestly be maintained. If the feudal system matured the

aristocracy of birth, if the capitalism that has comenced has produced the aristocracy of wealth, then the industrialism of the previous century has given birth to a new aristocracy, namely, the aristocracy of the knights of labour.

Rousseau's myth of the equality of all men, the idyll of beasts who go about in herds, has revealed itself in historical reality as social mythology. Even the herds of beasts have their aristocracy. As there have always been governors and the governed, so there have been in every age, leaders and the led. Without a hierarchy with a graded scale of powers, we cannot do. If one tries to realise clearly what aristocracy in its etymological meaning signifies, namely, a government by the best, then it will seem, not only a law of nature but even a dictum of reason, that aristocracies should occur, that is to say, that the best men among a nation should govern, if and so far as the rulers are really the best men.

As in the animal kingdom, so in the human race, there takes place a selection of the fittest and most capable. The ants have their higher and lower orders, division of work and organisation; among the bees we have the labouring bees as well as their queens. And why should it be different with men? Can the cretin have the same place in society as a Helmholtz? Does he render the same service to it? According to the universally-recognised formula which is found true in actual life: *do ut des* (I give that you may give), the estimation of the worth of individual men on the part of society can only be made according to what they have done for society. Those who have done the best work are the born leaders.

The best workers are, however, to be found in all departments of social life and activity. In deportment and good manners, in tone, bearing and courage, in the geniality and courteousness of manners, the full-blooded aristocrats have such a deep-rooted tradition and education that have now almost

become a second nature to them, that one can generally regard them as the best men for the forms of social intercourse. If and so far as this oldest form of aristocracy tries to realise its social mission, namely, that of being a model of courteous manners, it has, by the side of the aristocracies which we shall presently mention, kept intact its social justification and meaning which is, moreover, sanctioned by history.

The law of social selection has taken, from the feudal system of the Middle Ages, the theory of the aristocracy of birth, as it has taken from the capitalistic era of modern times the second form of aristocracy, the aristocracy of wealth or plutocracy. Where these factors are combined—high birth, and great wealth, as they often are in the English nobility—there arises the synthesis which is called in these days aristo-plutocracy. The capitalists are, whenever the question is of self-acquired and not of inherited wealth, *geniuses of organisation.* Whether this great wealth is acquired through industries or through land-speculations, it presupposes generally great circumspection, energy, shrewdness, and above all, talent for skilful organisation. It is for this and this alone, that I call the great capitalists who have accumulated in their own hands mighty sums through prudence and energy of thought, geniuses of organisation. Without this talent one may indeed inherit millions but cannot acquire and can with difficulty preserve them. Also there is in capitalism a choice of the best in action, an aristocracy of skill. In the eighteenth century this capitalistic aristocracy made its appearance; during the great French Revolution it struggled to maintain its right of existence and in the nineteenth century it made its appearance through the social recognition of the capitalist magnates.

As the transition between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was characterised by the intrusion of politics into all values, so the transition between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was marked by a similar encroachment of

sociology. No more the third but the fourth class stands in the foreground of the politico-social interest ; the first is the class that is saturated with aristocracy proper and has arrived at the age of maturity ; the last, born in the midst of the miseries of the Revolution, should attain majority in the twentieth century. The hierarchy of social organisation, the upward march of the lower stages to greater power and influence, the construction of even new forms of aristocracy, is an immanent, and thus an inseparable, characteristic of our culture-system. Government slips from the hands of a single individual in a more and more pronounced manner, in order to pass into the hands of the few and gradually into the hands of the best of all classes. Out of all grades of social life there are formed automatically and continuously the lower middle and higher classes and out of these also, the highest grade—aristocracy. If the labouring classes, as the fundamental principles of all evolution of our culture-system demand and bring about, participate in the government, nay, exercise authority in particular advanced democracies by virtue of their great numerical superiority, then the precondition of a declaration in favour of the labouring class of their having come of age is the *creation of an aristocracy of labour*.

For the construction of such an aristocracy, as indeed, of every aristocracy, there are required, above all things, tenacity, perseverance, prudence and, in the department of education, settled tradition. An aristocracy cannot be suddenly stamped out or arbitrarily dismissed. If it could, it would cease to be an aristocracy. If it is to avoid the danger of succumbing to infantile diseases in the future, this new aristocracy must grow upon its social soil, the highest class thus must detach itself spontaneously and unconsciously from the numerous subordinate classes. And this process of gradual aristocratisation of work attains its perfection in England, the home of trade unions, the classical land of the politico-social

model of our entire West-European-American culture-systems.

As England in her political institutions has become the model for Montesquieu, for the French encyclopaedist and for the Revolution brought on by this, and has further become the parliamentary prototype of the whole of the western continent, so also in her quiet social miner's work, the rôle of leader in the establishment of social peace seems to have fallen to her lot. The English working-classes have set about seriously to solve a part of the "Social questions" and indeed, the most delicate part, the building up of an aristocracy of labour, with the help of the most prudent self-help. There the conviction is gradually gaining ground that the danger of a European gigantic conflagration is the less, the more trained, the more morally ennobled and aesthetically refined the labouring classes are. This new nobility of labour is not won over or bribed by patents but is with pains acquired by hard minute work in the social sphere. This new selection, this creation of knights of labour by the favour of the people, wants all customary ceremonies but it compensates for this through the happy consciousness that it owes its origin, not to the whim or arbitrary will of a potentate, but to a process which is inevitable because it is due to a law of nature.

The degradation-theory which Marx and Engels in their day based on the condition of the English labouring population has received its death-blow in the recent change in these conditions. Julius Wolf will even be remembered for the fact that he first boldly opposed the Marx-Engelian degradation theory which had become almost sacrosanct. Edward Bernstein had the still greater courage to accept the theory of Wolf and others and abandon the degradation theory. It is not true, as Marx and Engels prophesied on the basis of insufficient—and only for the time being true—material that the poor must become poorer. The opposite is rather proved for all who would see. Not a gradual impoverishment, but on the

contrary, a constantly increasing aristocratisation of the masses takes place in England, in that England from which Marx and Engels have drawn their examples.

Not that Marx and Engels have taught false history. The conditions noticed by them half a century ago were really as shocking as they represented them to be; only their assumption that the conditions would grow still worse has been falsified by history. For with the rise and growth of democracy at the cost of the English monarchy, the condition of the English working-classes has gradually improved and become more worthy of a civilised Government. What the working-classes formerly fought for, namely, political leadership, they now begin to demand and to possess. As however, no State can maintain itself without an aristocracy, modern England has developed into an *aristocracy of democracy*.

In the middle of the nineteenth century three-fifths of the children in England grew up without any education, and of about 750,000 married persons, more than 300,000 could not write their names. And even to-day the education of the people in England lags much behind the standard of education on the Continent, but the "progress that has been made during the last generation is extraordinary." At least to-day the elementary school, indeed, the secular elementary school, is a public institution. And the higher culture which has for its object in England not so much the creation of books as the creation of men, is not so wholly closed to the working classes as formerly. More and more do the labouring classes participate in the higher culture and this has ceased to be "something aristocratic." "The thought of equal rights and toleration is not only legally recognised but has actually been realized and has been so much transformed into flesh and blood that frictions are as good as non-existent" (v. Nostitz).

To attain this happy result, the higher classes in England, especially, the Fabians, have worked with assiduousness. The "University Extension," the "University Settlements,"

the well-known Toynbee Hall, as well as the less known Working Men's College have all contributed their share in improving the English working classes.

As the moral and intellectual standard has been raised through schools, so the economic has been raised and refined through social legislation. Legislation is pedagogy for grown-up people. In the year 1898 the number of members of the Trade Unions rose to the gigantic figure of 1,600,000 divided into 1,300 societies and 13,000 branches; it represented about 21 p.c. of the total working population. These Unions of working classes are now the upper class from which the aristocrats of labour grow.

All this success in England has been possible through the most prominent qualities of Englishmen, patience and perseverance. There have been no sudden changes, no catastrophes, no volcanic eruptions of the social organisation. It is not in vain that the evolutionary theory bears the stamp of England on its face (Lyell, Darwin, Spencer). England is the model of all evolution—that is, of the aggregation of small effects into mighty forces. An English Minister (Mundella) has also made the important assertion that in England "progress in legislation has gone hand in hand with the advance of public opinion."

In any case, the politico-social position of the working classes has been fundamentally changed and they have been recognised as a class by the side of other classes. The upper middle class of the labouring population comes to twenty-two per cent. of the whole population. The trade unions have created their own aristocracy, so much so, that a *fourth of the whole proletariat* belongs to the highest grade, whilst the low proletariat (loafers, occasional workers, semi-criminals) amounts to only twelve per cent. of the whole proletariat. And thus at the present moment three forces are at work in England which remove the bad blood and bitterness created by social questions, the self-help societies, the social feeling of the

upper classes (especially of the Fabians) and the force of public opinion.

If the aim of our Western culture is social peace, then the creation of an aristocracy of the labouring classes by a well-planned process of strengthening the corporate activities is surely a means to it. It won't do simply to destroy all weeds, right and left: this is only the negative, critical half of the social work. The positive, creative half consists in producing after the manner of the English Trade Unions, skilled labourers to form a higher order, training the proletariat economically into the bourgeoisie, and along with these, creating a new species of aristocracy, namely, the *aristocracy of labour*. The politics of the middle classes is, however, the only reliable way of creating such an aristocracy of labour.

The greater the number of people interested in the permanent establishment of method in domestic economy, the less is the danger, as I have elsewhere expressed, of its destruction. Countries with a healthy middle class like Scandinavia, Holland or Switzerland, are, in spite of all political freedom, and probably on account of this, more protected against powerful social convulsions than backward states with pronounced class distinctions. Only short-sighted lake-dwelling politicians will ignore the fact of the present day that the politically most free countries—England and Switzerland—have in their parliaments, taken in an absolute and relative sense, the smallest number of social democratic representatives. The most important social ground for the immunity of a league from revolutionary outbreaks, even if it accepts as its guests the expatriated revolutionaries and exiles of all lands, is to be sought in its healthy middle class. Social legislation, legal socialism takes here the place of social democracy.

If the social ethos is united with the personal interest of the greater and better part of a whole, then there is produced through this companionship in arms a social phalanx. We

can easily come to an understanding with an intelligent organised labouring class that takes its stand upon logic and law: others, however, we can only treat as they would treat us if they had the power.

Elementary instruction, protection of the labouring classes, care of health and residence make out of the new aristocracy a new society. The nobility of work appears side by side with that of the intellect, the talent for organisation and birth.

The handling of these social problems is now the problem of a special discipline, Sociology. If Sociology has, as a detached branch of knowledge, the right of existence, it must represent a comprehensive system of all social sciences and include them in its sphere. It is a philosophy of society. If, according to Comte and Wundt, it is the problem of philosophy in general to determine the extent of all scientific disciplines and to combine their results into a consistent unity, in order, in this way, finally, to create unified knowledge, highest formulas or laws for all being, thinking and duty, it is reserved for Sociology as a philosophy of the human society, to deal separately with that branch of science which has for its contents the manifold social activity of men. What anthropology, palæontology and comparative ethnography (Ratzel's "anthropogeography"), demography, political economy and moral statistics, universal history and folk-psychology, comparative history of languages, of law, morals, religion, art, economics and of more general culture-history, have done as separate disciplines, sociology should seek to do, in case it succeeds in performing the highest work, namely, the work of inter-connecting them and placing them in relations free from contradiction—the work, in fact, which philosophy undertakes for all human branches of knowledge.

The starting-point and indispensable basis of Sociology as an exact science are always the social facts, the universalisation of which and the elevation of which to the highest factor

of explanation are first attempted by it. A world-view, besides, which calls itself positivism must ascend from facts to causes, and not descend from the asserted causes, accepted without any proof, to the facts. The history of philosophy, as Hegel has characterised it in great measure, is stranded as a science on this, that it starts from a demand, a proposition, and indeed, from the postulate of a logical fate in nature and history. The self-movement or self-revelation of logic with the help of the law of contradiction, that triadic rhythm-according to which the harmony of the spheres or world, symphony realises itself in the time of the three crotchets as positing, counter-positing and connecting (thesis, antithesis and synthesis) is replaced by Ratzenhofer in his *Sociology* (1907) by the world-formula of "inherent interest" which constitutes, as it were, the central string of the world-occurrence and constantly accompanies all forms of manifestations in nature and history. This "inherent interest" expresses itself, according to the doctrine of the "positive monism" of Ratzenhofer, in three stages (categories)—the kingdom of substance, the kingdom of individual consciousness and the kingdom of social life (p. 19). All order, according to Ratzenhofer, is an expression, and an evolutionary process, of the same primeval force. Social life is no exception to it. "The social impulses belong to the individual as a part of the indestructible evolutionary-series and rest upon the inherited conditions firmly fixed morphologically in the organism of consciousness" (p. 11). The inherent interest governs the physico-chemical processes and the biological laws no less than the individual and social spiritual structure. Whether one sees in these three stages of the self-revelation of the prime force with the help of the inherent interest, *identical* events or only *analogies*, is a matter of small importance. The presupposition of Ratzenhofer is that the inherent interest is as inseparably connected, as a permanent accompaniment, with all processes in nature and history, as Hegel's triadic rhythm

accompanies the self-revelation of the laws through all the forms of manifestation, namely, the forms of *in itself, for itself* and *in and for itself.*

This *a priori* construction of history we call, however, philosophy of history and not sociology. In order to deduce the individual stages of history from a given world-formula, whether it is called substance, logos, thing-in-itself, or "primordial force," and thus seek, as it were, God in history, as the materialists refused to discover it in nature, there was required in fact no new science which, with the pretentious, etymologically questionable title "Sociology" had appeared from the time of Comte (the philologists justly raise the objection that the linguistic creation "Sociology" represents a hybrid of the Latin word *Socius* and the Greek λογος). The philosophers of history of all ages, from Augustin to Hegel and Rocholl, as Robert Flint has shown in his *History of the Philosophy of History*, do nothing but reveal the plan of the universe, or, expressed in the language of the Church, exhibit the finger of God in history. It could not possibly be Ratzenhofer's ambition to emulate Vico or Herder, Kant or Schiller, Fichte or Hegel in the construction of the philosophy of history. What was to be got from this side was exhausted by the folk-psychologists from the time of Lazarus and Steinthal, and especially, by the pioneer work *Folk Psychology* of Wundt.

The "discovery" of "folk-psychology" Lazarus has claimed as his own life-work. The Berlin literary historian Richard M. Meyer published in the *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde* (Vol. III, pp. 320-24) which, on its side, is only a continuation of the "Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft" started by Lazarus and his brother-in-law, Steinthal, and continued for twenty years, an article in honour of Lazarus in which this Castor-Pollux relationship in the domain of Folk-Psychology is characterised as follows: "Besides, the division of work was in the beginning like that

between Moses and Aaron, as described in the Scripture: Steinthal put the words into the mouth of his brother who spoke them to the people." This greatly annoyed the true band of worshippers of Lazarus. With regard to these names Alfred Leicht in his "Lazarus der Begründer der Völker-Psychologie" gives the circumstantial documentary evidence which rests upon the words of Steinthal: "The honour of being the founder of folk-psychology does not belong to me but to Professor Lazarus!"

This struggle for priority which has assumed an unpleasant form, which, however, on the chronological side has been undoubtedly decided in favour of Lazarus, concerns science all the less, as it is a wholly doubtful matter whether a folk-psychology as science is possible, above all, whether it, as a separate discipline, is at all possible. The circumstance that Wilhelm Wundt has called his researches on speech, mythology, customs and art "folk-psychology" does not at all confirm, as Meyer says, the "disputed validity" of this discipline. If one compares with this Wundt's essay on *Ways and Means of Folk-psychology* (Philos. Studien, Vol. IV, 1888) one will find the limits within which Wundt allows a folk-psychology very narrow, as compared with those allowed by Lazarus. Moreover, Lazarus, the taciturn person, has thoroughly investigated and clearly put this question in his *Philosophie der Geschichte, Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie* (Philosophy of History, Folk-psychology and Sociology) which appeared in my *Berner Studien zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte* (Bern Studies in philosophy and its history), Vol. XVII, 1900. In a similar direction proceed the works of J. Seliger (*Das sociale Verhalten des menschlichen Individuums zur menschlichen Gattung*) and of Hermann Klein (*Individual-und Sozialethik in ihren Gegenseitigen Beziehungen*) (Berner Studien, Vols. XXXVI and XXXVII, 1904). If their results cannot be ascribed to Lazarus, this is due to the fact that fifty-eight

years separate us from the foundation of folk-psychology. We work with other methods, according to other points of view, with different ends and consequently, arrive at wholly different results. Respect for person has always, and under all circumstances, to make room for duty to science. It is regrettable that Steinthal was so little influenced by Comte in Paris that he wrote rather contemptuously and disparagingly of the author of "philosophic positivism" to his friend, and later, brother-in-law, Lazarus. A deep study of Comte, Condorcet and Vico convinced Steinthal and Lazarus that Comte possessed already that which they sought. The name surely was different—a philosophically unfortunate name, namely, sociology. But the thing was already in existence. Herbert Spencer's Sociology, especially, the theoretical and descriptive portions of it, constitutes in reality that system to which Lazarus and Steinthal, through more than 25 years' joint work, have supplied the key-stone. To indicate in one word the nature of this joint work, we may say that the Schillerean demand of the union of charm and dignity was satisfied in this way, that on the side of Lazarus there was charm and on that of Steinthal, dignity. That the movement towards folk-psychology proceeded from Lazarus appears to me an established fact. Likewise, I regard the important work of the year 1851 on "the concept and possibility of folk-psychology" as a product of the brain of Lazarus, so that the priority in time cannot be questioned. But one must have respect for truth; the actual work fell principally, if not exclusively, on the shoulders of Steinthal, whilst the produce of the work, the ideal produce of course, was so apportioned by Steinthal that the greater portion was made over to his then adored brother-in-law. In the first years only. Lazarus wrote some articles and reviews. One has only to examine the last 12 volumes of the magazine to be convinced that the contribution from Lazarus amounts to very little. What could be done by divination,

grace, happy inspiration, a charming style and flattering words, Lazarus performed beautifully, and where, on the other hand, the question was of boring deeply, digging into the strata of knowledge, penetrating behind and beyond the surface of knowledge, the dignity of Steinthal was in place.

In Prutz's "Deutsches Museum" Lazarus published in 1851 the already-mentioned article "*Ueber den Begriff und die Möglichkeit einer Völkerpsychologie* (On the concept and possibility of a folk-psychology.) Here Lazarus investigates closely what might have hitherto appeared to him dark and dismal, namely, the concept of the total spirit. That with it a new science is founded, Lazarus might very well claim. For the happiness of the discoverer, the fortunate and rapturous eureka cry of the youthful enthusiast, one may make allowance, and one may sympathise with him for the fact that this pretended "discovery" which he put on paper in three weeks with "feverish" haste, so that he broke down under the weight of the work, caused a shudder to pass through his whole frame. Seen from the historical distance, the enthusiasm for this alleged new science must perceptibly cool down; it is new in proportion as it is science. As for its newness, its problem is not more recent than philosophy itself. The Aristotelian doctrine of the "total spirit" of man which alone is immortal (νους ποιητικὸς and νους παθητικός are the problems of the later commentators; Aristotle himself speaks only of ποιουν) contains within it the model of all folk-psychology. The unity of the will, as the aim of the State, is an old fundamental thought of Plato, which, moreover, the Thracians, Scythians and Hellenes have already characterised in the manner of the folk-psychology of Lazarus. And finally, the philosophical central problem of the Middle Ages—the so-called problem of universals—is nothing but the fundamental question of Lazarus, How

is the individual related to the universe? Only, Lazarus confines his theme to the relation of the individual man to the race-spirit, to the spirit of the people or the nation. But this does not raise any new problem, but the old problem of universals receives at the hands of Lazarus a "folk-psychological"—we say "sociological" to-day—turn. The problem of Lazarus is rather only a sociological special case of the comprehensive problem of the universal. Which is earlier and higher in value, the particular or the universal, the species or the race, the particular sensation or the logical concept, the particular individual or the religious, social and natural community, the individual citizen or the State?

Leaving aside all the philosophers of the Middle Ages who worked at the problem of universals, Hegel's doctrine of the objective spirit is the direct model for Lazarus's "total spirit" as well as for Wundt's collective will, and what is called in recent times universal spirit. Aristotle and Hegel are the true fathers of this thought which Lazarus and Wundt have sketched in their own way.

Of course, Lazarus has obtained new aspects even of Platonism. In the "Introductory thoughts on folk-psychology" with which Lazarus and Steinthal's "Journal of folk-psychology and philology" so happily opened in 1859, social Platonism, as I call the world-view of Lazarus, received support and strength from remote corners. The collective spirit—the Platonic Idea in a social sense—is, according to Lazarus, earlier and original and the individual spirit receives from it its existence as well as its rights. He does not do away with the individual, as Plato does, but he incorporates it completely in the race. "I try everywhere to know and grasp the collective spirit and yet not to lose the individual," he wrote once to Graffunder. Through Lazarus's folk-psychology the collective spirit is brought to "scientific consciousness." Lazarus distinguishes four forms of social life: speech, public service, public spirit and legislation. In the *Synthetic Thoughts and Folk-psychology*

(Vol. III of the Journal) these thoughts are enlarged in this way, that the view is propounded that the objective spirit reveals itself in five different modes of activity. The "relation of the individual to the whole" Lazarus has treated of separately in a finely conceived inquiry which one can unreservedly praise, like all writings of Lazarus, as being written in the style of highest popularity. Steinthal has undoubtedly advanced science, but to have widened science and carried it to distant corners is the lasting service of Lazarus.

Gustav Ratzenhofer, on the other hand, deserves credit for having put a German "Sociology" in place of the "folk-psychology" of Lazarus and Steinthal. Ratzenhofer has arrived at pure philosophy through politico-social problems. His first work *Wesen und Zweck der Politik als Teil der Soziologie und Grundlage der Staatswissenschaften* (Essence and object of politics as a part of sociology and Principles of political sciences), 3 Vols., Leipzig, 1893, exhibits the influence of Comte. Only there is this difference, that Comte has closed his system of positive philosophy with sociology, whilst Ratzenhofer has begun his world-view with sociology. The Heraclitean πόλεμος πατὴρ πάντων stands in the current of Ratzenhofer's *Politics* which states the "law of absolute hostility," the formula of which runs, "Absolute hostility is the prime force in politics." Through this formula there arises the naturalistic, Macchiavellian tendency of Ratzenhofer. For him not only art and nature, as in Goethe, but history and nature are one. For here Ratzenhofer recognises his "prime force." From this there results the fundamental naturalistic view. Human history is only a special case of universal natural history. Man is only a part of the entire nature and is therefore subject, not only in his mechanism and chemism, but also in all his inter-spiritual experiences, to the universal natural laws. As the atoms are regulated in their mutually opposed relationship by attraction and repulsion, or as the chemical compounds are regulated by affinity and its opposite, resistance to the

formation of compounds, so man is governed in society by the elementary striving for self-preservation (ἐπὶ τὸ τηρειν ἑαυτο' of the Stoics, *sse se velle* of Spinoza). And thus, according to Ratzenhofer, the satisfaction of the indispensable material needs is the proper theme of history. Like Comte, Ratzenhofer also recognises, by the side of social statics or the state of rest, when the social equilibrium is attained, a social dynamics, that is, a law of movement in history. If the equilibrium between methods of production, State institutions, social divisions and ruling ideas (idée mère of Comte, idée maîtresse of Taine) is disturbed, the class-struggle or race-struggle in history seeks again to bring about this equilibrium, in accordance with strict laws of evolution. This law of evolution (*progrès* with Comte) constitutes a permanent advance in the humanisation of the social struggle for existence. As St. Simon, Comte and Spencer unanimously declare, the warrior type gradually gives way to the industrial. The disturbed political and social equilibrium which is found to-day within our culture-circle, moves, according to Ratzenhofer, as well as according to Comte, in accordance with a formula which banishes opposition of interests. Ratzenhofer calls this "harmony of the political impulses" Comte, *pouvoir spirituel* or *autorité spirituelle*. Comte maintained that the individual in the State is a fiction like the atom. In every drop of blood of a person there runs the race-experience of the preceding series of forefathers. In the static condition (of social preservation) the individual within the family, especially, the chief endowed with *patria potestas*, would acquire a social significance but in the transition from the family to the race, to the nation, to the State, the individual loses himself, in order to give way to the collective, to the nation. In the age of machines, especially, personality sinks to a negligible quantity. The Moloch or Leviathan, State, reduces personality, as in Hobbes, to an automaton. The citizen is a machine for voting, an

automaton for the performance of socially useful actions. Also according to Ratzenhofer, in the civilized state the individual cannot free himself from the entangling and pressing networks of relations. The individual as a "social unit" is, according to Ratzenhofer also, a pure fiction. Only the *political* personality (group, party, above all, State) represents the unit of the social will. As in Comte, so in Ratzenhofer, the race *man* governs in advanced States the objects of the isolated individual. Thus, however individual the essence of politics may always be, so far as it tries to protect the just interests of individual citizens in the State and preserve their well-acquired rights, the object of all politics is civilization and culture. As according to Kant, the path of history is characterised by three mile-stones, cultivation, civilization and moralisation, so that the whole path from bestial animality to humanity has to traverse three stages, and as according to Comte (also, according to Turgot, as we have already seen), mankind passes through the theological and metaphysical stages before it reaches the positive phase, so Ratzenhofer lets civilization and culture triumph over tricks and violence; the interest of the race, humanity, the "harmony of the political impulse" overcomes the individual utility, the individual interest. From here the road leads straight to Ratzenhofer's "Sozialischer Erkenntnis" (Social knowledge), (Leipzig 1898) which work tries to bring under scientific categories the mutual relationship between men. Lester F. Ward, the leading American sociologist, regards Ratzenhofer's *Soziologie* as one of the most important contributions to sociology during the last decade. Gumplowicz puts forward the exaggerated dithyramb that the whole range of political and social literature has nothing better to show. Otto Gramzow's monograph keeps at a respectable distance from these outbursts of passionate apologetics. I myself dedicated in the summer of 1904, in the life-time of Ratzenhofer, who with great satisfaction

welcomed the first few essays on board his ship, immediately before his death according to the account of his son, three essays to him which appeared in a slightly modified form in my *Sozialer Optimismus*. There I tried to characterise the fundamental principle of Ratzenhofer's sociology (p. 174 sq.). The "unity of law" of nature and history, Heraclitus was the first to teach. As Heraclitus is the progenitor of evolutionism and thus governs the world view of Spencer and Ratzenhofer, so he has also laid down the principle of that organic method in sociology which receives in Ratzenhofer the formulation, "Every agreement of biological laws with historical, whether grounded upon analogy or identity, is only thinkable through a unity of law of all phenomena."

The development and extension of this "unity of law", advanced as a *petitio principii* over all provinces of nature and society, is the proper work of Ratzenhofer's Sociology. Spencer brings for the same purpose out of the inexhaustible fountain of "descriptive sociology" powerful comparative ethnographical materials. Ratzenhofer works, on the contrary, more with his unnaturally passionate, sensitive, happily inspired fantasy. For him dogma arises with absolute certainty out of the "unity of law of the world." Physics, mechanics, geology and chemistry cannot be essentially different from sociology so far as the form of the laws of evolution is concerned. The laws of chemistry can be applied easily to the phenomena of human society, and Ratzenhofer has the courage to say that "the identity of causes in chemical and social phenomena is capable of being a support of the molecular theory." In order to remove every ambiguity of expression, Ratzenhofer carries his "monism" of the unity of law to an extreme point and announces with emphasis, "This agreement of organic life-process with the social process is not an imaginary agreement but a causal one."

Such a "unity of law" cannot, however, be taken for granted but must be proved. For such a "philosophy of identity" as Ratzenhofer might sociologically make easy for us, one cannot make use of the "unity of law," demanded but not proved by Fichte and Schelling, about which Hegel says with contempt in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Phenomenology of the Spirit) that it is shot from the pistol and resembles night in which all crows are black. If one takes as wide a view as is done by Ratzenhofer and all philosophers of identity that have existed from the time of the Eleatics to that of Spinoza, who take for their standpoint the propositions, *Being and thinking are only one and the same thing*, "*One is All and Being*," all manifoldness and contradictions disappear, but only because the observer from the high watch-tower of his accepted standpoint can as little see them as the Alpinist can see the summit of the small hill in the valley. The faintness of the impression is not due to the hills but to the chosen horizon of the observer.

He who has obtained this insight will not raise himself with Ratzenhofer, Fichte or Schelling, through a metaphysical chimera, through a somersault of human reason, to this highest unity, but he will allow himself to be guided by philosophical systems which have stood the test of history. If philosophy wants to have a topography of the universe in nature and history, that is, if it wants to survey and measure the *globus intellectualis*, it must begin empirico-inductively, proceed from the simple and individual, regard things and objects in very close proximity to their reality and not place itself at a great distance from them, in order to derive reality from the unity assumed without any proof.

Ratzenhofer is as energetic an evolutionist as Fichte before him and Ostwald in his time were. And the fundamental proposition of Ratzenhofer: "Without consciousness there is no being, without intellect, no individual being, and without sensation, no consciousness": is epistemologically as much

shot from the pistol as Fichte's highest requirement: The ego posits itself. Here, as there, thought begins with a postulate, a requirement: Posit yourself. Whoever accepts this *petitio principii* can further believe in the system; he whose critical progress, however, is stopped by this postulate can make no further progress. For this reason Hegel has shown how one must accept this identity of thought and being, spirit and nature, consciousness and the external world assumed as a matter of course, not at the beginning of philosophy as an hypothesis but at its end as an indispensable logical consequence. Hegel's derivation is a logico-dialectical one which will not at all satisfy the taste of our age. The other great evolutionist, Herbert Spencer, has in his *First Principles* arrived at his unknowable, the manifestations of the force of which we place as effects in our consciousness, not like Hegel, according to the dialectical method, but through the path of physics, chemistry and the exact sciences, which he has investigated scientifically and arranged in their proper order. Hegel's starting-point is the *epistemological* ground according to the causal relation of ground and consequence, Herbert Spencer's is the *real* ground according to the causal relation of cause and effect. Hegel proceeds therefore dialectico-logically, Spencer, on the other hand, logico-inductively. Hegel's logical positing is "logos," "thought," "being," Spencer's is the sensuous experience. The two thinkers equally arrive at a highest point of unity, because according to Spencer also, the ground of knowledge and the ground of reality run parallel through the two attributes of extension and thought. A third path has been struck by Wundt in his *Völkerpsychologie*, in which he pays more attention to legends, myths, religion, morals, art, science in their origin and historical course, than to biophores, cells, monera, protists, and thus unfolds through the path of history the mystery of human existence. This path seems to me more easy than that struck by Ratzenhofer. To me, an epistemological foundation of sociology, as well as a psychology of

philosophical system-building appears to be the most pressing necessity of our age. The unity of law which Ratzenhofer takes for granted cannot be accepted as a supposition but must be achieved as a result.

Ratzenhofer's world-view rests upon a generalisation which he has taken from sociology and transferred to metaphysics. The "adhering interest" is the central concept of his sociology in which the ascent from self-interest to race-interest is clearly sketched. Now it has become an astrophysical generalisation. All phenomena from the heavenly bodies down to the atoms, and all organisms are parts of the primitive force with an adhering (inherent) interest in their evolution.

As Hartmann did with regard to all phenomena of the unconscious, as Schopenhauer did with regard to the phenomena of the will, as Nietzsche did with regard to the manifestation of the "will to power" or the philosopher of the world-fantasy did with regard to all forms of manifestation of "fantasy," so Ratzenhofer seeks to examine all provinces of knowledge from the central thought or "inherent interest," in order to find the forms of externalisation of the "inherent interest." "Positive monism" (1899) seeks the validity of this fundamental proposition in the domain of the whole living and non-living nature, *Positive ethics* in the field of human morals, whereas the last work but one, *Die kritik des Intellekts* (Leipzig 1902), seeks to defend it in the province of psychology and epistemology. As every philosophical system sends out rays from a single centre to the periphery of knowledge, so Ratzenhofer also seeks to work through natural and spiritual sciences, but only so far as they prove useful to his fundamental thought. Positive monism, as the system of Ratzenhofer is called, demands the unity of law of nature and spirit. This unity the materialists seek in matter, the idealists in consciousness, the energists in monads or units of force. The "thing-in-itself," explained by Kant and Spencer as unknowable, does not long satisfy the mind. The

"metaphysical craving" which Kant himself recognised, forces us to symbolise the unknowable, and this is for Ratzenhofer the primitive force whose essence (attribute) is attraction. The primitive force-points embedded in the layer of force move freely in space according to the law of attraction. They form the elementary atom which is the bearer of potential energy. Attraction and repulsion play in Ratzenhofer the same rôle of the world-architect as the eternal rhythm of integration and differentiation does in Herbert Spencer. Ratzenhofer infers the unity of all forces, and even life is included in this unity. Life is for Ratzenhofer no phenomenon *sui generis* but a mode of energy, such as reveals itself in the process of chemical affinity. What works in the apparently lifeless nature as latent energy, we call in the world of life, inherent interest, and we call that which one's own nature has created, will. Even human consciousness is thus no exception to the universal law of energy. Even the most beautiful thing of mankind, the moral law, fits in with the innate interest of the primitive force-point. The world of values and ends, the moral *ought*, is governed by the law of nature, and is already portrayed in the formula of energy. The ethical ascent from what is useful to the individual to what is useful to the community, from egoism to altruism, is viewed by Ratzenhofer, as it is done by Comte and Spencer, as a strictly determined process of natural law. Even æsthetic perception is grounded in the innate nature of the interest of man.

Since the appearance of the *Kritik des Intellekts* 1902, "consciousness as original expression" has come to the foreground of Ratzenhofer's thought. Now "sensation is the first experience of organic life." "Without consciousness there is no being." In place of the lower mechanical functions there now appears intellect. And when Ratzenhofer, moreover, became acquainted with the writings of the Kiel botanist Reinke and his theory of

dominants, there occurred an important change in his thoughts. In the scientific appendix of the "Allgem. Zeitung" for May 26, 1904 Ratzenhofer expressed his views in an essay on *Sociology and Reinke's theory of Dominants.* Reinke's dominants or "system-forces" are to-day brought close to the "inherent interest." "Life, given mechanically by the primitive force, is, in consciousness in the waking state, guided by the other interests.....Interest is an expression for the will of the ruling primitive force to preserve consciousness in the microcosm of an organism, so long as the necessary constellation of bodies (system-forces) is present. Here we stand in front of the single principle of all appearances, the primitive force capable of coming into consciousness, the eternal riddle." This primitive force manifests itself, according to Ratzenhofer, with causal and not with final necessity, that is, it knows only the laws of its process, not laws or final causes (causale finales). With it, however, as Gramzow points out rightly against Ratzenhofer, such purposive structures as "self-preservation," V. Baer's "striving after ends," nay, even "the impulse of the primitive force towards perfection," find a place in the world-process in Ratzenhofer's system. I go a step further. Ratzenhofer's fundamental formula, the inherent interest, is a teleological and not a strictly causal formula. For in everything causal, as we have seen, the parts precede the whole, the causes the effects, so that the momentary present is ruled by the past, whereas in everything teleological the whole is earlier than its parts (in the protoplasm the whole future organism is foreshadowed). The effect occurs in point of time earlier than the final causes calling them into being and the momentary present is not governed, as in the causal succession, by the past, but by the future, that is, by the end to be fulfilled. If the "inherent interest" had been really what Ratzenhofer had wanted, namely, a long and vainly sought world-formula, then the course of all events would have proceeded according to the world-plan foreshadowed in

this inherent interest. The separate forces or energies, nay, even the laws of nature, would then be subject to the universal imperative of the inherent system.

If this is not metaphysics, I do not know what metaphysics is. Ratzenhofer's world-view is energistic pantheism in the terminology of our age. It stands very close to the ethical pantheism of Fichte. Both start in the same way from Spinoza: only, Spinoza lived in the classical age of constructive mathematics and consequently, he wrote his "Ethics" *more geometrico*. His pantheism is, therefore, a mathematical one. The substance of Spinoza is a logical "postulate" of the *ratio intuitiva* possessing a thought-necessity, as the axioms of Euclid are nothing else than necessary "postulates." Substance as a logical axiom has the same self-evidence as the mathematical axioms. These are not deduced or demonstrated from below, as ascending from the parts to the whole, as proceeding from the sensuous experience to the highest generalisation; all sensuous data are required and conditioned by the highest "postulates." Fichte, on the other hand, conceives his system under the guidance of the "categorical imperative" of Kant.

For him substance is no being, as it is with Spinoza, but an *ought*, a problem to be solved, a duty to be performed. *Deus sive natura* is not geometrical-statical, as in Spinoza, but dynamical, full of movement, as in Leibniz. The pantheism of Fichte is not an ontologico-logical but a teleologico-evolutionistic one. The direction of evolution of substance—its *dominants*, its *conatus*—is therefore an ethico-practical one, no being but a doing. God is the same as the *ordo ordinans*, the moral order of the world, which gradually fulfils itself in man and through man. Fichte's age is a predominantly dialectico-speculative one and thus it happens that Fichte conceives his world-view, not like Spinoza *more geometrico*, but like Schelling and Hegel, who make use of the dialectical method,

more dialectico. Ratzenhofer, however, is a product of the Darwin-Spencerian epoch. From the time of Darwin the problem of life has become the problem of the day. Since the beginning of the biological period of science nothing in life interests us more than life itself. With biology, moreover, the purposive elements appear in the foreground and we have that neo-vitalistic movement which we have sketched above (p. 213 sq.). Spencer revives Schelling, Ostwald nature-philosophy. In this groove of thought Ratzenhofer appears first as an apprentice and very soon after as a master. A proper survey of his position in the history of philosophy is wanting. But "feeling is the pioneer of knowledge," Ratzenhofer once says, quoting Wundt, without relating that building on this thought Ribot has revived to-day a world-view which was the prevailing one in England in the eighteenth century. With this "feeling" Ratzenhofer grasps the problems and very soon the problems grasp him. He believes he has pushed but is himself pushed. The immanent logic which draws him with irresistible force towards pantheism makes him identify the "primitive force" with Herbert Spencer's "Unknowable" and Kant's "thing-in-itself." Without knowing the thought-current of the history of philosophy, Ratzenhofer is driven into the arms of Fichte. But Fichte is a speculative genius. Ratzenhofer, on the other hand, is a thinker who starts from Herbert Spencer and is trained in the hard school of life and of natural science, a thinker who does not share the flight of thought of Fichte and falls far short of his knowledge of the history of philosophy but makes amends for this by a rich, careful and delicate conception of the principles of natural philosophy of to-day. His method is thus not a dialectical one, as Fichte's is, but a biological one, like that of Reinke. But in his principal thoughts, in the structure of his system of positive monism, he is a pantheist like Spinoza and Fichte.

If sociology, however, should have the scientific right of existence or even claim to be a philosophy of society, it must follow straight the path shown to it by Comte and Spencer and continue with perseverance, and this is, as we have represented above, the inductive procedure. It must ascend from facts to causes and not, as in Ratzenhofer, descend from the causes, taken as metaphysical postulates, as a "primitive force," or an "inherent interest," to the facts. First, description, then explanation, and not inversely, as in Ratzenhofer, first explanation and then description. First, the real ground, then the ground of knowledge—this is the requirement of an exact sociology.

There are several methods for a scientific sociology which proceeds from facts, in order gradually to rise to explanations, experiential rules (empeireme, as Wundt calls them) or uniformities in history, as Karl Lamprecht and Kurt Breysig represent them. One can examine comparative ethnography, as this has been done by the English and the Americans with the help of Tylor, McLennan, Lubbock, Morgan and Spencer, and on the German side has been done with great success from the time of Bastian, principally by Steinmetz (a Dutch sociologist who has been teaching since January 1908 in Amsterdam and who, besides, writes in German) and Vierkandt in Berlin (Die Stetigkeit in Kulturwandel. Soziologische Studie, 1908). Another method is to pay attention to statistics, especially, criminal and moral statistics, as this has been done from the time of Quételet and v. Oettingen. The next method is to take a group of social facts, namely, anthropologico-ethnological ones, for people in a natural state, and statistico-demographical ones for civilized people. In this way one gets control of the firm land of facts upon which to build the superstructure of sociological generalisations. If one has first investigated the real ground of social events then the time comes for investigating the epistemological ground.

But even the biological method of the so-called organists in sociology (v. Lilienfeld, René, Worms) has a certain justification, has at least a heuristic value. If one accepts, with the organic school of law (v. Savigny, Bluntschli) and the organic philosophy of history (Schelling and the Romanticists), and lastly, with the vitalistic nature-philosophers in these days (v. Bunge, Reinke, Driesch), that the forms of society follow the same laws as all organic forms (cell-state, symbiotes), one must investigate the laws of the phenomena of life in order to deduce from these the laws of the social phenomena as special cases. Sociology would then be a part of universal biology, that is, the universal laws of life, as applied to humnn social forms. This biological method may be one-sided and may have suffered a scientific ship-wreck, yet it proceeds at least from facts, although from biological and not directly from sociological ones, as the followers of ethnographical and comparative-historical methods maintain.

Lastly, a third path is possible which has been followed by George Simmel (*Sociology* 1908), Emile Durkheim and Lester F. Ward, namely, the psychological and logical method. In this method, the socio-psychical phenomena are examined with regard to their origin and contents of knowledge ; at the same time, however, they are examined with regard to the limits of their generalising capacity. In this direction lie the efforts of the Vienna sociologist Rudolf Goldscheid (*Soziologie und Geschichtswissenschaft.* Ostwald's Annalen der Naturphilosophie, July 1908, p. 229) who proceeds from Wundt, and of Rudolf Eisler, whose short sketch *Sociology* (Weber's illustrated Catechisms, Vol. 31, published by J. J. Weber, Leipzig) is the most useful sketch in the German language and is far superior to the rival attempts of Achelis and Eleutheropulos. Ludwig Gumplowicz's *Outlines of Sociology* (Second Edition, Vienna, 1905) is the fundamental work for the disciples of Ratzenhofer. The Windelband-Rickertian enunciation of the problem which has unfolded the logical problem of the historical

formation of concepts has taken a wholly epistemological turn. In any case, the sociologists of to-day, especially, the German sociologists, have discussed at length these fundamental questions of this young science on their psychological, epistemological and logical sides. Nothing of this kind, however, is found in Ratzenhofer. Neither the ethnographical method which starts from the description of social facts, nor the biological, which has for its starting-point the facts and laws of life, nor lastly, the psychologico-logical method which has for its principles the facts of individual or social spiritual life, is consistently followed by Ratzenhofer or even examined on the question of its utility. That in a modern sociology there are violent disputes between the rival methods, which during the last ten years greatly excited the scientific interest of those who took part in them, is serious enough. That, however, none of the three rival methods is seriously followed, far less consistently developed, is a scientific sin of omission. But my pointing this out does not show that my respect for the thinker has suffered any diminution. Of this favourite method of to-day, the method of giving vent to philosophical likes and dislikes, of exhibiting a predilection for a favourite thought which acts as a guiding motive that never gets out of the head of the writer, in order then to vary this theme through nature and history, we have already spoken. If every one feels himself a "separate individual" and philosophises against all other thinkers, there arises a dialectical anarchy of thought or ego-centric philosophy of hobby.

Ratzenhofer's posthumous *Sociology* (1907) is a political book, formerly a continuation of his three-volumed work *Wesen und Zweck der Politik* (Essence and aim of politics) as also of his "Sociologische Erkenntnis." Politics is applied sociology. There personal convictions, effusions of feelings, reflexions on everyday movements are as admissible as they are inadmissible in a "sociology" which still takes its stand

upon positive monism and wants to be free from all hypothesis. A "sociology" must calmly and quietly group the social facts, whether ethnographical, statistical, biological or psychological, but only *facts*, not emotional effusions and resentments. And from this defect unfortunately, the posthumous work *Sociology* of Ratzenhofer is not free, as reflexion throughout predominates, while the social facts fall completely into the background.

There are, especially, two problems to which this Sociology principally leads—the race-problem and the class-problem. Here Ratzenhofer has shifted his position, if not made a complete change of front, as compared with his views in his former writings. The reading of the "Grundlagen" of Houston Stewart Chamberlain has greatly affected him. By an emphatic rejection of Gobineau (p. 85) he approaches more and more the standpoint of Chamberlain, although he admits (p. 38) that there can be no constant race which is absolutely unchangeable. All races rather continue on the assumption of variation. Only the division of ruling races, labouring races and industrial races (p. 68) is one of those hasty categorisations which constitute Chamberlain's emotional strength but at the same time his logical weakness.

Two spirits struggle in the breast of Ratzenhofer. Backward-looking instincts always oppose forward-pressing convictions. The legal socialist in him is in everlasting conflict with the monarchist. Hence the emotional, lively, forward tendencies of his *Sociology*. It is a confession of the interesting personality of Ratzenhofer. The book is full of contradictions and forcible like life itself. As a personal testament of the interesting man, the book will have a permanent value. One cannot, however, claim for this posthumous work the title of a sociology, still less, *the* sociology. For this the "inherent interest" in the political questions of the day clings too strongly to him. The clear philosophical view of what is beyond to-day and yesterday which one finds in Spinoza, the favourite thinker of Ratzenhofer, is wanting in this "Sociology." The questions

are not handled *sub æternitatis specie*, not calmly and dispassionately discussed, but on the contrary, attacked humanly, indeed, all too humanly.

The German sociologists look at the social problem very seldom without party-feeling. The dispassionate and impersonal view which we regard as a self-evident necessity in every other discipline, we can demand but seldom attain in this young, not yet fully-fledged discipline which is struggling for its right of existence. In the problem of sociology we are included as individuals and in its solutions we are personally interested. The "social problem" and its solution touch our innermost nerve in a way wholly different from that in which chemical or physical questions touch us. Consequently, sociology has not only the earthly smell of nationality—not only does the problem of nationality itself belong to its domain—but it carries with it the hot breath of the sociologists. It is easy for sciences like mathematics to reach not only the stage of being international but also of being impersonal. The "social problems" are, however, so deeply rooted in our innermost life that one can understand, if not approve of, the circumstance that there are to-day as many sociologies as there are sociologists. The English have advanced most in the direction of impersonality in the treatment of social problems, as the English have discovered in the constitution of their State the most happy synthesis between the just claims of personality and the requirements of universality.

In full and conscious opposition to that world-view of the ancient thinkers, which conceived the universal, the city State, the Hellenic or Roman nation, as everything, and looked upon the individual, so far as he was not a political or scientific genius, as a tiny trifle, as absolute meaninglessness, the sons of Albion always esteem the particular more than the general, the individual more than the State, practice more than theory, the concrete more than the abstract. Whether the English

Empire which has become a true *imperium universale* and not merely a Mediterranean Empire, like the *imperium romanum*, has been successful on account of, or in spite of, this placing of the particular and concrete in the foreground; whether thus the *post hoc* of the English empire is due to the *propter hoc* of English individualism, cannot here be discussed at great length. On the English soil for the first time political theory and political practice shook hands with each other. The English opponents of monarchy—with Milton at their head—have placed the democratic problem of the sovereignty of the people in the foreground of the scientific debate, the English politicians—with Cromwell at their head—have taught civilized people not only how revolution is made but how it unites men and leads to the welfare of the whole nation.

It is a caprice of history that even the theory of "class struggle" has been conceived on the English soil, although by a German, Karl Marx, who enjoyed the hospitality of England for no less than one-half of his life and reached the formulation of his class-struggle-theory by a study of English political economy.

Whilst Marx was refining and polishing his class-struggle theory, Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer constructed that biological formula of the "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest" which became the shibboleth of the entire civilised world in the second half of the nineteenth century. Karl Marx, the representative of the class-struggle-theory, and Herbert Spencer, the philosophical representative of the struggle-for-existence-theory, worked ten years together in coming London, like Saint-Simon and Fourier in Paris, without into close personal contact. The satire of history, His Majesty Chance, as Voltaire called it, has not given us the pleasure of bringing together, in life and work, Marx and Spencer. Surely, they would then have opposed each other both as human beings and with regard to their objects. Karl Marx manifestly never came within the range of vision

of Herbert Spencer, otherwise it would be difficult to conceive how the latter completely passed over in his autobiography, where he treated everything with the painful accuracy of a diarist *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*, a man like Karl Marx. Karl Marx, the scientific investigator and a man of literary tastes, surely knew Herbert Spencer's works and saw in the energetic nonconformist liberalism of Spencer his own political and social counterpart. But on the other hand, there is no mention of the existence of Karl Marx in the writings of Herbert Spencer. The author of the *Capital* had many things to say to the author of the "Synthetic philosophy" which deserved serious mention, which might perhaps even have led to a revision of his political views and convictions which were deeply rooted in him from his childhood. But it never came to this. The *Capital* was written in German. And Herbert Spencer who himself understood no German did not manifestly give it to his secretaries for having it translated. And thus the philosopher of the class-struggle is completely ignored by the philosopher of the struggle-for-existence.

Following the historico-genetic method I make a historical derivation of the theory of class-struggle. Its originator is Heraclitus, the "dark" philosopher of Ephesos, the founder of that evolutionistic world-view, whose most eloquent spokesman and most happy interpreter has been Herbert Spencer. The remains of the works of Hippolytos discovered about half a century ago have given us that wonderful sociological fragment (44 and 84 in the edition of Bywater) which we can look upon as the beginning of sociology as a science. "War," says Heraclitus, "is the father and king of all things or beings. War has shown some to be kings, others to be men, some it has made slaves, others free." This πολεμος πατηρ παντων is, as we have already said, the sociological model of the "survival of the fittest." "Those who have fallen in the struggle," says Heraclitus at another place, "them worship gods and men, and the greater the fall, the louder the cry."

And Gomperz interprets (**Greek thinkers**, 2nd Edition, Vol. I, p. 59) this sociological fragment of Heraclitus in this way, that through the testing and verification of forces the skilful and the unskilful are differentiated, the State formed and Society established. Herbert Spencer has allowed this military type of human race which is now being detached from the industrial type of mankind, the same rôle of selection as the struggle-formula of Heraclitus. From here a straight line leads, through Hobbes's "bellum omnia contra omnes," to the biological formula of the struggle for the conditions of life, according to Malthus's law of inverse arithmetical and geometrical proportion. The "struggle for existence" of Darwin which refers clearly to Malthus, and Herbert Spencer's formula of the "survival of the fittest" which Spencer had formulated long before Darwin, lead directly to the "class-struggle" of Karl Marx and the "race-struggle" of Gobineau, Gumplowicz and H. St. Chamberlain.

The formula of the "struggle for existence" of living beings had only value for Herbert Spencer in the grand structure of his world-view when he succeeded in incorporating Darwin's doctrine of "natural selection" as a special case in his universal theory of evolution. In his *Autobiography* (Vol. II, Chapter 39) Herbert Spencer states the date—it was the 9th June, 1864—on which he succeeded in incorporating in his universal evolution-formula of integration and differentiation, of the distribution of matter and motion, the Darwinian doctrine of "natural selection" which seemed to be a phenomenon *sui generis* unrelated to other phenomena. Henceforth, he replaced Darwin's "natural selection" by "survival of the fittest." This biological phenomenon of survival of the fittest was in his eyes satisfactorily deduced when it could be resolved into a physical law. The strictly agnostic monism of Herbert Spencer even demanded, like the evolutionary monism of Herder, a monistic conception of the universe which did not tear nature and history into two heterogeneous halves

but conceived history either as a part, or as a special case of universal natural occurrences. History is for Herder, as for Spencer, nature itself, only at a higher level of evolution. The universal physical laws maintain, therefore, their validity in biology as well as in sociology. So long, thus, as sociological phenomena could not be resolved into the biological, and these, again, into the purely physical, the scientific explanation or deduction was unsatisfactory for Spencer. For this reason he received Darwin's formula of "struggle for existence" with some coldness, for in 1859 he had not yet seen the way from the biology of Darwin to the physics of the Spencerian doctrine of evolution. In 1864 the idea occurred to him that the proposition of the parallelogram of forces, the doctrine of Clausius, that the entropy of the world tends to a maximum, constituted the bridge from biology to physics. He was strengthened in this, as we have already said, by K. Ernst von Baer's doctrine of striving for an end which he esteemed highly, and by his initiation into the mysteries of Schelling's nature-philosophy which was served to him by the English Schellingian, Coleridge, especially, by his *Idea of Life*.

The synthesis completed by Spencer in the year 1864 through the doctrine of equilibrium gave the following result (*Sociology*): All changes in nature tend constantly towards a condition of equilibrium. On the road to absolute equilibrium, that is, to rest, there occurs a process of labile equilibrium, a system of interdependent parts which, when separate, perform such actions as conduce to the preservation of the whole. Every living organism represents such a labile equilibrium, the removal of which means death. Every race shows individuals, the equilibrium of whom has passed through fewer variations and who consequently, preserve themselves better than others. These are the fittest who survive the other individuals (with a less favourable condition of equilibrium), or, as Darwin says, they are selected by nature. If

one thus understands the continuation of the individual as the preservation of its mobile equilibrium, which in certain individuals is destroyed early by chance causes, whereas in others it is still preserved for the continuance of the race, we see that survival and continuance of the selected are to be conceived as purely physical processes, namely, as the direct results of a *complex form of the universal dissipation of matter and motion.* By thus placing biology and physics side by side, and thus subsuming the sociological under the universal laws of living organisms, and these, again, under the purely physical ones, Herbert Spencer approaches the primitive type of human philosophising as it meets us in its naïve unreflecting originality among the Ionian nature-philosophers. What Anaximander called the endless, the boundless (ἄπειρον), the final unity of all changes in nature and spirit, is called by Herbert Spencer the Unknowable. What further Anaximenes called the double process of condensation and rarefaction, what, according to Diogenes of Apollonia, the disciple of Anaximenes, lies at the root of all forms of change (ἑτεροιώσεις) of the primitive matter, we call to-day attraction and repulsion in physics, affinity and chemical resistance in chemistry, contractibility and expansibility in biology, sympathy and antipathy in sociology, and lastly, integration and differentiation in the general formula of Herbert Spencer. The two attributes, matter and motion, have in Herbert Spencer a strictly proportional relationship of integration and differentiation to each other, just as the two attributes of extension and thought in Spinoza run eternally parallel. But even in Empedocles love (φιλία, ἁρμονία) and hatred (νεῖκος or ἔχθος) succeed each other in cyclical rhythm, whence there results a periodic change from world-destruction to world-construction with which philosophy has become familiar since the days of Anaximenes.

The eternal struggle-formula of the world which meets us within the narrow limits of class-struggle, already existed

among the Indians in *Atman* and *Brahman*,[1] in Vishnu and Śiva, among the Persians in Ormuzd and Ahriman, in our own culture-system as heaven and hell, God and devil, Christ and Anti-Christ. That all harmony rests upon the reconciliation of contradictions, is what the Orphic mysteries and the primitive myths of men suppose, and in the table of ten contradictories which the Pythagorean Philolaos, presumably after the Babylonian-Assyrian model, has set forth, we see a clear picture of Heraclitus's formula of struggle and harmony (παλιντονος α'ρμονιη). Even the music of the spheres itself takes place through the conquest of the opposition among the heavenly bodies. The co-existence of the opposites is thus a primitive Orphean-Pythagorean-Heraclitean doctrine.

Corresponding to this primitive opposition in the outer world there occurs in human nature itself a psychological dualism to which this necessarily outward-projected conception of opposition seems to owe its origin. Herbert Spencer recognises, for instance, in his *Psychology* only two fundamental forms of consciousness—discrimination through similarity and discrimination through dissimilarity which underlies all acts of thought. Expressed in the language of arithmetic, this doubleness of our psychological elementary functions signifies addition (comparison) and subtraction (discrimination). The logical expression for assimilation is the proposition of Identity, that for discrimination is the proposition of Contradiction. In the logical doctrine of method, this dualism is called synthesis and analysis, induction and deduction, subsumption and abstraction. With just pride Herbert Spencer could point to a brilliant verification of his fundamental postulate, according to which biological laws must be resolved into physical ones, in order that they might have sociological value, to particular

[1] Probably, Prof. Stein means *jivâtmâ* and *paramâtmâ*, for *Atman* and *Brahman* are identical.—*Translator.*

results of natural sciences which constitute a remarkable verification of this agreement of psychological and logical with biological and physical laws. The double process of similarity and dissimilarity, of synthesis and analysis, has its analogue in the entire process of nature.

According to the present-day conception of natural processes, the three kingdoms of nature hang together with solidarity. The plant assimilates inorganic substances like salt, in order to transform these into organic ones. This assimilating power of plants the scientists (Hertwig, Bunge, Ostwald) call an act of synthesis—a process of reduction. In the plants, however, the heat of the sun's rays is, as it were, warehoused (stocked). The living force of the sun's rays appears in plants as heat and light combined, which they transform into a building force. On the other hand, all animal life represents an act of analysis. For all animal life is a process of combustion or oxidation in which the elastic forces are transformed into living forces (motion, work, heat). Vegetable nourishment, therefore, gives the animals that elastic force which serves to regulate the temperature of their bodies, and the latent energy of plants is transformed, consequently, into the living energy of heat and motion in animals. The primitive conception of the eternal cycle of all things, to which Nietzsche to-day gives the name "return of all equals," is a wise one, as Moleschott has shown exquisitely in **Kreislauf des Lebens**. For plant life sinks again into the lap of Mother Earth, fertilises the ground upon which the plants grow, in order to serve the animals as food, and so in eternal cycle *ad infinitum*.

From here must the organic method in sociology, which Herbert Spencer has employed, exactly as this was done by the organic school of law (v. Savigny and Bluntschli) and the organic nature-philosophy of the romanticists (especially, Fr. Schlegel, and later, Schelling, Karl Ernst v. Baer and

Coleridge), be historically deduced. The organic method of Spencer is only a special case of the logical doctrine of method, a special part, applicable to sociology, of the questions of the extent, limits and logical value of analogical inferences, with which, finally, Ernst Mach (*Erkenntnis und Irrtum*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 217) is occupied. Spencer has, to satisfy the old requirement of Bacon, examined the negative instances of analogical inferences, and in this way, has placed, indeed, between an historical hyper-organism and an animal-vegetable particular organism, a "partial identity"—unity of purpose, solidarity of parts, growth and assimilation in the structure and function—but he has not succeeded in establishing any "total identity." For in the animal organism the parts (limbs) are perfectly coherent and directly grow with the whole organism (body), whereas in a purposive unity—society or State—the human *interests* are united but not their *bodies*. Further, the particular organism has a connected central nervous system, a special sensorium, by which the parts are directed—a thing which in supra-organisms is done by monarchs or presidents, governments or legislation, so that one can only indirectly and figuratively speak of a brain of the supra-organism.

In an organism as well as in a supra-organism the old Heraclitean formula of struggle as the father of all things holds good. The co-existence of contradictions, Heraclitus expressed in oracular words of wonderful compactness. We have, for instance, such sayings as the following:— "The disunited is in harmony with itself"—"The invisible harmony, the harmony springing from contradiction, is better than the visible one." "We are and we are not." "Good and bad are the same." All these oppositions are, however, overcome, reconciled and squared by the harmony of the universe. The struggle is not an end in itself but only a means to an end. And just as Hegel, the logical evolutionist, once said of himself, that there was hardly any proposition of Heraclitus

which he had not taken up in his logic, so Herbert Spencer, the evolutionist *par excellence*, can say of himself that he has systematically carried out the thought of Heraclitus. For even Spencer's relativism and agnosticism which seems to be concealed in Heraclitus's "Everything is fleeting," knows the co-existence of contradictions, the physical struggle of integration and differentiation, the biological opposition of assimilation and dissimilation, the psychological one of comparison (addition) and discrimination (subtraction), and lastly, the sociological one of class-struggle, interest-struggle, of sympathy and antipathy, of the military and the industrial type of the human race, and lastly, the opposition of capital and labour which is the supreme conflict of to-day. But the class-struggle is for Spencer and Heraclitus, like all struggles, no purely mechanical one, but an immanent teleological one. Struggle is, as it were, the way in which nature educates itself in order that it may choose the fittest. The ultimate aim is, as in Heraclitus, harmony. Understood physically, this harmony signifies the state of equilibrium. The striving for equilibrium governs the whole living and non-living world.

As the "struggle for existence" in the individual life of the organism signifies a principle of choice, so that the "struggle for existence" is only the means, and "survival of the fittest" the end of this whole process—the former represents the mechanico-causal, the latter, the teleological principle—so even, according to Spencer, class-struggle is the indispensable means to the attainment of higher culture forms. The military type was therefore the indispensable stage in the development of the human type "International quarrels have substantially advanced the evolution of the social structure," Spencer says in his "Sociology" (§ 435). The complete subjugation of the weak by the strong, adds Spencer, was on too many occasions and in too many places absolutely necessary. The type of a society is even conditioned by the nature of its units. If these units are cannibals, then

even the inter-social actions of groups will be cruel. As, however, in the animal world the preservation of the species is placed above the preservation of self, so also the preservation of society will precede the preservation of the individual. Consequently, the meaning of the class-struggle enjoined upon us by nature, will not be the preservation of the individual but only the elevation of the race. Everything which helps the continued existence of a society will be sought by the race-struggle, and inversely, everything will be prohibited which prejudicially affects the existence of society.

The struggle for existence ("Sociology," § 438), says Spencer, as it is carried on in the whole organic world, has become an indispensable means of evolution. Not only in the struggle between the individuals of one and the same species has survival of the fittest always worked in bringing about higher types, but we see also that the necessary struggle between the different species is the principal cause of growth and organisation. Without a universal struggle no evolution of living forces would be possible.

In this "universal struggle," the "social class-struggle" is as much a special case for society as the struggle for existence is for the individual. "With bloody teeth and claws" has the merciless selection of nature compelled living beings—and especially, men—to enter into this struggle for existence. For by virtue of this struggle the functions of the fighting organs have created themselves, that is, have forged the weapons which make this unceasing struggle easy for us. A similar thing is true, according to Spencer, of the social organism. It is the struggle of particular societies for existence which advanced their evolution. Only, this social struggle for existence when it took the form of a war was called the struggle of races and nations with one another, whereas in the industrial capitalistic era which carries on this struggle, not with the sword but with the pen, not with bloody warfare but with peaceful methods, it is the form of

the class-struggle which the social organisations are compelled to advance in the interest of their own preservation and the preservation of the equilibrium.

This inter-social struggle for existence, says Spencer, will not necessarily play in the future the same important rôle as it has done in the past. In the piratical state of the human race war had an educative value. Common defence and common attack, the secret of " viribus unitis " has chosen for us men in the struggle for existence social instincts which we have always developed and refined by adaptation and heredity. Without a social struggle for existence or war, we should perhaps be still to-day troglodytes, weak cave-dwellers or horrible natural men, like the Australian negroes. The military type was an educationally indispensable stage of the progress of the human race, for it was only through warfare that great nations were combined, organised and disciplined, so as to form one single whole. Certainly, pressure and compulsion have contributed their share towards the formation of character. The military type equalises, levels and automatises men. But this stern selection of war was indispensable if one wanted to develop certain qualities of character. The *bête humaine* could only be domesticated by the military type. But the military type of human nature has also created the harsh, rough, cruel tendencies. It is necessary to-day, in the era of industrial systems, in which settlement by arbitration has taken the place of dynastic war or wars of succession, to gradually remove those tendencies which were present in the military type of humanity.

In the industrial type, into which we are gradually growing, the proper weapons of fight are no more warfare between nations, but the Court of arbitration, no more the ordeal of fighting but settlement by compromise. Here the struggle takes a wholly different form ; it is competition, rivalry, trying to secure advantages and suppressing one's rivals. In place of the national or political strife, there has appeared the

industrial struggle. In short, it is no more nations and people who fight with one another, but in the industrial system it is principally classes, professions, groups of interests which are at war.

The individualist Herbert Spencer cannot surely ignore the sociological justification of social struggle for the attainment of better conditions of life. In him the sense of justice was so strongly ingrained that he could not but sanction every means of bettering the condition of the working classes, and therefore, class-struggle, strikes, movements for enchancing the wages, etc. If now to Spencer, the common end of all living beings is self-preservation, then naturally, every social organ strives to maintain itself in its isolation. If thus the labourers who get wages combine in the interest of the class, because they attain better, through class-consciousness, class-interest and organised class-struggle, their ends of self-preservation and maintenance of the social equilibrium, then the Spencerian sociology cannot by its own logic deny this class-struggle the sociological justification of existence.

What Spencer, however, is afraid of as a *noli me tangere* is communism. For him freedom, such as the individual enjoys under the industrial type, is above everything else, even above equality and brotherhood. He sees in communism only a new form of the mediæval feudal system which the communists pretend to destroy (Sociology, §444). Every form of absolutism is absolutely hateful to him, the despotism from below, as much as despotism from above. His Majesty the Sovereign People wishes as much to schematise and chalk out his whims, his love of power, his love of oppression, as the worst tyrant. For all communism, says Spencer, (Sociology, § 562) rests upon that principle of compulsory co-operative work which belongs essentially to the military type. The good and the bad, the lazy and the industrious are placed politically on the same level. This does not, however, agree with the educational work of the industrial type which seeks by preference such

individuals as are best adapted to life in the industrial state. In communism, however, there would result, in place of the direct plunder of the many by the few, as happened formerly in the military type, an indirect plunder of the few by the many.

The social tendency of our times Spencer has not certainly misconceived. As the industrial type has given us our altruistic feelings, we are becoming every day more and more philanthropic and humane, as our benevolent institutions for the working classes have shown in a thousand ways. But a leaning of our individualistic State, which rests upon the universal formula of the freedom of all—a conception which Herbert Spencer shares fully with Kant (see *Justice*, Appendix A, Kantian Idea of Rights),—towards communism, which rests, on the other hand, on the principle of the equality of all, Herbert Spencer looks upon as a retrograde movement. In a letter to his German biographer, Otto Gaupp, Spencer says, "A lasting improvement of society is impossible without an improvement of the individual. For the social types are necessarily determined by the character of the units. Out of inferior men one can as little build up a good society as one can build a good house with bad materials." "I believe," so Spencer concludes his remarkable letter, "that socialism is inevitable and that it will be the greatest misfortune which the world has ever had and that it will end in a military despotism of the worst type."

Whatever happens for the good of the working classes receives at the hands of Spencer full approval. All social measures which have for their object the removal of the cramping disabilities of workers, Spencer has warmly championed from the beginning of his political career. This advancement of the condition of the working classes has, however, according to Spencer, only one limit: the removal of the injustice to the working classes should not have greater injustice attending it than that from which it itself suffered.

Between socialism and liberalism the political struggle of to-day oscillates. Both recognise the class-struggle, but the liberals recognise it as an educative method, the social democrats as an end in itself. For Spencer class-struggle is a subordinate question of social-pedagogic tactics, for Karl Marx class-struggle is the most important principle. For Herbert Spencer, class-struggle is only a special case of the struggle for existence, and thus a starting-point, a moment, of social correlation which manifests itself according to eternal natural laws. For Marx, on the other hand, class-struggle is the permanent factor of history, and thus not a pure accident of social evolution, as in Spencer, but the central category, if not the substance of history. In Marx the Hegelian conceptual realism still works, whereas Spencer continues the old English tradition of nominalism. In fact, the struggle of this class-struggle-theory between the socialists and the liberals is only a modern sociological form of the ancient problem of universals—Which is prior, the individual or the race? What is the obvious meaning of history—personality, as the individualist Spencer holds, or the collective, as the socialist Marx maintains?

This eternal opposition between the individual and the race chokes us. The Biblical Cain and Abel myth has a sociological counterpart in the fratricidal conflict in the human breast itself. As personalities we long for freedom, as species of a race, for equality. In our heads we are individualists, in our hearts, socialists. In our intellect we are individualists, in our feelings, socialists. Social logic offers us, with Spencer, freedom, social ethics, with Marx, equality. The sociological dilemma of the present day is, as I have said in my *Sinn des Daseins* (Meaning of Existence), freedom or equality. And thus we men oscillate, without rest and without certainty, between the oppositions in our own breast, between the eternal strife of personality and race, of self-assertion and race-preservation, of individualism and

socialism, of freedom and equality. This eternal oscillation of the human race we call history.

Must we, however, be crushed between the millstones of freedom and equality? This is not what Herbert Spencer thinks. For he is always an evolutionistic optimist. His "system of synthetic philosophy" over which he worked patiently for forty years, concludes with a hopeful, social-optimistic announcement. The class-struggles of the present day will disappear in order to make room for the social peace. "In course of time there will come more and more men whose disinterested end is the higher evolution of mankind. Whereas men look from the heights of thought upon the life of their race lying in the distant future which not they but their remote successors will enjoy, there will arise a silent pleasure from the consciousness of having assisted in the advance to that land of futurity." The class-struggle has, then, its subterranean work of the evolution of men from egoism to altruism. The transformation of individual man into a social man makes possible the passage from the individualistic constitutional State of to-day to the altruistic social State of the future.

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CHAPTER XIV.

THE PROBLEM OF TOLERATION.

From the questions of theoretical Sociology let us turn to the problems of practical or applied Sociology. "Toleration" and "Authority" form two fundamental problems of Applied Sociology. As we have discussed so long the question of the methods of Sociology, we will, in the problems of toleration and authority, test these particular examples and will try to investigate them both by our comparative-historical method. What we can catch out of the appearances surrounding us and mould into a well-ordered inner experience, is at best fragments of our reality, portions of nature or history, and thus, partial truths of one comprehensive, logically "posited" eternal truth. This truth we can only surmise and claim as our own but can never prove. The natural sciences disclose to us, as we have already said, the world of reality, the kingdom of facts. Mathematics makes us guess the world of eternal truths which we put into the "whole." With the help of our highest form of knowledge, intuition, from which it descends to the parts deductively, history, lastly, opens before us a corner of that kingdom of human ends and values, the deepest meaning and essence of which are hardly accessible to our scientific knowledge. Only a perfectly intuitive understanding, which could comprehend and survey everything at the same time, or a world-surveying Divine eye, which with its all-knowing glance could comprehend not only the sum of all particular appearances, but also the innermost grounds and connexions, would be in a position to realise toleration in its most comprehensive sense. Were we in possession of that world-formula which once presented itself

to the minds of Laplace and Claude Bernard, then we could, in the celebrated words of du Bois Reymond, predict with astronomical accuracy when England would consume its last coal. We have become to-day more modest. We men have, as Kant tells us in his *Judgment*, a discursive understanding, that is, we see the phenomena not, as in exceptional cases, genius does, which can claim a resemblance to God, as a co-existent "whole," but as "parts" succeeding one another.

Genius, therefore, has, like the Divine spirit, something intuitive in it, because it sees in a happy, inspired, creative moment the whole of the artistic sketch or plan as something finished and complete, so that the creative hand builds the separate parts into that complete plan which presents itself in a complete form to the artistic mind. Kant has even reserved genius exclusively for art, because only artists that are favoured by God can perceive intuitively, and whilst they perceive something they can also create, whereas specialists, investigators, thinkers can at best exhibit talents; their method, especially, is a discursive one, that is, one which gradually builds up and shapes the whole out of the parts.

If we wish to establish the "essence of toleration" sociologically, we shall have to adjust our argument in a way which discursive thinking prescribes. Our argument will not descend from the whole to the parts, but, on the contrary, will rise from the parts to the whole. When one tries to explain toleration to us as the command of religion, as a thing demanded by statecraft or as an imperative of history, then we can, with the help of natural knowledge, show the way, stage by stage, which nature itself has shown us in her formations and which constitutes, as it were, a model for toleration. Religion, statecraft, morals and history prescribe toleration, as it were, from above, on the ground of Divine commands or moral sanction, as constitutional codes or historical necessities. We will, on the other hand, look at toleration from below, namely,

as the natural process of evolution of all living beings. We will let the phenomena of toleration unfold themselves slowly before our eyes, and consequently, look upon toleration at first principally as an unreflecting natural process, in order afterwards to pass to conscious toleration among men, as history and sociology show us in an ascending line. This method one has been in the habit of calling, from the time of Comte, exact philosophy or positive sociology. One ascends from the simple to the complex, from the known to the unknown, from the parts discursively to the whole.

The individual natural sciences which we shall investigate for the characteristics of toleration, present partially unified knowledge, whilst the philosophical method of handling a problem tends towards securing a completely unified knowledge for a given problem. As the Bunsen-Kirchoff spectrum analysis has proved clearly that the whole planetary system has the same chemico-physical structure as our planet, the earth, and has given the death-blow to the Aristotelian dualism of a world beneath the moon and a world above the moon, of a *this side* and *beyond* (Τὰ ἐνταῦθα), so philosophy tries to connect nature, the kingdom of laws, with history, the kingdom of ends. The dualism of nature and history which the logical doctrine of method, as Windelband and Rickert have shown, imperatively demands, sociology admits as a method of inquiry, but not as a philosophical principle. History is surely also for sociology no pure continuation of nature in its higher stages, as Herder supposed, but there are easy transitions from nature to history, from the kingdom of laws to the world of values and ends. The opposition between inorganic and organic nature disappears in sociological monism as much as the eternal opposition between matter and consciousness, between world and God. The world of laws in which mechanical causality rules absolutely, is a stage preceding the world of ends and values which the human race itself places in history. What nature

has unconsciously begun, history has consciously to complete. Historical life is more than a mere continuation of the vegetable-animal life. The natural process runs unconsciously, the process of history—the longer, the more markedly—runs consciously. There the causal series rules—cause and effect—here, ends and means. There mechanism, here teleology. What is put into plants and animals unconsciously and purposelessly by nature, and only just indicated, should be realised by the human race that has attained consciousness through historical processes, and should be converted into customs and law, into religion and morals, into social and political institutions, and further developed.

The exhorting and warning cry of Rousseau, "Let us go back to nature," receives from philosophy the auxiliary sense that the question is not of an atavistic fall into pre-social forms of existence but only of asking nature, with the help of the central organ of all consciousness, namely, science, especially, the experimental method, what it wants, what ends it has placed before us and what paths it has shown us, so that we may accomplish consciously and purposively in the framework of the historical life, what nature has unconsciously begun. The sociologically conceived essence of toleration looks for the traces of toleration in nature, in order all the more forcibly and intelligently to be able to follow their forms of appearance in historical life where the same phenomenon of toleration repeats itself as a conscious social principle, and to determine closely the assumed future forms of evolution of toleration. He who is not satisfied with the fact that the dictate of philanthropy, the requirement of forbearance and patience for the individual or racial peculiarities of foreigners, comes from above, whether from God or the founders of religion, from the Church or from State, or lastly, from the forum of law and history, he who rather creates the binding force of his moral convictions

out of commands which are democratically decreed from below, by which every individual man becomes autonomous, that is, becomes a self-creator and co-constituent of this revealed command, will have to accept the philosophical argument which leads from the "hidden" mathematics in nature to the "revealed" spirit in history. Toleration means putting up with foreign characteristics, endurance of the feelings, customs, views, convictions and morals of others, respect for the principles, views of life and tastes of our fellow-creatures, and lastly, a considerate treatment of groups belonging to a foreign race which are widely different in their faith and nationality, in their political views or social tendencies from the group to which we belong. And thus we speak of a religious toleration when the Church-creed is in question, of a political, when the question is of a party-tendency, of a national, when the question is of tolerating or legally protecting subjects of foreign States, of a social, when differences of rank or profession come into play, and lastly, of artistic toleration, when forms of style or matters of taste form the dividing line among men. True toleration must individualise: it cannot generalise.

Every one of these types of toleration rests upon the category of reciprocity. Their common formula is—viribus unitis—one for all and all for one. We respect your spheres of power and wills, on the supposition and in the expectation that the counter-right is possessed by us. We tolerate your individuality, if and so far as you respect ours. All toleration is a social form of relationship among men. It is, indeed, the relational form of reciprocity, mutuality, solidarity. The relations of men are either subject to the category of causality or to that of reciprocity. The first is the case when the despot orders, the subject obeys, the law decrees, the citizen complies, the constitution demands and the subject of the state carries out. There you have in a nutshell the problem of toleration, stated in general terms, though not in its

differential aspects. In social causality as well as in nature-causality, the axiom—causa aequat effectum—holds good. The effect can never contain more reality than the cause. In States where absolute government prevails the subject can never rise above the despot, in States governed by fixed laws the individual can never be above law, in States having fixed constitutions, the citizen can never be above the constitution.

There the individual, the citizen, stands to the whole (the State or the sovereign) not in the relation of reciprocity but in that of causality (social causality). In strict monarchical States the *voluntas regis*, in the constitutional State the *salus publica*, commands, and the subject there, the citizen here, has only to obey. Even Spinoza sees in obedience the highest virtue of the citizen, be it obedience to God or to customs and laws. The open command is the cause, the universal obedience of the citizen is the effect of all social events. This social causality is, like all causality, a relation of compulsion. The cause leads necessarily and without contradiction to the effect. State toleration means equality in the eye of the law. Every universal and public command which concerns a social group—confession, people, nation, profession—without any condition or difference, has, it is true, the legal advantage of equal treatment, inasmuch as the strongest is as much subject to it as the weakest, but on the other hand, it gives up all peculiarities, all individual traits and therefore, discards personality. Every law, whether it is the command of God, the command of belief, the imperative of morals or the command of the State, has a causal character and is inevitably attended with a tendency towards intolerance, because it rests upon the interchangeability of individuals. The law is valid for all without any exception. Although the interpretation of law depends upon tricks and affectations, upon intention and personal disposition, the rigid legal formula knows no difference between the

individual A and the individual B. The letter of the law kills personality. In the eye of the law, and only in its eye, individual personalities are the same, that is, interchangeable.

Here appears society in full and conscious opposition to the State. The State represents the universal, that which is racial, in short, the interests of the whole without any exception. It thus takes for granted the interchangeability of the individuals A and B. For the same reason, however, the State levels, flattens personality and renders it uniform. The State is intolerant of personality in many respects and must naturally be so, as it generalises and does not individualise like society. If toleration means entering sympathetically into individuality, if it means a feeling understanding of the individual character or individual peculiarities, then the fundamental political principle, which has for its object the abstraction from all separateness and the placing of the common factor of all citizens upon the highest formulæ of unity, cannot possibly be tolerant in the sense of respecting personality which is a detachment from what is racial. The fundamental political principles are rather in their intention, if not in their effect, no less imperative than the natural laws, although the latter work mechanico-causally, while the former work teleologico-causally. As little as for the law of gravitation, the law of falling bodies, etc., there is a difference between the marvel of Peru and a beetle, so little does a Napoleon behave, in his mechanism or chemism, with regard to the biological principles, differently from the worst cretin. Political principles have to establish the universal, the racial, the thing which includes everything without any exception, so that for the law every one is only *one*, that is, is no less and no more than one. As for the laws of nature which know absolutely nothing of conscious toleration, the commands of which demand rather a mechanico-causal obedience, A and B are interchangeable, because Nature knows no

exception and her commands are as much binding upon the one as for the other, so in strictly constitutional States the constitution takes for granted the interchangeability of A and B. The command, "Thou shalt not commit murder" holds good as much of one man as of another. With regard to such a command the State cannot be tolerant, and it cannot take into account the individual character of A and B, for if it does it only destroys itself. The being of the State rests upon the establishment of the universal, upon that which is true for all, as the being of society consists in the regard for the particular, in the discovery of the universal in the individual, in short, in bringing into prominence and respecting personality. The State represses, society protects and frees personality. The public commands, set down in institutions, ordinances, legal imperatives and political principles, belong, consequently, to the category of social causality, because here the will of the whole is the cause or reason and the will of the individual is the effect or consequence, so that the whole commands through the law and the individual obeys. The State speaks to the individual in the strict imperative which admits of no contradiction, because in its very nature it must be intolerant of any deviation from the prescribed rule; society, however, regulates its social relations according to the category of reciprocity. Its prescriptions are therefore not law and constitution but manners and customs. Its organ is not the penal code with its repressive force, but tact which speaks to us not through an imperative but through an optative, which does not command but advises us, which thus demands no blind obedience from us as inexorable law does, but appeals only to our judgment and reflexion, as manners and customs, social practices or traditions do in our own interest. What the law is for the State, norm is for morals, and the unwritten code of good breeding, manners, in short, good will, as shown in disposition, morals and deportment, is for society. If, thus, law and State represent the sphere of compulsory human

actions, that is, that minimum of social work without which moral men cannot live in peace with one another, then the commands of the State represent the category of social causality. Here there is no place for individual life and manifestation of personality. One has rather to subordinate the individual, as effect, to the whole, the State, as the cause. What in physics the law of gravitation is, the law of the country is in sociology, as Hegel says in the doctrine of "objective spirit"; it does not leave any room for freedom and personality. So far, therefore, as men are lawful subjects, they belong to the kingdom of laws. Thus, we obey in our physical life the physical law of gravitation, in our biological functions the biochemical laws which are true of all living beings without exception, and lastly, as law-abiding subjects, the laws and constitutions of the State.

Happily, we men possess, along with the kingdom of laws, a second citizenship in the kingdom of ends and values; the former we call, as we have repeatedly said, nature, the latter, history. There we have the causal formula: cause and effect. Here, it is motive and action, end and means, and this relation allows freedom and personality in the choice of the strongest motive. The commands of nature are unconditionally valid, those of history only conditionally so. Nature decrees, "If you swallow strychnine you must die," history says only, "If you wish social peace in your own well-understood interest, then you must practise toleration to others. If you even claim to be a personality, you must show regard for every other personality in its own character and thus respect the sphere of freedom of every fellow-creature or your own personality is endangered." Nature knows no freedom. History, however, is the kingdom of "compossible freedom," to use an expression of Leibniz, which the French thinker Emile Boutroux has worked out in a beautiful book and has developed into a system. Or, as Hegel defines it, history is the process of the self-realisation of personal freedom, the

"graudal ascent in the consciousness of freedom." In the history of mankind there is contained, as the philosophers of history of all ages have shown, a latent civilizing plan. The elementary civilizing factor of history is law, to which Hermann Cohen in his *Ethik des reinen Willens* (Ethics of the pure will) has given its just place in the constitution of history. A higher and more subtle means of civilizing the human race is religion. And this universal pedagogic factor Augustin has conceived and represented on a gigantic scale in his *civitas dei*, from the standpoint of the Middle Ages with its Church government and feudal system, and Lessing has done in his tolerance-trilogy—the "Freemason letters," *Natham* and *Education of the Human Race*—from the elevated plane of purest humanity, of all-overcoming, all-comprehending and all-forgiving toleration. Another civilizing factor, as Schiller brings to our consciousness in his æsthetic trilogy, *Anmut und Würde* (Charm and Dignity), *Briefe über aesthetische Erziehung* (Letters on æsthetic education) and *Naïve und Sentimentalische Dichtung* (Naïve and sentimental poetry), is *Art*. A fourth civilizing factor, as the philosophical positivists maintain with Comte, Taine, Renan, Mill and Spencer, is *Science*. This civilizing work of the human race finds its most comprehensive expression in history, as seen in the philosophy of history of Herder and Kant. According to this, law and religion, art and science, morals and State are all only functions, only partial educators, of that comprehensive educational system of the human race which we call history. Kant's teleological conception of history, which Schiller at first rejected, till Goethe freed it from this ban, teaches us to conceive and look upon with awe the whole process of history as the secret plan of Providence for the realisation of freedom. History has raised, through its three stages of cultivation, civilisation and moralisation, men possessed by nature of a "radical evil," that is, of an egoistic impulse of self-seeking instincts, gradually from animality and

bestiality to toleration and humanity. "World-history," said once the historian of culture, Rocholl, "is not earth-history but history of mankind and its world." History resolves itself finally into social psychology, as Hippolyte Taine represents. History is, as it were, a "living geometry." The natural men who have no history accept the world as nature has placed it before them. They are determined mechanico-causally by their natural bent, nay, fatally determined by soil and climate, by flora and fauna, by watercourses and chains of hills. In a different way have the civilized people who experience in their own selves the educative work of history, passed through the three stages of Kant, cultivation, civilization and moralisation, or the three stages of Comte, the theological, the metaphysical and the positive (exact-scientific). Here circumstances no more rule man but man rules circumstances. Consequently, man is not a pure natural product, not a fatalistic product of the "world around him," a "will-less determinate result" of the "milieu," of a social fate, as Taine holds ; but the civilized man, especially, the great culture-man, genius, creates the surroundings, the milieu. Thus, the natural man as a pure natural product is under the dominion of the social category of causality, because partly through natural law, partly through human law, he is a slave, whether of natural circumstances or of his chief, satrap or despot. The civilized man first knows through the process of history what freedom signifies. We civilized men have first learned to remove these chains which bind the natural man causally to his circumstances, which bound the people of the Middle Ages into combinations and guilds, the believer to the Church, the vassal to his superior lord, the bondman to the lord of the manor, the trader to his social group, the scientist to his dogma, "even the poet to his tablature." This self-acquired freedom raises the civilised people from the animal world which has no history, and thus knows only mechanical causality, to the kingdom of

values where alone freedom is possible. For in the kingdom of ends, the ruling causal formula is, as we know, motive and action, in which the selection of the strongest motive represents the individual sphere of freedom. So far, thus, as we are connected in our mechanism and chemism with all living beings, and therefore, with the whole vegetable and animal world, we belong to Nature, that is, to the kingdom of laws and thus to the causal form, cause and effect; and here there is no *ought* but an inevitable *must*, no toleration but strict uniformity, no personality, but absolute interchangeability of the individuals A and B. So far, however, as we civilized people are the product of the educative process of history, so far as we have been raised to freedom through religion and morals, art and science, School, Church and State, we belong to the self-created kingdom of ends and values. Here man is wholly supreme, here he leaves the animal world far behind him. Every system of ideas and abstractions, of values and ends, such as we have set down in grammar and logic, in religion and morals, in art and science, forms the clear boundary between man and beast. Here we live and breathe in our own self-created atmosphere: logic and mathematics we have ourselves created. For this reason, in the world of ends and values we are, by virtue of our second citizenship, free, or, as Kant says, autonomous, and only here are we free citizens who have themselves given and determined the constitution of this second kingdom of values, as the laws of thought do in logic and mathematics.

In the process of history, we are no more deterministically bound to circumstances, but we create the circumstances. Here nature does not command us but we command nature. Here science builds for us in mathematics, logic and physics the *human* world. Natural laws are human laws of thought (Kant) and we may also, as Schelling thinks, have, in the last analysis, derived these logico-mathematical laws of nature from the "humanised mathematics of nature." In history,

however, laws of ends rule. And in this kingdom of values toleration has its true home. Toleration may be present in nature, which is our great teacher and which has become and will always remain an elementary school of the human race and may be foreshadowed in it, but civilized men have for the first time raised it to a conscious principle and realised it gradually in their institutions.

Where has man, this "copyist of nature and plagiarist of reality," learnt toleration? The faculty of imitation, on which the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde has built sociology, runs in our blood. Man has manifestly taken up in his faculty of imitation such forms of toleration—these forms have been built into a system by Tarde—as are foreshadowed unconsciously and blindly in the pure process of nature, and have built them consciously and with a definite end in view. Are patience and forbearance of living beings so much at work in the pure natural process that man can discover in it the rudiments of toleration and consideration for others? Does nature know only the cruel struggle for existence, or are there present in pure, unreflecting natural process traces of toleration? The fundamental principle of natural science, the Mayer-Helmholtzean law of the conservation of force, makes clear to us that no force, and thus no effect, can be lost, and the equivalence-formula of physics says that the exchange of forms of energy takes place according to the law of the parallelogram of forces. Clausius, as is well known, asserted the proposition: The energy of the world is constant. Energy, however, is, according to Ostwald, nothing else than work or everything which arises from work and is transformed into work. Only energy, Ostwald remarks, is found in all known natural phenomena without exception, that is, all natural phenomena can be subsumed under the concept of energy. Ostwald traces the growth of the forms of exchange of energy from inorganic matter. Thus, for example, he traces its growth from the salt lakes in Russia ("Nature-philosophy,"

p. 344) and the crystallisation-process to the highest forms of manifestation of human spiritual activity. Everywhere is completed the transition from causality to the category of reciprocity: energy is exchanged for energy. Living force, as it streams forth from the sun, is transformed in plants into building force and the building force of plants is transformed in animals into a living force. The eternal rhythm of physical events is completed, according to the laws of attraction and repulsion, as Kant formulates them, or according to integration and differentiation, as Spencer understands this eternal double process.

If in inorganic nature we already find examples of the purposive, solidaristic joint working of the parts to attain a whole, this is doubly and triply so in the phenomena of life. "All life," says Ostwald, "is directed to its prolongation. We therefore call everything purposive which prolongs life, purposeless, which shortens it." The exchange of energies aims at a condition of equilibrium. According to the proposition of Clausius, the entropy of the world tends towards a maximum, that is, the transformation of kinetic into potential energy goes on until perfect equilibrium rules in the universe.

From all this it follows that all forms of energy of the world point to a coherent connexion, and therefore, that Leibnitz is right when he maintains that "no effect is lost." A seedling scattered over the soil grows in another part of the soil, a spoken or written word ignites and stirs, and these we cannot at all ignore. The farther we enter into the world of living beings, the more clearly does the tendency towards increasing solidarity appear. The plant assimilates inorganic substances, in order to transform them into organic ones. The assimilative power of the plant is an act of synthesis—a process of reduction. In the plant the rays sent by the sun are stored, the living force of the sun's rays is preserved in the plant which takes it up and transforms it into forces of development.

Conversely, all animal life represents an act of analysis for all animal life is a process of combustion or oxidation, whereby the forces of development are transformed into forces of life (motion, heat). Vegetable food gives, therefore, animals those forces of development which they use for regulating their bodily temperature and the latent energy of the plant transforms itself, consequently, into the active energy of heat and motion in the animal. This transformation, however, represents an eternal circle, "the return of all equals," as Nietzsche calls it to-day. For animal life sinks back into mother earth, cultivates the soil upon which the plants grow, in order to serve beasts again for food, and so on *ad infinitum.*

If, consequently, through the secret cords of the eternal cycle of things, the three kingdoms are compactly bound up with one another, this solidarity clearly manifests itself in the transition from the kingdom of plants to that of animals. In the year 1879 the botanist de Bary discovered the phenomenon which has since been called *Symbiosis.* By this is understood (Strassburger, *Lehrbuch der Botanik,* 6th Edition, 1904, p. 186) "a common life resting upon mutual supplementation." De Bary himself defines symbiosis as "the common life of two organisms of such a kind that both have need of the joint life, or in any case, that one of these has not exclusively need of the common life." Not only is there such a relation of symbiosis between animals of the same species, such as animals with social instincts which herd together, but even between animals and plants.

In the process of crystallisation, in coral reefs, fungi, polyps, we encounter the first signs of a strictly collective life having a natural solidarity (*vide* the monograph of W. Schwarze, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Symbiose.* (Programme for the following Midsummer term, Hamburg, 1902). More remarkable are the phenomena of a common life between plants and animals. The so-called ant-plants give shelter to small and

extremely warlike ants. Consequently, they protect the plants who take shelter in them from animal enemies. Also between flowers and insects there occurs an interesting symbiotic relation. The flower by this gives nourishment to the insects, mostly in nectar and pollen, whilst the insects bring about the fecundation. And thus each is thrown upon the other.

For all symbiotic relations, naturally, the care of life, especially, the search for food, is the decisive factor for explanation. The weak leans upon the strong, it lives on the waste-product of its more fortunate or more richly fed companions. It will be its companion at dinner, its bed-fellow at night, and hence the name "bed-fellowism." If, however, only the guest derives advantage from this common life, and the host, while it maintains its independence, suffers from this symbiosis, such a one-sided relation of companionship is called parasitism or parasitic existence. If the relation, on the other hand, rests upon full reciprocity and both the companions sharing the same life advance each other, we call this relation *mutualism*—a mutual relationship lasting through life. Hermit-crabs exhibit, for example, this mutualism.

Whilst the symbiotes are either strictly bound up with each other in such a way that they grow together into an organism or at least work with one another in the same field, supporting each other with their common food products, the English scientist Ward (1899) observed another phenomenon, namely, metabiosis. This phenomenon is exhibited when organisms occur not together, but *one after another* in the same place, so that one organism prepares the ground for another. This is the true model for human solidarity. Man proceeds from symbiosis which he shares with the animal world. Thus he begins with primitive communism in which only the symbiotes belonging to the same social group appear together in solid union, but do not care at all for other groups, especially, for coming generations, and gradually rises to that metabiosis which consists in the care

for future generations. Also regarding the appearance of metabiosis physics gives us valuable indications and analogies. The cyclic transformation, for example, of coal-gas and nitrogen in the vegetable and animal organism, is already a model for metabiosis.—"Every organism would have changed the outer world for its own sake alone in such a way that it would no more be able to live. Only the existence of numerous, differently functioning organisms permits the constant return of new life on earth" (Ludwig Jost's *Vorlesungen über Pflanzenphysiologie*, 1904, p. 295). The cycle of all energies and all decomposition of living cells represent, consequently, the eternal model of solidarity in the universe, and human solidarity is only a special case of that universal solidarity which expresses itself biologically in the phenomena of symbiosis and metabiosis. Carbonic acid which occurs in animal structure as a waste-product is useful to the sea-weeds, whilst oxygen which arises through the decomposition of the sea-weed is taken up by animal cells and used for the oxidation of organic substances serving as food. "In their symbiosis," says Oskar Hertwig (*Universal Biology*, 1906, p. 395), "there is completed to a certain extent the same return of substances which takes place in the whole of nature between the animal and the vegetable kingdom." In the narrowest space vegetable and animal cells are apparently united through symbiosis to form a single individual.

"The more evolution advances on earth," says Herbert Spencer (*Sociology*), "the more does the degree of reciprocity increase." The protoplasm-lump, the living cell shows reciprocal action, a solidarity of fluidity and germ-plasm. Every organism is thus a system of self-regulation. Self-preservation through prolongation of its duration and regulation of its equilibrium are essential characteristics of all life. Every organism, according to Ostwald, is only a complex of energies and has the power to protect itself, to regulate its equilibrium, to form itself in growth and

reproduction, and lastly, to perceive itself. With the organism which is permanently adapted to its environment, we enter the kingdom of ends which sets in with protoplasm-lumps and reveals its immense effectiveness and even the highest forms of manifestation of the historical life. The mechanism of nature gives way to the teleology of biological functions. In an organism the parts or limbs serve the whole in such a way that all limbs work compactly together. If one stops in mammals the action of the lungs, the heart is brought to a standstill. If the stomach stops its work, then the whole circulation of blood stops. If digestion or secretion stops, all the limbs suffer one after another in their functions and death takes place. The same thing, as Socrates has seen, is true of the social organism. If the State falls to the ground, then all citizens inevitably suffer. A lost war, a telluric catastrophe, a great flood, a national misfortune does not occur to the collective concepts, State and Nation, which as abstract general concepts have no independent existence; it is the individual citizens who have to suffer the consequences, for the collection State or Nation is only a thing set up by men for the regulation of the social equilibrium. If the equilibrium in the State-management is perceptibly disturbed, this defect inevitably brings home to all citizens their common being in a greater or less degree. The striving for equilibrium thus rules all forms of manifestation of the universe. The Buddhistic (Brahminic ?) *Tattvam asi* which was placed in the foreground by Schopenhauer, expresses this solidarity most deeply. Toleration is nothing else than a special case of the striving for equilibrium in nature. Toleration, in fact, is the striving for social equilibrium.

Every organism is characterised by a mutual dependence of the parts upon each other and by their purposive, collective work for the sake of the whole. This is true not only of animal life where the heart and lungs, liver and kidney are connected through whole systems of canals, arteries, veins and

lymphatic vessels, but also of social organisations in which the connecting threads do not appear so clearly as in the structure of the animal organism. In symbiosis, it is true, a spatial collective life is present but the individual symbiotes are bound with one another by no visible bands. Host and guest are only connected by the common interest of the care of life; they can, however, be separated any moment without endangering the permanency of the whole organism. In social organisations, spatial collective life, such as we see in symbiosis, can be dispensed with, but in spite of spatial separation an invisible connection remains. The invisible connecting thread is then called *common interest*. On this common interest the Austrian sociologist Gustav Ratzenhofer, as we have already seen, has built a philosophical system which follows up this "adhering interest" from the kingdom of biology to that of bio-chemistry and astro-physics. We shall here conceive the common interest only in its social significance and follow up its region of validity from the animal world to the highest ramifications of the social structure among men. We shall thus get the result that the "essence of toleration" is grounded in the sociological principle of "universal interest."

All social organisations are characterised by this, that their individual members are bound up with their organisation in all spatial separation by invisible bonds of interest. As instances of this, we may mention the national solidarity between motherland and colony, the feeling of unity among religious societies, sects, members of the same order, political parties, resting upon economical, scientific, artistic or only sporting interests. Here the word interest loses its unpleasant metallic auxiliary clang. In religious or national solidarity one brings for the creatures of the same faith, opinion or party, offerings of goods and life, without knowing the individual to whom the offering is made. When catastrophes occur in the civilised world, helping committees are established without

distinction of creed and nationality; people collect funds for the famine in India, as also for the Boers, Armenians, Jews, etc. Common citizenship is ascribed here to an abstract principle (called mankind) which the individuals follow without knowing one another personally. Also this form of impersonal solidarity is portrayed to a certain extent in the animal world. Between the society of the wasps and their queen there exists a hierarchically arranged system of relations. In a similar manner there occurs an inner connexion between the bees that produce honey and their bee-hives. In individual animals we find the principle of the division of work fully at work. The male and the female are distinguished by their work. The division into classes, into warriors and labourers is in many respects thoroughly carried out; in antheaps which Lubbock has described, we notice slavery. The subordinate working ants are treated as domestic animals; they communicate with one another through a well-worked signal system, construct khuds and tunnels, buildings and roads, passages and bridges, chambers and magazines (Spencer's *Sociology*). A similar thing is true of birds, for example, of ravens. They place sentinels, exclude foreign birds from their property and punish evil-doers. All animals who herd together exhibit subordination to their leaders. He who is most in the front leads the series—so says Schiller in his *Wallenstein*. For the purpose of defending themselves against the beasts of prey living in isolation, they flock together and everywhere one knows one's leader by the proud mane. Of many races of primates Spencer says (*ibid*) that they develop social feelings in their common herd life. They know not only common work and subjection, such as obedience to their leaders, but they respect individuality and render mutual help, nay, they "adopt the orphans and their care goes so far that the entire society puts forth its efforts to help the members who are in danger." It can be shown throughout that inferior mammals

lead a solitary and unsocial life. With the race-historical advance of the evolution of mammals, their love of society, as Haack once remarked, has also increased.

The primitive man stands in his social organisation manifestly near the higher mammals; animals, indeed, according to a beautiful saying of Herder, are only the elder brothers of mankind. Erect posture and articulate speech, as a consequence of which, thought and composition, science, religion and art have been built, establish first a definite boundary between man and beast. And consequently, Herder sees in history—in contradistinction to Kant—not a second world in itself but only a continuation of nature. To the Goethe-Kantian formula, *Art and nature are one and the same thing*, Herder opposes, as it were, the formula, *History and nature are identical.* Between animal and man there is no essential difference, but only a difference of degree. The law of progress in nature continues itself in the stage of human consciousness as the law of progress of history. What nature has done with unconscious purpose, namely, the ascent to complete harmony, the process of history will hasten and lead to its highest manifestation. Herder ignores the intermediate stages between nature and history which Kant portrayed with great clearness. But both take a teleological view of history. What Lessing in his *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (Education of the human race) showed with regard to religion, is extended by Herder—and in this Kant is at one with him—to the whole history of the human race. The unsocial companion, *homo sapiens*, should be educated and raised to humanity—this is the secret subterranean plan of history. For this purpose, man who is destined to rule the world has to pass through two schools, the elementary school of mankind, nature, and the high school, history. There he learns the alphabet, here, the deepest meaning of humanity.

The educational scale of mankind proceeds clearly from the lowest stage—bestiality—to the highest stage, solidarity,

toleration, humanity. Man has begun his career as a cannibal and he will end his career as one who cares for other men, who views with reverence everything which bears the human stamp as an image of God, and that without any distinction of sex, religion, nationality, political opinion and race, in short, he will end by being a noble specimen of mankind, or, as Kant formulates this educational ideal of the human race, "one must have a perfect culture of the human race out of one's own reason." Rough and tough is this educational work of nature and history, for man is at first no fallen angel, as Rousseau's pastoral idyll dreams, but a wild devil, who is guided by a ruling passion, the "radical evil," the crass egoistic motive of self-preservation. To these has to be added according to Kant, as the special vice of culture, the longing for honour, power, wealth. The "strife of all against all," as Hobbes characterises it, or the "antagonism of forces," as Herder mildly puts it, is an indispensable gateway. Without such a scourge of God as the struggle for existence, which the Bible symbolises with the words, "With the sweat of thy brow shalt thou earn thy bread," the work of elevating the *homo ego* to the *homo alter*, the born egoist to the educated altruist, could not have been brought to perfection. This hard schooling men could not be spared but its work will then be complete when the "temple of self-seeking" is transformed into a "necessary idea of reason," when men are no longer guided in their actions by whims and caprices, by impulses and passions, and thus no longer by feelings alone, but by principles. This civilizing ideal can naturally only be gradually approximated but never completely realised; for "out of the bent wood with which man is made nothing straight can be created "(Kant).

The primitive man could only raise himself with difficulty in the scale of perfection, for the structure of his body was ordinarily smaller than ours—a fact which greatly rendered the struggle for existence difficult, because on account of his

diminutive structure he was ill-fitted for the struggle against the powerful beasts of prey of ancient times. It was first by the projection of his organs as implements and weapons, as well as through union with social groups (herds, tribes, races), that it was possible for the primitive man to carry on successfully the struggle against dangerous combinations of beasts of prey and this success was the more decisive the longer it lasted. And if the whole world of beasts of prey is tolerated by him and preserved and kept in his zoological gardens, man owes this, his decisive triumph over all creatures in our planet, to his social instincts, to his combination for a common hunt and common plunder, his organisation in customs and laws, in Church and State, his division and arrangement of work. It is thus an eternal error of crass individualism to suppose that any of us is a "unique one," an "overman," a *homo sui generis*. Through every drop of a man's blood, as we have already seen in Comte's doctrine, there runs the history of his race, the functions of which he already finds present in his central nervous system as an inheritance from the series of his forefathers. It is only by becoming a social creature and through education in the State that the cannibal of former days has become a man. It is only through mutual toleration and respect, through sharing common joys and sorrows, through the working of whole groups for common ends, that the human race has conquered the planet. That we have passed the stage of beasts of prey and have grown into the state of one for all and all for one, we owe to our social feelings which have first manifested themselves in our common social life, especially, in our common work. True toleration is thus first possible through insight into the machinery of nature and history. It consists in the conviction, based on science, that we "only live through others" (Comte). We are symbiotes or men sharing the same room. We are sociologically connected by the secretly woven, magically working threads of our race-interest which

teach us, if we are again to use the words of Comte, "the surrender of the strong for the sake of the weak, the worship of the weak by the strong as the stern command of the law of preservation of species," as we are held together psychologically by our identically organised reason with our identical experiences condensed into chain-reflexes in our race-memory ("mneme").

The man who lives in isolation sticks to his habits like the beast and knows no progress. The same is true of insular peoples or peoples living in mountains. It is first common life in society, mutual dependence by virtue of the creation of professions, divided to-day into more than ten thousand species of work, by which every one in his differential needs is thrown upon the professional work of others, in short, it is the entire culture-system with its reciprocal *do ut des* which raises us gradually to that conscious toleration which in animals and plants occurs in the form of symbiosis. As we are subject in our chemism and mechanism to the irrefutable natural law, so in the idea of toleration appearing among all civilized nations, are we subject to the milder or gentler rule of historical evolution or tendency. What is falsely called historical law is, as we have repeatedly pointed out, rather a tendency, disposition, direction of will (conatus, impetus, endeavour, tendency) of our whole culture-system. In the laws of nature in which the strict causal concept rules, we know of no exceptions; in historical tendencies, on the other hand, where the teleologico-causal relationship of end and motive prevails, exceptions are unfortunately more frequent than the rule. The way of nature is straight, the path of history is zigzag, or more correctly (according to Leibniz's motto: *inclinata resurget*), spiral. In history, consequently, retardation and retrogression, atavistic errors and perverse mistakes are not at all rare. That third age of human perfection, however, which the Sibyls and Chiliasts

announce, which our poets, Lessing, Herder and Schiller extol to us, which our philosophers, Kant, Fichte, Comte and Spencer announce to us, and which in these days again Tolstoi and Nietzsche prophesy to us—this third kingdom—is being gradually built up. This "third age" of the old prophets and of the eschatological doctrines of the destiny "at the end of the days" is proclaimed to us by thousands and thousands of sociological signs. "Nay, it will come, it is sure to come, the day of perfection, the age of a new evangel" (Lessing's *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, 85, 86). However much painfully particular historical experiences may lead us to gloomy despair and troublesome doubt, the hope of a third kingdom, of the social and humanitarian tendency of our culture-system, one can never give up. The same social reason which has tamed and subdued us and changed us from beasts of prey into domestic animals, which has educated the cannibals of former times into civilized men, will also be at work underground in building up the correct type of man, the social man, the true tolerant man. Nature has stamped us as egoists, history has built us up into true altruists, so far as it brings clearly into view the fact that the economic good and evil are dependent on the state of the whole world-market. The production of grain in Roumania is to-day dependent upon the production of grain in Argentine, because the price in the world-market is determined by the total crops of all the corn-growing and exporting lands. This economical solidarity which nurses on its lap conscious toleration, because we are led, nay, even compelled, to take the view that all men are connected with one another by a race-solidarity working secretly, is, moreover, only a preliminary stage of that "third kingdom," of that perfect solidarity and toleration which the great poets and thinkers of all ages and nations reveal. The God in history, the great

world-educator, brings us gradually, through community of economical interest, through habit and practice, to the social feeling by which we feel for others, wholly disinterestedly and purely out of good will to others. The day comes when we do the good thing because it is good. That this third kingdom will once come is of course only a conjecture. One cannot demonstrate it through number and measure but one should believe in it as in a postulate of historical reason, for when one believes in it one is best fitted to realize it. When will this third kingdom be completed? "And what have I then to lose? Is not eternity mine?" (Lessing).

Toleration as a philosophical problem appears comparatively late in the history of human thought. Toleration is long practised with regard to foreign races before there comes into the foreground the philosophical question, When, towards whom and to what extent, should toleration be practised? Nature and history educate men gradually for the practice of toleration and behind this the conscious spirit constructs in philosophy a theory of toleration. Here, as everywhere, reality precedes reflection on it in point of time. As men spoke grammatically correctly long before there was any grammar as science, as people thought logically correctly before Aristotle founded logic as a science, so did man attain toleration through the education of nature and history, long before the philosophers, Bodin, Locke, Spinoza, Pufendorf, Lessing, David Friedrich Strauss and others discovered and formulated it scholastically. And thus philosophy repeats everywhere, only on the stage of consciousness and reflexion, what nature and history have begun before it and religion and morality have carried out. In the State legislation of West-European-American culture, which not only tolerates every foreigner who is subject to the laws in force but gives them protection of life and property, nay, full legal equality, we have the transformation of religious prescriptions of an optional nature into strict legal institutions having the character of commands.

Foreigners and enemies were originally synonyms. Not only to the highly cultured Greeks was every not-Hellene a barbarian, a bearded wild man, and thus, a semi-savage being, but every race was always foreign and antagonistic to every other race. Man as man, therefore, is not social, as Aristotle thought and the social school believes with Hugo Grotins. Man is not social by nature but he becomes so in history. Sociability is not his fundamental nature, his inseparable characteristic, like his characteristic of two-handedness, but it is a spiritual characteristic of the moral man, developing itself in history. In the original struggle for existence man fights against man, later, hordes against hordes, tribes against tribes, race against race, people against people. The great wars, the "world-empire" round the Mediterranean Sea, the Catholic Church (the *imperium romanum* translated to the domain of religion) have greatly advanced the work of education of the human race. Out of mutual understanding there arises gradually mutual toleration. The foreigner is now no more an enemy, but under certain circumstances, a friend and companion. Thus the Roman world-empire not only creates martial law and a law of covenant but formal international peace associations.

The method of production, as the progressive division of labour conditions it, exhibits this process. Originally, no one was thrown upon others. In the beginning, every man himself supplied the aggregate of his necessities of life, therefore, every man was antagonistically disposed towards foreign races. What belongs to a foreigner is as good as *res nullius*, that is, is without an owner. The moment, however, one makes use of the products of the foreigners, as one becomes more ambitious and is no more content with his home products, one begins to respect even the property of a foreigner because one desires it. The oldest form of a friendly relationship with foreign races is exchange. Salt, colours for painting the body, bricks, tin, better kinds of stone are the commodities that are

exchanged. There were not only payments by cattle, but metals, ornaments, articles of daily consumption served as usual measures of the exchange price. Further primitive articles of exchange are shells, cacao beans, salt, pieces of linen, tea, hide, pieces of iron, ingots, iron bars, bronze rings, and lastly, silver, gold, paper money and cheques. Naturally, the course of the developing trade is determined by the richness of the soil. Commerce brings men of different nations and lands nearer to one another. Foreigner and enemy have now ceased to be synonymous. With his wares the foreigner brings ideas, manners, customs; in short, trade renders souls fertile and removes prejudice (*cf.* my work *Die Anfänge der menschlichen Kultur* (Beginnings of Human Culture), Leipzig, Teubner, 1906). The growing complexity of the care of life, the increasing claims of life which are only to be satisfied by the already characterised system of division of work, widens in course of time the narrow limits of race or tribe-isolation, and while professions always become different—the number of professions has increased a thousand-fold—human interests integrate themselves, render themselves uniform and grow in solidarity.

The different professions exhibit certain peculiarities of character. Hunting, tending of cattle and catching fish favour the tendency to solidarity, the inclination for common life, because the produce of work or the spoils of plunder grow by a combination of the people's working powers not only proportionately but absolutely. Common work raises, however, not only the quota of the produce of work devolving upon each co-worker but also ensures protection from the destructive attacks of enemies. This strengthens and raises the herd-consciousness—the social instincts. It is otherwise with agriculture. Here the isolated efforts are richer in production. Herds unite easily, just as farmers, up to the present day, prefer to live in isolation. And if the manufacturers embrace socialism readily, while the agricultural

classes oppose it strongly, this political fact finds its socio-psychical explanation in the circumstance that isolated agriculture by its very nature brings about an altogether different human characteristic from that produced by common effort. The spatial collective life and collective work furthers as much the consciousness of solidarity, as confinement to the soil strengthens egotism. The more lively the intercourse of people becomes and the oftener commerce and industry bring different races together, the more inevitably does a comparative view of things appear. This same comparative method of treating history leads gradually to the conscious perception of the problem of toleration in philosophy. For as soon as one compares, one ceases to deify oneself. There appear then before one's eyes not only the faults of the foreigners but also their merits, and in the light of the faults of the foreigners one learns again to value one's own merits, just as only he truly knows and loves home who has been in foreign countries.

However paradoxical the proposition may appear, it is nevertheless true that as the great world-wars determine the political peace of mankind for the reason that they have combined and united the small races and nations in eternal guerilla warfare with one another into powerful nations, so the most intolerant of all religious wars, the Crusades, have matured in them the scientific problem of toleration. Frederic II summoned Mussalman, Jew, Byzantine and Roman Catholic scholars to a congress, in order to determine by means of religious disputations the relative worth of the different religions. The first philosopher of toleration is Jean Bodin, whose *Heptaplomenes* offers an evangel of toleration for the end of the sixteenth century, as Lessing's *Nathan*, which rests on Bodin's figure of "Salomo," expresses in the most concise form the problem of toleration at the close of the eighteenth century. Bodin lets the followers of seven different religions cross their swords,

by which the tendency predominates, of showing through the "dialectic of religions that all historical religions and great sects have an objective right to permanency, that, however, for the same reason all religions not only make a claim to State toleration but even demand a recognition of their right to exist." As Jean Bodin, the French Renaissance philosopher, tries to smooth the ground for toleration and freedom of conscience on the Romanistic soil, so the Dutch humanist, Erasmus of Rotterdam, in his *Iranische Schriften* defended political toleration as well as religious, and preached it on the German soil. The triad—Renaissance, Humanism and Reformation—works together in order to set up among the advanced nations of Europe that view which prepared them for the ideas of toleration of Spinoza and Pierre Bayle, for the *Two Letters on Toleration* of John Locke, for the strivings for unity of Leibniz, and lastly and especially, for the attempts at toleration of the French encyclopædists, English Deists (at the head of which is Toland) and German philosophers of the Enlightenment. If Bodin had the courage to appear on behalf of the right of the State to religious toleration, Pierce Bayle throws the great paradox, whether the State can tolerate pure atheists, into the debating ground. Lastly, the rationalist John Locke appears in his letters on toleration—that enduring gem of the whole toleration literature—for the absolute duty of toleration on the part of the State, advancing the reason, which reminds one of Spinoza, that the State as such has nothing to do with the happiness of its subjects. Spinoza's theologico-political tractate has, therefore, the sub-title "De libertate philosophandi." The State is concerned with action and not with opinions. From this there would follow freedom of conscience for the most intimate inner experience, the religious conviction, which can never be forced. Of course, State toleration can never mean simply permitting its subjects to *have* an opinion, since it cannot forbid or

stop this opinion. The State rests upon the obligatoriness of its commands. One can, however, only command actions and never thoughts and opinions. Consequently, freedom of conscience means the right not only to *have* thoughts but to *express* them in words and writings (freedom of speech and of the press).

Still further goes John Locke in the limitation of the State's power of interference. Its problem he looks upon as consisting entirely in ensuring and protecting the interests of the subjects "through just laws and impartial administration of justice." Any compulsion with regard to the religious belief of its subjects no State can under any circumstances practise. For the essence of true religion rests upon the most intimate conviction of the mind, and here State with its myrmidons can never reach, for "faith is not faith without believing." Therefore the State itself has to practise the utmost toleration with regard to the heathens.

The prejudice of his age no doubt even John Locke could not shake off. The apostle of toleration sets up these two limits: atheists and Catholics. The State, according to Locke, cannot tolerate atheists because they destroy all religion. The State tolerates *every* religion but cannot allow that anybody should have *no* religion. For in the State everything rests upon faith and belief; the atheist cannot, however, take an oath because the compelling force of an oath, belief in a God, does not bind him. Catholics, Locke thinks, have also no right to be tolerated, because they are dependent on the Pope and therefore, on an external authority, whose commands the enemies of the State and traitors to the land must follow if the Church so prescribes. The Catholic doctrine is in the eyes of Locke dangerous to the State, and forfeits, therefore, the right to toleration.

Here Locke has to stop half-way. The great practical exponents of toleration, Frederic II, Joseph II. and Napoleon are incomparably more far-sighted than the theorist Locke.

The word of Locke, that in his State every one can be happy in his own way, becomes the political programme of the Enlightenment. "It may always be," says David Friedrich Strauss, in continuation of the thoughts of Frederic the the Great, "that the personal regulation of his relation to God makes man happy but a man may say, 'I will not become happy' and even such an assertion must be tolerated in a free State. In reality, history goes far beyond the limits placed by Locke and it has first in enlightened despotism and then in the French Revolution shown the way to absolute political and religious toleration, such as was indicated by Lessing before him and David Friedrich Strauss after him. The philosopher of law, Pufendorf (De habitu religionis), places political toleration by the side of religious. Consequently, the State aims at religious unity for the sake of the convictions of its subjects.

"Through violence and human punishment no illumination of the heart, no inner assent to a dogma can be produced" (Fr. Lezius's *Der Toleranzbegriff Lockes and Pufendorfs* 1900, p. 91). But even Pufendorf knows exceptions: In the province of natural religion atheists, idolators, scoffers, vilers of God and Sabbath-breakers are to be excluded from the scope of toleration. Even that heathendom which Bodin and Locke respect and tolerate finds no favour in the State of the illiberal Pufendorf, because it signifies "opposition to natural religion." The toleration preacher Pufendorf is intolerant of heresy, nay, even of politically tolerant States like Holland. Free Churches the State should not tolerate but it should rather look after the tolerated Churches in the interest of the State and of "natural religion." Against the individual no compulsion should be exercised with regard to belief, but the right of preaching and of founding sects should not be given him by the State. Church toleration of sects would be, according to Pufendorf, a "fall from evangelism." One sees how timidly and slowly the ideas of toleration have

conquered province after province among their renowned representatives themselves. Religion and the State have worked along with science for the last three hundred years to realise fully that toleration which nature and history have left to men as the inheritance of the race-experience of their forefathers. Religion has in Protestantism won freedom of opinion, as also religious toleration, by struggle. The State has secured for us in our West-European-American culture-system, ever since the passing of the Habeas Corpus Act, political freedom as well as the equality of all citizens, even the foreigners, in the eye of the law.

Still one problem remains to be solved, the problem of *social toleration*, social forbearance, as the completion of the equal treatment of all confessions, classes and political parties. Here science in the twentieth century has to begin. To it belongs the problem of representing, by irrefutable argumentation, the complete solidarity of the whole human race with the help of statistical, political, economical and sociological theories. Religious toleration worked out in the eighteenth century the toleration of confessions. Political toleration put forward in the eighteenth century the equal treatment of all parties. Social toleration should in the twentieth century crown this structure and the toleration of professions and classes, and above all, the conflicting social forces should maintain the equilibrium between capital and labour. If we have conceived toleration as the natural striving for equilibrium which appears already in inorganic structures, the crystallisation process of history has always rendered this striving for equilibrium of the human race more clear and more conscious. The Reformation has given us the toleration of religious opinions, the Revolutions have given us the toleration of political actions. The social movement of the present day should bring clearly before us the full value and contents of uninterchangeable personality.

CHAPTER XV.

THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY.

The philosophical treatment of a problem holds good principally of those still, silent assumptions which pass from mouth to mouth without examination and receive sanction from tradition, till a disturbing philosophical questioner steps in and says that the problems really begin where others see solutions. If the mathematician takes for granted space, time and number, the scientist, the existence of a material world with the character of a strictly causal law, the theologian, the existence of God, the legal doctrinaire, property as an event or occurence which cannot further be discussed, then all these resting points of thought are transformed into so many signs of interrogation. Is property a psychological category with a necessary character of evolution or only an historical category with a temporarily and spatially conditioned transitional character?, asks the philosophical ardent spirit, Ferdinand Lassalle. Is that which the scientist calls body only a phenomenon *bene fundatum*, as Leibniz holds, or as Ernst Mach says, only a complex of sensations? Is the existence of God demonstrable logico-mathematically, as Descartes taught us, or is it impossible to be established through pure reason alone, as Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* tried to prove? Is space, as it was with Newton, " un être réel absolu ", and even time a reality manifesting itself outside our consciousness? Is there any *tempus absolutum*, as Newton said, or are space and time, as with Kant, only forms of perception *a priori*? So runs the philosophical problem which has to do less with actuality than with the causality of all appearances which does

not look admiringly at the top of the tree of knowledge but digs up mother earth from which the tree receives its secret nourishment and does not stop till its roots are laid bare. A philosophical treatment of the question of authority will, above all, strike a different path from that of theology which announces Divine authority as a complete dogma, or that of a jurist who accepts, without proof, State authority as a fact of historical life. We shall have rather to ascend from the historical actuality of authority—which as a principle is so very little disputed that even bands of robbers find themselves compelled to set up leaders, to whose authority they are absolutely subject—to the deeper philosophical motives. For us authority is a socio-psychical problem, or more correctly, even the central problem of mass-psychology.

That men of all climes and times, as soon as they combine, as Spencer says, into an aggregate of more than one hundred persons cannot live peacefully with one another without social differentiation, without some hierarchical gradation, without a system of superiors and inferiors (*Sociology*), is not only an indisputable fact of comparative ethnography and universal history, but the fundamental phenomenon of social psychology. Mass-psychology, which has to do with the suggestive action of the leader to his men, of the speaker to his audience, of the founders of sects to their followers, of the great artist or scholar to his pupils—this mass-psychology has its scientific machinery in the problem of authority. We have therefore in the first place to seek a compact and exact definition of what is meant by authority. Then we shall have to examine the spiritual origin of all belief in authority and lastly, to enter into the logical value of the principle of authority, in order to see whether in the problem of authority we have to do with a purely historical category which could have been otherwise than it is, if the temporal and spatial conditions had been different, or whether we have to regard the principle of authority as a spiritual necessity of self-preservation

of the human race, as a regulator of the social equilibrium among the interests of the separate individuals which inevitably clash with one another. We shall then turn to the historical bearers of the principle of authority. The last question with regard to our treatment of the problem of authority, the question, namely, of its logical region of validity, of its scope and limits, its grade and measure, of the nature and effect of authority, which we intend to deal with in a special work, depends upon the determination of the preliminary question whether authority represents a purely historical or a psychological category.

By "authority" we understand logically the "unproved assumption of the truth of another man's judgment" (Jerusalem). To be subject to an authority means the giving up of one's own judgment for the sake of another, the renunciation of one's own opinion in favour of the opinion of persons, books or institutions recognised by us as bearers of authority. Belief in the superiority of things regarded as authorities by us, whether these are physical or hyperphysical persons, works or institutions, lies spiritually at the root of the need of authority. If we organise our thoughts and actions in the way in which the authorities set up and sanctioned by us command or advise us, then the authorities become the sources of our actions. One subordinates in this case one's own will to that of another person, whether this foreign will be God or King, religious revelation or law. Every action dictated by authoritative prescriptions is, as Kant, and after him, Fichte, clearly indicated, heteronomous and not autonomous. What the authorities perceived beforehand we have to perceive afterwards, what they thought before we have to think after, what, lastly, they willed beforehand we have only to will afterwards. There, command, here, obedience. Authorities determine the rules, norms and laws of thinking, feeling and acting, whilst those who are subject to these authorities or to their bearers are only organs for their

execution. They represent, as it were, the executive, while the authorities represent the legislative. Authorities are, according to circumstances, obstructive or helping organs of our will. They create the universal values; they coin money, whereas those who are spiritually subject to them help their coins to gain currency.

What is the cause of this voluntary slavery and tutelage of the whole human race? From the beginning of authentic history we know of no people in whom there have not been an upper and a lower, a superior and an inferior class, a division into those that command and those that obey, into masters and servants, in short, social divisions into classes and ranks. Is it a mere chance that the anarchy of the primitive State has grown with the advancing moralisation, noticeable everywhere, of externally regulated convention and legality, into a more or less complicated, highly organised system of superior and inferior? Why do the *forms* of authority vary precisely as much with zones and qualities of the soil as languages and cultures, whilst the *principle* of authority appears throughout the world to be as necessary and indispensable as the fact that all languages contain a common logic or that all ceremonials and cults contain a common religious germ?

If the need of human nature for authority or support were only an historical category, that is, temporally and spatially determined, and thus something relative, an arbitrary product which might have been different from what it is, then that *consensus omnium* which has brought forth authorities in all zones and times, would be a sociological enigma. Examples of such authorities are the subordination of children to their elders (patria potestas), of pupils to the teachers, of citizens to the State, of believers to their Church, of laymen to the specialists, of the public to the Government officers, of residents to the city fathers, of political parties to their leaders. Without a subordination of the individual to the

whole it would be impossible to maintain for any length of time a social equilibrium among such sensitive and excitable creatures as we civilized men are. The ζῷον πολιτικόν called man is undoubtedly the most helpless of all living beings, as Anaximander rightly observed in ancient times. The human infant requires parental care longer, more urgently and more pressingly than any race of animals. He who is born in the world without any parental protection is irretrievably lost, unless some kind she-wolf acts as a substitute for mother, as in the Romulus story. Until he has got the power of standing on his own legs in thought, feeling and action, it is an imperative demand of self-preservation of every human being to resign himself to parental authority, especially, as a failure or refusal of this authority brings with it the greatest injury to the individual in question. Nay, it appears as if the principle of authority were one of the internal means employed by Hegel's "world-spirit" for the gradual education of the human race from bestiality to humanity. In any case the principle of authority plays in the economy of human history the rôle of a temporary social regulator. In this sense I have characterised authority and anarchy as the two extreme ends of human social life (*Sinn des Daseins*, p. 240, originally published in Schmoller's *Jahrbüchern*). There I gave the following definition: Authority is the unifying, binding, race-preserving principle; anarchy is the dissolving, ruining, species-destroying principle. There, altruism, here, egoism; there, the universal intellectual interest of the race, here, the special interests of the individual.

The fundamental conflict of the world-history is the perennial opposition between the individual and the race. The protecting and levelling effect of authorities personality opposes, and the longer the opposition, the more haughty and self-confident it is. The theme of modern history, from the time of the Renaissance, Humanism and Reformation, has

been the struggle for autonomy, as against heteronomy, for individuality, as against authority.

To the political war-cry of the State : authority not majority : there is opposed absolutely that of Fichte, *person*, that of Stirner, the "unique," that of Nietzsche, the "overman." In the one case, the interests of the class are defended with as much one-sidedness at the cost of the individual, as in the other, the interests of the individual are placed in the foreground, separated from the interests of the class. The contradictories, authority and anarchy, communism and individualism, race-interests and individual interests are always placed by the stiff representatives of the world-views in question upon an *aut-aut*. Either, authority or anarchy. *Tertium non datur*. The philosophical treatment of the problem of authority will tolerate one-sidedness in one direction as little as in another. Where the rival parties see only a hot *aut-aut*, there the philosophical observer perceives a cool *et-et*. The problem of authority contains therefore also a *but also*. The bold assertion of a one-sided standpoint, such, for example, as the unhesitating acceptance of authority, which we have been witnessing from the time of Stahl and Haller, and the maintenance of the right of personality, ever since the days of Stirner and Nietzsche, has the advantage of great clearness and penetrating thinking. But nothing injures a standpoint with time so much as its own excesses. The rigid principle of authority, which Augustin (*Against the Manichees*, Chap. 6) once characterised thus: Ego vero evangelio non crederem nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas: has, with regard to historical facts, suffered ship-wreck ever since the great French Revolution, as much as the unshakable sovereignty or self-supremacy of the individual, maintained by the anarchists. Without authority we can as little improve and guide the human race as we can with the help of an authority which stifles and levels all personality. In extremes the human race can

never rest for a long time ; for every extreme social principle destroys the equilibrium, and in its colourless one-sidedness, falls to the ground. Thus wrote once the communistic historian, Hippolyte Castille, "The principle of authority is an eternal support of human society." Robespierre is an important person, not on account of his talents and virtues, but on account of his sense of authority. And in fact, even the societies of robbers, like the filibusters are compelled to set up and respect authorities. Thus, Stirner longs for a "society of egoists"—a droll counterblast set up for uniting those who are the chief opponents of society—and Nietzsche longs, as if hypnotised, for a new authority, for a leader, or rather, for a noble race of over-men. In a similar manner do the atheists or "free men" combine into a free religious society in the neighbouring province of belief. This spiritual impulse for combination, which with elemental force appears where personality inwardly revolts against every form of authority, shows us unmistakably that in the problem of authority, as well as in that of belief, its twin sister, the question is not of historical but of psychological categories.

In his posthumous *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, Hume has shown us that the religious need of the human race represents as great a psychological necessity as the metaphysical need of human nature put forward later by Kant. To the religious and metaphysical need I might add as a third fundamental quality of the human race with its race-experience (mneme), the need of authority. If one traced the religious need, with Schleiermacher, Goethe and Feuerbach, to the necessity of feeling, the metaphysical need (with Kant) to the necessity of thought, then I shall show the need of the human race for authority as a necessity of end, as an economy of will, as a consequence of the law of the least measure of force. What is temporal and spatial in religion is, as we know, only the confessional. What,

however, in all religions is over-temporal and over-spatial and thus represents the eternal, is the inevitable impulse of human nature to make itself a God, to throw away the old in order to replace it by the new. It is, as we saw, exactly the same with the evolution of the innumerable languages, dialects and idioms into a logic which binds them all. There are laws of logic which are common to all men and even to beasts and which rest upon such a spiritual impulse as the structure of the religious idea. The spiritual impulse we call the psychological category, in contradistinction to the particular historical confessions or the different conceptions of formal logic to which we grant only a temporal-spatial character.

What is determined temporally and spatially, we call an historical category, what reveals itself as over-temporal and over-spatial, as a permanent spiritual tendency of the identically organised human nature with its identical experiences, we call a psychological category. And such a psychological category we see in the indispensable need for authority of the human race. Only the *forms* of authority are historically necessary ; psychologically necessary, however, is the *principle* of authority. The impulse of the human race for the preservation of the species requires imperatively that man should set up authorities. What kind of authorities one has to set up or recognise is temporally and spatially determined ; for this depends upon the soil and climate, upon fauna and flora, upon waterways and chains of hills, upon physical and telluric qualities, and lastly, upon historical conditions. The *forms* of authority are, as historical categories, as diverse as the forms of Divine worship or the grammatical forms and sound-symbols of different languages, but the same inevitable impulse of human nature, which, as a psychological necessity, has led to the formation of language and shaping of religion, was at work in maturing, with inward necessity, the principle of authority as a social regulator.

In my *Sinn des Daseins* (Meaning of Existence), (Tübingen, Mohr, 1904, pp. 240-41) I have attempted a psychological deduction of the principle of authority and I have shown fear, imitation and insight as the three ascending forms of manifestation of the principle of authority in history. Here my work is to exhibit a still deeper spiritual view of the principle of authority, whilst I intentionally omit at first the question as to how the principle of authority manifests itself in history. I rather put the whole problem upon the question: How is the problem of authority to be considered sociologically? Can the historical forms of appearance of authority be brought to a common denomination, so that finally, the historical phenomena of authority may rest upon an inner spiritual impulse, and thus, upon a psychological category, like the metaphysical and religious need? Why do men give up their primitive freedom and want of compulsion in speech and thought, in feeling and action, and voluntarily subject themselves—in speech, to the rules of grammar, in thought, to the laws of logic, in action, lastly, either to law or to the moral norm? This increasing obligation of the individual to the collective, of which the individual either counts himself as a part or is forced by the State to form a subordinate member, is an important characteristic of every developed culture-system. This voluntary obligation of modern men, who have won for themselves, after several centuries of struggle, after a violent revolutionary outburst, political and religious freedom, freedom of the press and of speech, but who at the same time follow blindly in their speech, thought, feeling and action, thousands of prescriptions of grammar and logic, the dictates of customs and manners, of rights and laws, of convention and legal forms, of etiquette and norm, though they are looked upon as outcasts, requires a sociological explanation. If men with advancing civilization have left the anarchical state of the wilderness where rules an authority-less freedom from obligation, in order to place themselves

under the State, under innumerable obligations and prescriptions, there must be deep reasons for this renunciation of the freedom of the primitive State in favour of a network of obligations. The historical category of authority, which so long appealed to commonsense and based its sociological right of existence upon the fact that all civilized people known to us put forward and respect some forms of authority, must, in the last instance, be traced back to a psychological category, to an inevitable spiritual impulse which announces that the need of authority is an inseparable characteristic of the human race. The question here is, after all, one concerning the psychological, and further, the biological and sociological region of the principle of authority.

Here we should take into consideration the following circumstance: Herbert Spencer puts forward at first the concept of "representative feeling." By "representative feeling," Spencer understands the organised result of experience which the human race in the course of thousands of centuries has accumulated. These accumulated race-experiences which are condensed into hereditary instincts are, for the race, acquired, for the individual, inherited qualities. The human race has set down its storedup experiences in the paths of association and its functions and has organised them in the form of abstract logical concepts. Every such race-experience or abstraction represents a problem which has been thought out in ancient times and which spares us the trouble of doing the same work over again which our forefathers have already done for us. No individual is clever enough to foresee all near and distant consequences of his actions himself, and thus he finds himself compelled to guide himself by concepts or feelings, norms and laws which his forefathers, through their several thousand years' experience with regard to what is injurious and what is useful to the species, have left behind as a legacy. These race-experiences (race-memory, according to Hering, "mneme," according to Semon) claim an authoritative

value because they outlive the individual, spare him the trouble of making the experiences himself which hundreds of generations have made before him. Here lies, for example, the value of the wisdom of proverbs, traditions, golden rules of life which, like current coin, pass unexamined from hand to hand. Proverbs are, consequently, marketable judgments of value on which race-experience puts its stamp. Such race-experiences grow automatic through a thousand years' usage, pass by inheritance from predecessors to successors, as mental functions move along the paths of association. Every individual who is born in a culture-system, is born with the inheritance of these race-experiences in his social instincts as fixed dispositions. These dispositions are not unconditioned spiritual impulses, from which there is no escape, but a direction, a tendency, an inclination of the will for the performance of such actions as are prescribed for the individual by these former will-actions of the forefathers, shaped into instincts, and now become automatic and existing in the form of the impulse for self-preservation.

For the self-preservation of the individual, however, such "representative feelings" are unrivalled social regulators. For they guarantee men an economy of force which they, according to the law of the least measure of force, as natural beings, and especially, as rational beings, must perfect. If I can rely upon the experiences of others, so that I have not to do these things myself, then my time and power of work will be so well spared that I shall be able to apply myself to new problems for which there is no experience of my forefathers to guide me. The principle of the economy of force, to which Avenarius and Mach have given the meaning and form of a thought-economy, commands us only in the interest of our race-protection and self-protection to attain the maximum of production with a minimum of effort and work. If thus our forefathers have acquired great experience of what is useful and what is hurtful to the species and have

left to us their organised experiences in the form of universal (abstract) concepts, as logic and science, and in representative feeling, as religion and authority, then we have to handle this inheritance—naturally, *cum beneficio inventarii*—in the interest of our self-preservation.

One of these legacies of the race to the individual is now the social regulator of the principle of authority, to which I might give a will-economical interpretation. As Mach has derived all science and all logic from the standpoint of the economy of thought, so I might justify the principle of authority from the standpoint of will-economy, and with this raise this principle to the rank of a psychological category, as Hume has done in the case of the religious problem. Nietzsche once said, anticipating James's pragmatism : That is true which helps the existence of man. Belief in authorities, like all beliefs, is in this sense the expression of the faith that we have in the bearer of authority, no matter whether it is a man, a tradition, an institution, a proposition or a command. All belief in authority is indissolubly united with belief in, or acceptance of, foreign opinions or traditions. Had there been no belief in those truths which the preceding generation leaves to the succeeding in the form of strong convictions and unshakable propositions, every generation would have had to begin anew. This, however, as a useless expenditure of force, offends against the law of economy in nature. If a tradition of our forefathers is found true, or if the directions given by authoritative prescriptions or direct commands in the interest of the race prove themselves correct, they have a claim upon our belief and trust. When a thing has proved itself useful in the past a hundred times, it makes us conclude that the future will resemble the past in this point, and so one can understand how it is that Herbert Spencer, for example, saw in the worship of ancestors the origin of all religious feeling. The cult of ancestor-worship, the worship of the dead, of the dead souls of

one's forefathers and hero-cult, psychologically hang together closely. The departed souls leave behind oral commands or written testaments and work with authoritative force on the will of the survivors. The departed ancestors or heroes are not only the first representatives of the principle of authority in point of time, but also the most effective sources of authority at present. He to whom the memory of his fathers or national heroes is holy, is guided in his own actions by a preference for the ideals striven after by them. Authorities are, consequently, formal models of will. Ancestor-cult is perhaps the stiffest form of authority. For the will of a dead person is something absolutely irrevocable. No appeal is possible. The dead men cannot be contradicted. Thus there are formed, especially, in feudal societies which have great family traditions, whole circles of traditions which, as motives of authority, produce such a lasting effect that they stifle the individual personalities through excessive family authority. What the continuity of the family tradition and worship of ancestors are for the particular individual, the three Testaments signify, as prescriptions of the highest authority or of God, for the three monotheistic religions, and lastly, constitution and law signify for the political structure. All these centres of authority represent, as it were, abbreviations of will-forces. Every authority is an obstructing or facilitating apparatus of the will—*an abbreviated formula for trust.* It is absolutely impossible for the individual to perform all his actions wholly by himself through the exercise of his own will alone. His own need of inertia, a phenomenon corresponding to the law of inertia in nature, is in keeping with the fact that instead of thinking always for himself and getting into the bargain the trouble inseparably connected with it, he acts in the way in which his authorities advise or command him, no matter whether the question is of religious, political or social authorities.

It is thus extremely convenient to rest comfortably on the cushion which our authorities have prepared for us and laid

softly beneath our head. Hence the revolt of all energetic natures, especially, of Fichte, against the stifling power of authority which reduces all personality to a channel of the universal. Kant regarded heteronomy, the reference to foreign will, as ethically of little value, whilst he granted the character of morality only to such actions as result from one's own free will. Still further goes Fichte (in the *Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* (Principles of the present age), 1806, and in *Rechtslehre* (Doctrine of Right), 1812, in the condemnation of the principle of authority. Fichte in his spirited manner regards all action dictated by authorities as extremely "unconscientious." And yet Fichte has a deep insight into the double nature of man and reveals the eternal opposition between race and individual, between altruism and egoism, between authority and anarchy. Fichte resolves this contradiction lying deep in the human breast prophetically in such a way that in the age of complete rationality, the coming of which he announces, the individual is consciously placed under the authority of the moral law. Through insight into the process of history the individual is brought under the imperative of race-reason. In his *Rechtslehre* especially, Fichte sees the principal problem of the State to be such an education and culture of the people as will enable them to do through insight what formerly they did out of belief in authority. This prophecy of Fichte may serve as an ideal to be striven after: reality, however, seems to be something quite different. Should the principle of authority disappear, make itself superfluous and be replaced by perfect insight, then authority would be an historical category and not a psychological one, as we maintain.

Much as I agree with Kant and Fichte that the moral value of an action can only be measured by the share the individual had in it, and not by obedience or subjection to a constituted authority, I can hardly convince myself that the

principle of authority as a factor of selection, as a necessary will-motivation for our common actions, and lastly, as a social regulator, will ever disappear. Its psychological necessity is based upon the strong ground of biological utility. I see, therefore, in authority such a necessary evil as Ernst Mach sees in prejudice. Here one cannot help feeling a peculiar charm, the charm of seeing the untiring champions of all national and confessional prejudices fight for the principle of prejudice. Ernst Mach once said, "Too great respect for every new fact allows no strong habit of thinking to grow. Too strong habits of thinking hinder free observation. In struggle, in the compromise of judgment with prejudice, our insight grows. A habitual judgment applied to a new case without proof, we call prejudice. Who does not know its frightful force? Very rarely do we think how important and useful prejudice can be. As no one could physically exist if he were to create and maintain his circulation of blood, his breath, his digestion, by arbitrary, preconceived actions, so no one could intellectually exist if he were compelled to judge everything which comes before him without allowing himself to be guided by a prejudice. Prejudice is a sort of reflex movement in the domain of intelligence."

What Mach says of prejudice is true of the application of intellect to the will, of thought to action, and thus of authority: it is a *reflex movement in the domain of will*. Authorities are centres of power and abbreviated forms of will, models of action which as convenient sources of judgment, lighten for those individuals who place themselves under them, their own work of choosing and examining. Not every individual has, when forced to meet the needs of life, the power to choose that which serves him best in his happiness and misery. Without authorities that have not only thought out, but also *willed* and *acted* beforehand for the individual, men will be, like Buridan's ass, between two bundles of hay and will die of hunger. Thus, man in the course of his daily work

transfers even his will-actions to the individual centres of force or will-motivations which are respected by him as authorities. He goes to the Church, as his confession demands of him, to the ballot-box, as his State or his party orders him; in his professional duties, as his professional etiquette prescribes, he sits and stands, drives and rides, embraces and laughs, as morals and customs, convention and etiquette, mode and tact prescribe. By far the greatest portion of the indifferent actions of men—the Stoics had for this the expression "adiaphora"—takes place according to the prescriptions of innumerable centres of authority, whether according to the written law of the State or according to the unwritten law of social morality and good manners. And it is well that it is so. For these convenient models of will relieve our power of will and leave it free for the really great ethical problems which are only fit to ocupy the mind of the individual. Authorities, as *reflex movements in the province of human action*, relieve us of superfluous efforts, perhaps in 90 per cent. of cases, and spare us the trouble of looking out for the sources of motives and of choosing between contending motives. Just as in prejudices to which we stick, others have *thought* and *felt* beforehand for us, so authorities have *willed* beforehand for us. What in the logical sense a prejudice, in a good, as well as in a bad sense, signifies, authority does in a good, as well as in a bad sense, in the ethical region, namely, a sort of fore-will. If in prejudice one has to hold back one's thought in favour of that of another who has already judged beforehand for us, then in authority one holds back one's will in favour of that of another who has willed beforehand for us, and through this willing beforehand, has shown us the way. What is useful in this psychological category of the principle of authority is the immense relief which it gives to our daily will-actions. As scientific formulæ spare me the trouble of making the whole thought-process which is symbolised by them—every scientific formula indeed

relieves human memory,—so is it the case with all individual centres of authority which serve as sources of motives of our action and thus relieve our will. What sciences are for thought, authorities are for action.

As little, however, as the possession of science relieves us of the problem of striking out new paths and finding new formulas, so little can a thorities act as hindrances to finding new paths of morality or coining new ethical values. Here, as there, the highest ethical command is: Work—work in the realm of science, in order to widen the horizon every day and to set up new formulas in place of those that are no longer valid, work in the field of practical reason with indefatigable energy, in the domain of action, in the world of values and ends, destroying old authorities and setting up new ones in their place. For what is a psychological category in authority, that is, what possesses the character of eternity, is only the biological principle and not its changeable historical forms. We require the traditional authorities, where they serve us, where they relieve our will a thousandfold in the adiaphora of life, just as physiologically we make use of the reflex movements in our motion and rest and in our automatic actions. But wherever the question is of serious problems of life, of ethical principles, of the value, or absence of value, of personality, there can be no reliance upon those authorities that have willed beforehand for us. For in all important ethical questions and questions of culture, every developed organ must examine anew the current values, clear away all soot and dust, remove everything that has become rusty or dusty, in order to maintain energetically as a new authority only that which exists, and which is in conformity with the culture-consciousness for the time being. The *forms* of authority change and are destroyed but the *principle* of authority as a psychological category remains.

If we have, therefore, revealed the principle of authority on its utility-side as a biological function, we have now to discuss

the historical bearer of this principle. The function of authority is biologically necessary (φυ'σις') the carriers of this function, however, are historical principles (θεσις) that is, principles which are determined temporally and spatially by climate and qualities of the soil.

What, namely, the principle of self-preservation means for the individual, the principle of authority signifies for the preservation of the race. If the individual proceeds according to whims and arbitrary impulses, according to inclination and temperament, suggestion and disposition, the interest of the race, the principle of social self-protection, demands imperatively that rules and canons, norms and laws should be set up which do away with individual predilections, and that the collective should give public orders (commands, prescriptions, laws), to which the individual will unhesitatingly subject himself, if he does not wish to render himself liable to physical punishment or suffer in moral estimation. Such commanders or law-givers as compel the individuals, who either voluntarily subject themselves to these imperatives or are forced to do so, to move in the paths prescribed by them, are regarded as authorities. This happens whenever the powerful will of prominent personages—founders of religion, law-givers, despots, prophets, apostles, geniuses, heretics or sectarians—sets up universal rules of conduct, which, when accepted and followed, constitute models for the will, and these act upon the particular individuals through habit and custom, with an almost machine-like precision in the course of centuries. The normal, that is, docile, average individual acts generally in a way prescribed by his family traditions, his *milieu*, his Church or State authorities. With the help of the principle of authority which represents an eternal biological support for the preservation of the human species, a stable uniformity, nay, a beneficial agreement among the actions of human groups, is formed which is a natural protection from the anarchical arbitrariness of the individual.

The development of the ordering functions in the human cerebral system first establishes a real boundary between man and beast. Sensations and perceptions, memory and imagination, feeling and impulse, affections and instincts, animals also have like men, though no doubt we have these in a better and clearer form. But our ordering functions, which make it possible for us men to put the chaos of millions of impressions into the cosmos of the purposively connected world-view, are not present in animals. Such an ordering principle we have already shown above, and it exists for speech in the rules of grammar, for thought in the laws of formal logic, for feeling in the prescriptions of religions, for the will in the moral norms, for action, in the rights and laws of the State, for conduct and behaviour, in customs and habits, in mode and tact, in convention and legal forms. The ordering principles which combine and unite the chance impressions of our sense-organs which we share with the beasts, according to such strict rules, that out of them a general law of thought arises which is true for all men and which thus removes all personal arbitrariness, thereby making it impossible for the animal intellect to keep pace with ours, we call with Kant categories. To these categories in logic, in the centre of which, according to Schopenhauer, the category of causality stands, there corresponds in sociology the category of authority. As the question is there of thought-necessity, so the question is here of the necessity of action. What the logical category of causality does for the explanation of the cosmic connexion, in setting up, in place of the arbitrariness which the world exhibits in the eyes of the wild and the barbarous, strict and regular coherence of all godless natural forces, the sociological category of authority does in assigning a purpose to the anarchical arbitrariness of individual action. As the logical category of causality destroys the anarchy of thought of the wild and the barbarous, so the sociological category of authority destroys

the unrestrained anarchy of feeling and will of the egocentric individual.

The farther we penetrate scientifically into the mechanism of nature and the organism of society, the more clearly are chance and arbitrariness ruled out of court. As natural science has excluded chance and miracle—branded by Spinoza as an *asylum ignorantiae*—from the theoretical explanation of the world, so social sciences are about to remove arbitrariness—as it were, the contingency of action—from practical reason, from the world of universal-human action. And just as the principle of causality has banished chance as a logically untenable form of explanation from natural science, so is the principle of authority about to banish arbitrariness as a sociologically untenable form of action.

Those ordering functions which raise man above the beast, claim to be the laws of the autonomy of the human race-reason. Sensuous pictures, which in causal succession and in a thousand divers individual forms, appear in the circle of our perception, we civilized people receive from the external world, exactly like beasts, wild animals, idiots and children. But we alone are in a position, with the help of our logical functions (categories), to bring that final order into the apparent chaos of isolated impression-atoms which is present in astro-physics and in descriptive natural sciences.

In the same line of comprehensive principles of order which build for us civilized men a "system of nature," a scientific world-view, lies the principle of authority which gives precisely such directions for human action as causality does for human thought. And as Schopenhauer has ridiculed the eleven remaining categories of Kant as "blind windows," in order to set up causality as the central category, so we might put forward authority as the social central category, although we have repeatedly asked for a sociological table of categories.

If one would raise, against this placing of the principle of authority in the foreground, the objection that it is a risky thing in this age of the autonomy (self-legislation) of human personality to be a champion of the principle of authority which we pretend to have cast away and consigned to the rubbish heap, I reply that no doubt the historical forms of authority change and transform themselves with time, as we believe we have already shown, but the biological selective principle of authority as the social regulator of the preservation of the human species is fixed and unchangeable. The historical bearers of authority have had their day and are disappearing, but the sociological category of authority remains constant throughout all changes of time. For in truth, Europe, in spite of the breaking of all authority of the Church and the State since the English Revolution and the great French Revolution, has never been so well disciplined as she is to-day. The Heidelberg theologian Ernst Troeltsch says in the " International Weekly Journal of Science, Art and Technique," under the title *Autonomy and Rationalism in the Modern World* (No. 7, dated the 18th May, 1907), " The prevailing spiritual characteristic of the modern world is the destruction of all supernatural authorities for the sake of authority. But only the supernatural Divine value and origin of authorities, the ethical need of breaking the individual for the sake of humility, has disappeared...The authorities and objective forces remain essentially as they were and the ethical demand of the employment of the individual in the service of the whole works not very differently from the demand of authority...Life has become much too complicated for the old supernatural authorities but their essence remains and forms the starting-point and substance of thought and practical conduct. Everything else has become formal and this formality goes deep into the tone, feeling and structure. The old has continued in all essentials." The reason of this phenomenon, as given by Troeltsch, namely, that the authorities change no doubt but *authority* as a social

function continues with undiminished strength, I believe I have explained by the difference between authority as an historical and as a psychological category.

The historical bearers of authority are either persons and their traditions or public institutions. Ancestor-cult and hero-cult come in the wake of all religion as well as of all authority. Consequently, parental authority (*patria potestas*) is the original symbol of authority. Even God is mythologically the father of the human race (God as father) and great monarchs are looked upon as fathers of the fatherland (*pater patriae*) and consequently, as the highest bearers of authority. Fathers of the land or Church fathers are always favourite sources of authority. The historical bearers of authority are (1) parental, (2) Divine, (3) priestly, (4) kingly authority, (5) State and military authority, (6) legal authority, (7) school authority, (8) scientific authority.

Authority is the stabilising, preserving, strengthening element of the collective will, as contrasted with the variable, fleeting and arbitrary element of the individual will. Authority represents in all its bearers the collective will, which rests most upon the race-experience of the previous generation, as contrasted with the confused arbitrariness of the individual. The eternal tragedy of man is, as we have repeatedly pointed out, his restless oscillation between self-preservation, which stirs him to maintain his own interest with vigour, and preservation of the species which forces him to give up his own will in favour of the collective will beneficial to the species. And the successive bearers of the principle of authority symbolise this collective will.

That these bearers were in the beginning real or imaginary persons—ancestors, heroes, gods—and only became later, through increasing capacity for abstraction, institutions, has its reason deeply rooted in the nature of the human race which rests upon sensuous perception. Everywhere the concrete presupposes the abstract, the personified or objective thinking presupposes

the conditional, especially, relative thinking. Authority, however, is a relative concept, precisely like causality or truth, usefulness or injury. That the relative concepts are only valid of man and for man, and that thus beyond human consciousness there is no reality whatever, is only too easily forgotten. As we bow before word-fetishes, so we do before conceptual fetishes. We strive for "justice, as if it were a person to whom we could sacrifice ourselves," or we become martyrs in the cause of "truth," as if it were a being that could exist by itself, a God to whom we could pay homage. In reality, the substantive *truth* arises, through a categorical transposition, out of the adjective *true*, just as the substantive *justice* is only a derivative of the adjective *just*. True and false never relate to the relations of *objects* to one another—for these are either real or unreal—but to the judgment with regard to the permissibility of the combination of *representations* with one another. Similarly, *just* and *unjust* concern only will-actions as human characterisations of value and they apply only to human will-actions. Animals are of a good or a bad sort but never just or unjust. Justice, however, as a thing or a concept of object, expresses only the transformation of a rational form of human will-actions into the form of a substance. As we cannot represent to ourselves qualities without bearers of these qualities, without a substratum, so we imagine the bearers and we sensualise, personify and substantialise the qualities through a categorical movement from attribute to substance. The pure relational concept *justice* transforms itself into a Dike or Themis, takes the form of a person or is dignified into godliness, in order later to be retransformed into Divine justice. And thus everywhere this substratum which is ascribed to the rational concepts, serves as a living spirit which breathes life into the dead skeleton of abstract relational concepts and helps it to an independent existence. Without the hypostatised (imagined) bearer the empty relation of "justice" or "truth" could not stand. The

transformation into a substantive gives these relational concepts a support, so that they move independently. If, however, relational thought is re-transformed into an objective one, as, for instance, happens in the pure thought-form (category) of causality which expresses always in itself only a relation between cause and effect, ground and consequence, stimulus and sensation or motive and action, then the conceptual extension of such a word-fetish knows no limit. Thus, for example, causality appears first in the mythological form of destiny, Providence or Moira, as justice does under the word-cloak, "Dike." Gradually, however, it transforms and resolves itself into the logical concept of determinism, in order, finally, to rise in Spinoza to the highest stages of objectification and substantialisation. The logical causality of ground and consequence becomes, according to him, a *causa sui*, a Substance, Nature, or God. God is for him, as we have seen, the logical premise of the world.

The principle of authority has gone through the same logical process. It begins with ancestors and heroes, magicians and priests, law-givers and founders of religion whom we have to look upon as the first bearers of authority. Gradually, the imagined personality, the bearer of authority, is resolved into a conditional or relational concept, exactly as Dike resolves itself into abstract justice and fate into philosophical determinism. No more are persons bearers of authority but institutions, which one can look upon as condensed race-reason or, as Hegel says, the objective spirit.

The decalogue, the Solonic ten-table-law, Sulla's twelve tables, the three testaments of monotheistic religions, the Roman law, Empire and Papacy, councils and synods, laws and constitutions, parliaments and governments are the modern sources of authority. The concrete authority of the father, which still lives in its last dumb form in the "god-father," the "holy father," the "father of the people," or "father Czar," is gradually condensed into impersonal

institutions and laws. The personal source of authority of the *voluntas regis* gives way, in the ascending historical rhythm, to the impersonal *salus publica*. Even the principle of authority has been democratised. In place of heteronomy, there has appeared, ever since the great French Revolution, autonomy, which manifests itself more clearly as time advances.

The bearers of authority are no longer commanded from above but are chosen from below, and that means autonomy (self-legislation, as opposed to legislation by others). Laws as impersonal sources of authority are no longer forced upon us by a foreign will, no matter whether this will is that of ancestors or heroes, gods or despots, councils or synods whose nature has not been determined by the sovereign will of the people, but by legislative commands, which in constitutionally governed States finally represent the will of the people. All citizens entitled to vote are subject to these laws which they obey all the more willingly, as these laws are not foreign commands but the people's own commands. Consequently, the constitutionally governed States, in spite of all freedom, or rather in consequence of it, are really better governed than the earthly colossus, Russia, where the dark authority still rests upon fear and imitation that belong to a past historical phase of the self-revelation of the principle of authority, and not upon the view which the modern autonomous principle of authority demands.

Our principle of authority to-day is no more any preached faith but a scientifically established conviction. We ourselves put forward authorities—officials, legislative bodies, governments, public-legal institutions, constitutions—because it can be shown biologically that we indispensably require such authorities in the interest of the preservation of our species, which, in the last analysis, also helps the preservation of self. The sociological value of the principle of authority rests upon its proved utility as a principle for the preservation of the species. The bearers of authority set up by ourselves are the

requisite pillars, without which the abstract relational concept *authority* would have no effective, perceptually representable base. As we set up the causal concept or the concept of substance, in order, with the help of this framework of unity, to conceive the functions and laws of nature, so we set up authorities consciously, in order to attain with their help the objects and values of human society.

The bearers of authority are now those centres of power or will which we require for the creation of imperatives in the interest of the preservation of the species. Every bearer of authority represents a form of the government of man over man. The carriers of authority are organs of the social will-formation. According to the zone and stage of civilization, such a command (social imperative) is given either by supersensuous or by sensually representable units, either by gods or monarchs, tables of laws or statute books. Paterfamilias, the leader of the herd, liege lord, the Eupatridæ of Athens, the mediæval town magistrate, corporations and guilds, orders and brotherhoods, Pope and Emperor, Church and State are, according to their historical constellation, examples of bearers of authority. Where, formerly, the individual ruled absolutely over the collective, to-day, in advanced States, the collective rules over the individuals.

The bearers of authority make use, for the purpose of imposing their will upon the normal individual—other individuals who oppose authority are called in the Church heretics, in the State, revolutionaries, in law, criminals, in art and science, innovators or theorists—throughout of mass-suggestion. Their weapons are great words, revelations, miracles, pictures, formulas, cults, illusions, promises, emancipations, illumination, and lastly, rational grounds. The nature and degree of these helping media for mass-suggestion rest upon the climate and quality of the soil, upon the stage of civilization and degree of culture, in short, upon historical conditions. In advanced countries party-words and political catchwords do

the work of mass-suggestion. With the widening of the knowledge of nature, the mythological form of authority gives way gradually to the logical, as with the advent of commerce and industry, the mythical representatives of authority retire, in order to make room for consciously determined bearers of authority.

The principle of authority loses nothing in value from the fact that we have discovered it to be something put forward by us. The concept of God itself must, since the days of Feuerbach, be content with this spiritual origin. If one puts, for instance, person in place of the authority of the human race, then there is one God, just as in the Orient, there is only one despot. The function of unity of our consciousness presses with psychological necessity always and everywhere upon the symbolic unity of authority. Even republics have presidents as bearers of this symbol of unity. Every organic combination of several men for the purpose of attaining common objects requires a hierarchical organisation, and therefore, there is a tendency everywhere towards obtaining a leading personality, a presiding head. Although the individual law-givers (Solon, Lycurgus, Moses) gradually disappear, in order to make room for abstract law, and natural gods conceived as persons must, as symbols of natural forces, admit that the natural divinities are only personified symbols of natural law, still we moderns have also our unified centres of authority, whether they are called humanity, justice, truth or human progress. Nevertheless, we conceive to-day these instances of authority no more as living *persons*, but as life-giving *ideals*. Persons are (exist), ideals *ought* to be, *ought* to realize themselves. If the previous generations conceived authorities as existing, we conceive them to-day as something that belongs to the region of 'ought.' The bearers of our autonomous (self-established) authorities should realise those objects for which we have introduced them. The former bearers of authority were ontologically conceived as necessities

of being, those of to-day are regarded teleologically as necessities of ends. Those realized a lifeless idea, these carry out a gradually realizing ideal. To the laws of nature in physics and the laws of conduct in morals, there correspond the laws of ends in sociology. If the laws of nature—according to Kant—have the value of thought-necessity and the moral laws (the categorical imperative) the value of will-necessity, the imperative of authorities has the character of a necessity of purpose. To the laws of nature one must, to the laws of morality one ought to *unconditionally* subject oneself, to the laws of ends, however, in the centre of which the imperatives of authorities stand, one should only *conditionally* subject oneself. Natural and moral laws are absolutely valid; the social imperatives of the authorities, however, are only relatively valid, for they are conditioned in time and space. They establish no fixed laws but only tendencies or inclinations of the human will. Mathematical or logical ("eternal") truths are propositions having a thought-necessity. Authorities, however, are only will-assertions which establish a disposition. Their value depends upon the complete fulfilment of their task. If the bearers of authority have not conceived or fulfilled those ideals, in the service of which they are placed and as living incarnations of which they were introduced, then their commands have no irresistible compulsory character. Prescriptions with regard to ends can be annulled, the moment they no more fulfil their functions purposively. Our present bearers of authority are, therefore, subject to public control, because as functions of the whole, they have to show themselves in their public actions in such a way that the placing of the centre of faith and power in a representative manner in their hands is permanently justified. Formerly, the authorities had only to command, and the individual only to obey. To-day, however, the bearers of authority are our own creations, and therefore, they are subject in their actions to public criticism, just as they owe their origin to public

confidence. As we must conclude from the historical fact that Penates, Divine images, and idols are only destroyed, in order to create always new gods, that the concept of God is only a spiritual necessity of human nature developing itself in culture, so we must inevitably conclude from the circumstance that all authorities are destroyed in order that new ones may be set up, that authorities represent a socio-psychical necessity.

CHAPTER XVI.

The Problem of History.

I.

Every historical prediction presupposes a certain uniformity in the course of events. It is an analogical inference from the observation of past events, which show characteristics that agree with one another, to the future. The feeling of expectation, on which every prediction is in the last analysis based, assumes absolutely that the uniformity so long observed in the series of events or in the complex of facts gives also indications of the future. The events which will happen in the future must, according to the causal law, be similar to those of the past, if and so far as the conditions which constitute the observed symptom-complex are the same. From a law of events we expect, nay, demand that the fixed consequences, everywhere and at all times, are sure to appear if the physical causes or the logical grounds—real grounds and grounds of knowledge—are the same.

This unconditionality in the predictions of the future is, however, as much denied to political or historical prognoses as to medical or meteorological ones. For the convictions lying at the root of all predictions are not so much facts which can be realized directly as such, as symptoms, that is, facts which first relate to subjective judgments and estimates of a whole complex of facts which is not knowable in itself. Of the eclipses of the sun or the moon, there is no prognosis but an exact calculation, in which even seconds are taken into

account. Astronomical certainty appears with a hundred per cent. expectation, because in the whole experience up to the present day, no case has been observed which has given the lie to astronomical predictions.

We have only to do with a world which is given spatially in three dimensions, temporally, in measurable past, present and future, and causally, in the strict regularity of natural phenomena. What lies beyond it is no more an object of knowledge, nay, not even a scientifically permissible hypothesis, but a matter of belief. We know only two scientifically permissible forms of the predictions of the future: astronomical certainty with a hundred per cent. expectation of the correctness of our predictions and problematic judgments with an hypothetical certainty, based on the calculation of probability. There the future is calculated, because one has to do with mere facts, the course of which can be determined beforehand with absolute mechanical-causal certainty or probability; in historical sciences, on the other hand, it is only *predicted*, because one has to do here, not with the facts themselves, but with the meaning of facts, whereby the subjective factor of judgment is unconsciously introduced, the result being that the predictions of the future rest not upon the direct facts but upon facts *judged*, that is, upon whole symptom-complexes.

The predictions of history have never a categorical but only an hypothetical value, as the calculation of probability proves. The expression $2 \times 2 = 4$ is a truth independent of all historical conditions, and thus a timeless truth which will have its logical validity even when the dissolution of the world, as the apocalypses announce, will take place, but the historical predictions which have been made by the prophets of old or the great politicians of the last century are sometimes wrong, if they do not represent a *vaticinium ex eventu*. Celebrated examples of false political prognoses of great politicians, like Napoleon, Bismarck and Pitt, V.

Holtzendorff has collected in *Prinzipien der Politik* (1869, p. 330).

Are now political or historical predictions scientifically without value or historically meaningless, because even the most esteemed statesmen have been wrong in their predictions of the future? This is the same as the question, Should we only have categorical expressions or apodictic judgments? An all-seeing Divine eye which would be in possession of the Laplacean world-formula might attain this ideal of certainty. We poor blunderers, to whom intuitive knowledge or intellectual perception is denied and only discursive thinking is allowed, must consider ourselves fortunate, if we have, by the side of the mathematico-logical truths, the *verités éternelles*, the opposite of which is logically unthinkable, the physico-chemical truths which are still truths of the second class, the opposite of which is no doubt thinkable but is contradicted by all past experience. Historical truths, on the other hand, are related to physical, somewhat as the grammatical rules are related to the phonetic laws or laws of the transformation of sounds. Sociology is consequently, a kind of grammar of history. The first two, mathematics and descriptive or theoretical natural sciences, have to do either with logical laws of thought which are always valid, the opposite of which contains a logical contradiction (and here we speak of mathematics), or with the universalisations of experience which have never been contradicted (and here we speak of physics and chemistry, as also of the descriptive natural sciences). With these there is a third group of truths which are contradicted by historical experience in exceptional particular cases, as demography, moral statistics, mass-psychology and lastly and principally, historical rhythm, discernible in the great uniformities, show us; these, however, exhibit a certain constancy in the agreement of the actions of human groups. This we call *historical probability*. Here the question is never of laws but at most of rules, such as we

have in grammar, and of tendencies, such as we have in history. In history, the irrational, the causal, the compossible (Leibniz, Boutroux) has its place. For here, neither logical laws of thought nor physical laws of nature are the only determining grounds of human action, but the question is of ends which transform themselves into actions guided by motives. Consequently, in politics which has to do with an approximate valuation of the actions of human groups, there can never be any prediction having an astronomical certainty. The conjectural value of politico-historical truths can perhaps be raised to a degree of probability amounting to ninety per cent., but it can never reach absolute certainty. Politico-historical statements, therefore, can give a problematic judgment but can never make an apodictic assertion.

On apodictic statements, which in the last analysis rest upon the proposition of identity, the scientific man cannot live. The Newtonian *hypotheses non fingo*, Newton himself could not consistently follow. Without analogical inferences and hypotheses and problematic judgments based on these, Science, as Mach in *Erkentnis und Irrtum* (Knowledge and Error) has already shown, could have made no progress. Scientific hypotheses are no doubt far removed from the truth but they are its indispensable pace-makers and pioneers. Very many scientific judgments which we to-day look upon as categorical, were for centuries problematic. Thus, for example, the law of the conservation of matter or energy was a problematic judgment, as long as the Stoics and their earlier followers maintained it on the ground of analogical inferences. But it was transformed into a categorical judgment when Lavoisier with a balance in hand or Robert Mayer and Helmholtz with strict proofs demonstrated its truth. The path of science proceeds everywhere, through problematic judgments from sensuous perception, which gives us only the certainty of reality, to the eternal truths in mathematics and

logic which make an apodictic statement possible (it must be so, it cannot be otherwise). Prognoses, logically conceived, are nothing but problematic judgments, that is, logically justified hypotheses with regard to the future. This future can take the form of an opinion (δοξα), a conviction (πιστις), or lastly, unconditional certainty (αληθια). The mathematician who works with eternal, that is, timeless truths, can most easily and surely predict the future, for as his judgments have a timeless validity, the difference between the past and the future disappears. The physicist, who in his nomothetic legislative procedure can assert that experience so far has never contradicted the law formulated by him, which, indeed, is only generalised experience, establishes the future, the coming event, on the ground of the unconditional regularity of similar past events. Hence the certainty of astronomical calculations. The security of the future lies here in the strict regularity of the past. Neither mathematicans nor physicists thus offer us problematic judgments with regard to the future. We do not *believe* in the Pythagorean theorem or in the solar eclipses; we *know* them. Thus, where apodictic assertions or categorical judgments are permissible, the future is unconditionally determined, whether through the necessity of thought, as in mathematics, or through the necessity of experience, as in physics. Not so with the problematic judgment. Here prediction has only a high value as a conjecture which no doubt can be determined approximately through calculation of probability but always only *approximately*. Doubt—called chance—creeps in, therefore, in the problematic judgment where it can build its nest or make a hole through which it can enter. Unconditional *knowledge* ends here; *belief* appears in its stead.

In the inquiry into causes, the question is of unchangeable knowledge, in the inquiry into values, of personal convictions. The contrast between the inquiry into causes and the inquiry into values which has its origin in Windelband, and which

Walter Haecker has made the basal principle of his work in the collection called *Natur und Kunst* (Nature and Art), (Vol. II, 1907), I recognise as logically permissible and scientifically useful. Even the distinction between the judgments of being and judgments of values (*ibid*, p. 57) is justified. In our picture of the world we have to do, according to Haecker, with *knowledge* ; in the world-conception, however, there is at the root, a *belief*, a personal conviction. The more I agree with this proposition, the less can I assent to the conclusion of Haecker, that prognosis belongs to the inquiry into causes and not to the inquiry into values. In placing diagnosis and prognosis side by side, Haecker himself has fallen into the erroneous way denounced by him, of deducing judgments of value from judgments of being. With diagnosis, it is said (p. 62, and in greater detail, p. 258, criticising Spencer and myself), a prognosis can be combined. It can be shown—and this can also be said for the case on the ground of the universal concepts regarding the probable distant course of history—that this course is left to itself. Here lies the mistake of Haecker. There can be no causal process in history which is left to itself. Historical predictions, which rest upon human motives and not upon mechanical causes, make no knowledge but only belief possible.

II.

All belief is the child of superstition. And thus also, the art of political prediction can be traced to an honourable series of ancestors in the forms of superstition. Before the "ancients" engaged in war or undertook any important work, whether private or public, they consulted the oracle or "the old and the wise." The old adage runs: The wise are they who foresee the coming. Hence the respect for the reader of dreams and interpreter of signs. Later arose prophets who made political prognoses till the "end of the days" and

astrologers who foretold the coming events from the constellation of the stars. Even Kepler, as the successor of Tycho, and Wallenstein, as the imperial court astronomer, had to cast a horoscope. And so the number of superstitions with regard to the interpretation of the signs of the future is legion. But just as fetishism and animism were succeeded by theism, so all superstitious forms of reading the future converge to a centre, namely, destiny !—The Church expression of destiny is belief in foreknowledge. In the Greek Ἀναγχη and Μοιρα, in the Roman fatum, in the prescience and providence of the Jews and Christians, in the *Kismet* of the Muhammadans, in short, in the widespread belief in foreknowledge, all superstitious forms of projections into the future are condensed into a single form of belief, evaporated into an attribute of God, till in philosophical determinism the logically justified germ of this mythological interpretation of the future is sown. And just as the one God dethroned old household gods or tribal gods, so the central concept of foreknowledge drove away all personal and spatial forms of foreknowledge—the oracles and readers of signs, no less than prophets and astrologers—and in place of personal enlightenment, suggestions, inspirations or visions of individuals there appeared *foreknowledge*.

But foreknowledge itself which was originally conceived with reference to persons as "destiny"—the εἱμαρμενη of the Greeks, the fate of the Romans—evaporates itself in the Greek philosophy into the προνοια and in the Jewish-Christian philosophy, into a pure attribute of God. Spinoza resolves personal fate, as well as the Divine attributes of foreknowledge and omniscience, into strict determinism, so that the once *personally* conceived fate is transformed into a *logical* fate. Personal "destiny" becomes "nature" and "nature" in Spinoza is transformed, in the "harmonie pré-établie" of Leibniz, into Divine omnipotence and moral necessity. From the time of Kant, especially, this logical fate of Leibniz has sunk, like the iron determinism of Spinoza, to a mere function or category (according to Fichte

and Schopenhaur, the central category) of the understanding. Foreknowledge no longer rules *over* us as a binding force but only as a human law of thought. A great step no doubt from the oracles and interpretation of the signs to foreknowledge, determinism, and the discovery of Kant, that it is the category of causality which gives us the necessity and universality of our statements!

The same characteristics which one formerly attributed to Divine foreknowledge—namely, necessity and universality and therefore, a timeless value—are to-day placed in the subject, projected into the human race-reason, the thought-forms of which—especially, the thought-form of causality—claim to have a constitutive value for the whole of Nature. Natural laws have, since the days of Kant, transformed themselves into laws of thought. These, however, are *a priori* ordering functions which make possible and condition all experience. The logical 'fate' of Spinoza has been since the days of Kant pushed from the outside to the inside from Nature to Spirit. Predictions and prophecies of past generations transform themselves gradually into *a priori* ordering functions of the human race-consciousness. What has so long been observed by our senses under the guidance of our understanding in millions of similar forms gives us the necessity of thought, the logical compulsion to interpret the future, according to the scheme of the past. No one else—not even a prophet or a genius—interprets this to us but we interpret it in our own way. Heraclitus says by way of anticipation: To man his existence is his God. Human race-experience, which matures in every individual the same forms of combination and thought (categories), interprets the universal world-connexion with the help of science for the thinking individual, by virtue of its ordering principles or categories, especially, the category of causality. If we did not possess this power of reading unity with the help of the categories, then the world would be for us no closed system, no unified universe or cosmos, but a

confused mass of isolated impression-atoms, an arena of anarchical arbitrariness, in short, a chaos.

Now, are there principles of order which represent to us the meaning of history as clearly and thoroughly as the logical categories with the help of astro-physics reveal to us the meaning of nature? Are there "categories of history," as there is a "mathematics of nature"? Can the process of history be subjected to the same principles of order as the natural process, so that history becomes only a chapter, a special case, of universal world-occurrences? This is the standpoint of the naturalists (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Holbach's *System of Nature*, and the advocates of the milieu theory (Taine, Buckle, Gumplowicz). The evolutionists of the school of Herder, on the other hand, and the organic historical conception of the school of Schelling place, in opposition to the causal law of the naturalists, the historical law of ends. At the opposite end stands Schopenhauer who can discover in the process of history neither plan nor meaning. We have therefore in history in the one case, a strict, iron conformity to law or significant purposiveness, and in the other a dark, blind, clumsy chance. There can therefore be no talk of politics as a science, either according to the first or according to the second view. For if there were in history strict laws, then there would be strict calculations of the future which mean *knowledge* and therefore leave no room for predictions which claim only our *belief*. If, on the other hand, King Chance were lord and master of history, then this would put an end to *all* predictions and a political prediction would have no more value than a reading of the hands, the art of prophesying, fortune-telling or casting of horoscopes. For science means always, as Comte defines it, *savoir pour prévoir*.

Before, however, we deal with this question which has been attacked with feverish energy, and its solution, we might quote a significant word of Schelling as our starting-point

(*System des transzendentalen Idealismus* 1800, p. 430). "That out of the wholly lawless play of freedom which every free being enjoys, as if there were no other beings outside him (this must always be accepted as a rule), there still arises something rational and harmonious which I am compelled to assume in every action, is a thing that cannot be conceived if the object in all actions has not something general, through which all actions of men can be directed towards an harmonious end, so that however they may be placed, or however riotously they may exercise their arbitrariness without their will and even against their will, through a necessity which is inherent in them and which determines beforehand that they should reach just through the lawless element of their action (and the more lawless it is, the more certainly), a development of the play which they cannot themselves intend, they *must* act through necessity, when their will is powerless."

This Schellingian view of the problem as to how the uniformity of human collective actions, in spite of all individual differences, is to be conceived, represents only a further development of the Kantian problem (*Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*), (Idea of a universal history with a view to a world-citizenship, (1784)). "How is it possible," asks Kant, "that in the apparent freedom of will-impulses and actions of individual men a regular process of world-history is found?" The answer of Kant, as is well-known, runs thus: This possibility of rendering the collective will uniform is given only by the State. Consequently, the history of mankind completes the hidden plan of nature which strives after a perfect constitution in which mankind can unfold its latent forces. This is that teleological view of history which governs even the leading systems of Schiller, Fichte and Hegel and which can be expressed in the short formula: Not causal laws, but laws of ends govern the process of history. The regular course of world-history is explained by Kant by the circumstance, that in order to save themselves from ruin in the

unfettered struggle of interests, men voluntarily subject themselves to State organization and its laws, by which the highest possible freedom of the individual can be preserved by the side of, and along with, the necessary regularity of the whole. In all essentials the logical evolutionist Hegel, with his doctrine of "objective spirit" and his celebrated formula of world-history as "the progress in consciousness of freedom," agrees with the Kantian fundamental thought, as does the biological evolutionist Herbert Spencer, who conceives the freedom of all as the meaning of history.

The uniformity of human collective actions, as demography and statistics have revealed, cannot seriously be questioned. Only, there is dispute regarding the *causes* of this agreement. The idealists attribute this agreement to *ideas* to which they grant a constitutive character for history; the naturalists trace this agreement to interests, be they the interest of self-preservation (Mandeville, Helvetius, Ratzenhofer) or that of the preservation of the species (Spencer) or lastly, that of class-struggle (Marx). For idealists of the type of Hegel, Nature and History are only ascending steps in the self-revelation of the absolute world-ground or God (logos); for the naturalists, on the other hand, history is either the continuation of nature at a higher level (Herder) or simply, a special case of universal conformity to natural laws (Gumplowicz). As for Goethe, art and nature, so for naturalism, history and nature, are one. Hence arises the demand for laws in history, as it appears timidly in Vico, Condorcet, Turgot and Herder and more boldly in Auguste Comte, Thomas Buckle and his French disciple (Bourdeau).

III.

Condorcet gave the demand for the historical law that classical shape which in its forcibleness and wealth of meaning cannot be surpassed. Why, thinks Condorcet, should the

principle of natural sciences, the principle, namely, that the universal laws which regulate the appearances of the world-whole are necessary and constant, be less valid for the development of the intellectual and moral capacities of man than for the other activities of nature? Is it not an anthropocentric audacity, an unpardonable megalomania of the zoologial upstart—called man—to claim for himself separate treatment in the household of the universe? If causal laws are sufficient for governing the whole planetary system, they are also quite competent to guide that division of the universe which comprises the proletariat among the planets, called earth. If it succeeds in showing the historical laws of the human race to be special cases of universal conformity to natural laws, the path from history to nature is made and the unity of the world-whole is conclusively proved. Comte and Buckle, Taine and Spencer, Mill and Littré revel in painting those perspectives which reveal the historical laws to the coming generations. As now principally Marx and his school held the milieu theory and incorporated it in their economical conception of history, "the historical law" appeared triumphant and occupied the position of the ruling doctrine of our culture-system.

This naturalistic interpretation of history was checked on the German soil. In his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (Introduction to the spiritual sciences) Wilhelm Dilthey compared the bold representatives of "historical law" with the fantastic dreams of alchemists. Every formula in which we express the meaning of history is, as Dilthey says (p. 122), only a reflex of our own experienced inner nature. Rümelin's *Reden und Aufsätze* (Speeches and Essays) (1878), *Über den Begriff eines sozialen Gesetzes* (On the concept of a social law) and further *Reden und Aufsätze, Neue Folge* (Speeches and Essays, New Series) were the first to cut out for us the problem with which we are concerned. The reading of human qualities into, or ascription of them to, the world-connexion or historical connexion seems to be indissolubly

bound up with the nature of human consciousness. This anthropomorphising tendency expresses itself as animism in religion, hylozoism in nature-philosophy, and lastly, as organic historical conception in social philosophy. The infinitely rich life of history cannot at all be exhausted by hazy generalisations. And consequently, according to Dilthey (p. 115), those theories of sociology and of the philosophy of history are false which see in the accounts of the individual the raw material for their abstractions. The superstition which places the works of the historian under a mysterious plan, in order to transform the individual substance found in them alchemistically into the pure gold of abstraction and to compel history to yield its last secret, is, according to Dilthey, as strange as any dream of the alchemistic nature-philosophers ever was, which thought of deciphering the great word of nature. Such a last and simple word expressing the essence of history is as little to be discovered in history as it is easy to find it in Nature. Against this scepticism of Dilthey, compare Othman Spann's *Examination of Wilhelm Dilthey* (Zeitschrift für das gesamte Staatswissen, 1903, No. 2). The same year (1883) that saw the publication of Dilthey's *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* witnessed the publication by Karl Menger of his *Untersuchungen*, in which, like Dilthey, he brought out clearly the opposition between the knowledge of the "general" and the "individual" (in Dilthey, the "singular") and utilised it in his methodological inquiry. Wilhelm Wundt in his *Über den Begriff des Gesetzes* (On the Concept of law), *Philosophische Studien* (Philosophical Studies), has examined carefully this question. The rectoral address of Wilhelm Windelband, *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft* (History and natural science), with its contrast of nomothetic and idiographic ways of thinking, gave the first impulse to the logical revision of the relation between nature and history.

Windelband's stirring thought threw out sparks. Logicians and historians carry on a noble rivalry for constructing the

theory, developed by Windelband only in its broad principles. Heinrich Rickert (Limits of conceptual formation according to natural science) coins the formula, "Nature is Reality in regard to the universal. History is reality in regard to the particular. In the one case being, in the other, value, is the scientific problem." Sigwart and Schuppe, Münsterberg and Husserl penetrated into the logicomathematical questions up to their deepest ramifications, so that the whole problem has during the last decade advanced a great deal. As a century ago, "mathematics of nature" was the central metaphysical problem to the romanticists, so the "logic of history" has come to-day of the foreground of scientific interest. If history may proceed idiographically, nay, look upon the particular, the singular, the individual, as more important, then the historical conceptual formation in its permanent relation to values cannot avoid the phenomenon of uniformity of human collective actions, such as, for example, those which Le Bon and Sighele have shown in the *Psychology of the masses.* Only the phenomenon of uniformity is referred to universally recognised values by the representatives of the idiographic method. Thus, Rickert thinks (p. 371), "That even belongs to the historical concepts which arises simply by reference to universally recognised values and combines to form individual unities." And thus the idiographic method finds itself compelled to trace the uniformity of human collective actions, the historical rhythm, as the doctrine of stadia of Augustin, Ibn Khaldun, Bodin, Bossuet, Turgot, Vico, Lessing, Kant, Schiller, Fichte, St. Simon, Comte and others represents it, to the idiographical series. Friedrich Gottl has recently ("Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft," Vol. XXIII, No. 2 and Vol. XXIV, No. 2, 1906-07) published the outlines of a theory of individuality, in which he demands, along with the singularisation of the concrete and individualisation of the singular, an "idiographic series." Gottl finds himself compelled to accept an "idiographic series" for the reason that "all individualism of the particular is bound up by the relation

of reciprocity with the explication of the all-comprehending whole" (p. 438). The idiographic method presupposes, therefore, according to Gottl, two things : the constant aid of nomothetic knowledge and permanent reference to a total connexion. And thus idiographic thinking also leads, however much it may aim only at values, to a kingdom of necessary values. For, according to Gottl (Vol. XXIV, 1907, p. 296 and other places), to the perceptual contents of experience "belongs not only endless manifoldness but also permanent connexion. Experience is permanence in intuitive connexions and endless manifoldness of perception."

These "permanent connexions," which we can not only show in the kingdom of nature but are compelled to acknowledge in history, as being the world of purposes and values, lead the historian to make rash attempts to inquire into "historical uniformities." Ignoring all logical difficulties which are raised by the followers of Windelband, with the approval of distinguished historians (von Below) and economists (Max Weber), regarding the admissibility of the nomothetic method, Karl Lamprecht and Kurt Breysig proceed to apply the concept of law to history. In the "Zukunft" for the 18th and 25th January, 1902, Kurt Breysig explained in a series of writings, the programme of "historical uniformities," of which he was a champion. Karl Lamprecht, especially, contends in his "Deutsche Geschichte" and in numerous strongly polemical isolated writings and essays (Old and new methods in the science of history; What is Culture-history ?; Two polemical writings, etc.), for "the total spiritual unity (diapason) obtaining in any age." This socio-psychological method which leads the individual, singular, unique, irrepeatable element of particular historical experience back to the harmonious, constantly repeating and typical element of the actions of human groups, is essentially the same as Rousseau's old requirement, the requirement, namely, that the *volonté de tous*,

the summation or cross-section of casual individual actions of citizens, should be raised to the position of a *volonté générale*, a longitudinal section of the national collective will. And Fichte's "Speeches to the German nation" with their socio-pedagogic programme of a national culture of the will, make as much use of the socio-psychological method demanded by Lamprecht as do Schelling's organic views of the State and History and Hegel's doctrine of the objective spirit. The stages of symbolism, typism, conventionalism, individualism and subjectivism, introduced by Lamprecht on the spiritual side, and professional economy, collective and individual natural economy, collective and individual financial economy, on the economical side, maintain the parallelism between the evolution of consciousness and economical evolution as *Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Phenomenology of the spirit) represents the strict parallelism between the evolution of individual consciousness and that of the universal—human race—consciousness which manifests itself in the historical process with unwavering perseverance. But whereas with the positivist Lamprecht, the *phases of consciousness* and the *phases of economy* run parallel, with the logical pantheist Hegel, Nature and History, and thus the whole circle of the external world with all forms of manifestation of the human race-spirit, are shown to be parallel logical phenomena with the help of the dialectic method (logic of contradiction). That Hegel accepts six stages and naturally gives every stage different contents from those of Lamprecht's five stages, has nothing to do with the principle. For whether one holds with Turgot and Comte, with Lessing, Kant and Schiller, three, or with Fichte (in the *Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*), five, or with Hegel six stages, is indifferent to the principle in question. Lamprecht has summed up excellently the principal questions thus. The sum of all socio-psychical factors forms in itself in every age a unity and thus must undergo a continuous transformation which is itself divided into periods.

What separates Lamprecht from the speculative philosophers of history of the school of Hegel and places him close to Comte, Mil l and Buckle, and especially (in the intensive application of economic moments), to Nietzsche and Karl Marx, is the strong emphasis placed on the conformity of history to *causal* laws, whereas the speculative triad, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, lays stress on the *teleological* moment. Lamprecht's thought started principally from the mechanical view of the world. A wholly satisfactory explanation of facts, even of historical facts, is, therefore, for Lamprecht only then and there present, when and where causal purposive connexions can be shown. For the singular which, according to Windelband and Rickert, is historically the more important, is for Lamprecht irrational, that is, incapable of a scientific treatment. William James says exquisitely (*Pragmatism*): "In a world of pure singularities our logic would be useless." Every science depends, according to Lamprecht, upon "an absolute and unconditional admission of causal thought." This, however, can only be applied to historical collective appearances, in which the solitary, the arbitrary, the casual and the irrepeatable is excluded as a negligible quantity. Every highest generic concept which brings a vast plurality of individuals to which it relates and which it includes in itself, under a classificatory unity, no matter whether this unifying process is only psychologically necessary, that is, is required by the economy of thought (Mach), or must be effected with logical necessity (Cohen), must separate the casual, the irregular, the strictly individual element, in order to conceive the common and the typical. Only then there arises out of that plurality to which primitive thought is hopelessly opposed, a rational-logical unity which has arranged and classified the whole contents of nature, spirit and history. At least, this logical order which guides us and spares us a good deal of labour, is either (with Mach) demanded by thought-economy or (with James's pragmatism)

required mnemo-technically. This order saves labour by a well-planned grouping of an otherwise unmanageable series of facts or experiences. Thus the pragmatist James once (Pragmatism) cried, "We have all an ear for monistic music; it rises and falls." Out of chaos a logical cosmcs is born with the help of the working of concepts, so that one rises from the individual, to which the primitive thought clung permanently, to the species, and from this gradually to the genus. Every scientific progress is due to our power of abstracting from the individual and the casual, in order to ascend gradually to the concept of species and race. Every general concept, however, allows the specific characteristics of the concepts of species (the differentia specifica) to pass unchallenged. What are thus called stadia, stages, phases or grades of history, are in their final logical root nothing but the highest generic concepts for historical reality.

The scientific quarrel between Lamprecht and Breysig, on the one hand, and O. Hintze and G. von Below on the other, is principally to be conceived only from the logical side, as Windelband and Rickert, Simmel and Münsterberg, Barth and Tönnies, Gottl and Weber, and lastly and especially, Sigwart, Schuppe and Husserl have rightly seen. The collectivistic method of Lamprecht, which by preference brings into prominence the typical phenomena in history, will maintain its logical existence as an *explanatory* method, by the side of the individualistic method which is a *descriptive* one. Only Lamprecht will have to give up the phantom of an "unconditional admission of causal thought" in the explanation of historical phenomena, if his collectivistic method of writing history is to claim a lasting value. Uniformity in the course of historical events gives us the view that in the process of history, we know only *tendencies*, and not the view that we only know *laws*. The scientists of to-day seem fairly disposed to speak only of *tendencies* in nature, instead of strict *laws*

(impetus, conatus, endeavour, momentum, *tendances* of the philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries). Recently, Rudolf Goldscheid in Vienna (Ostwald's "Annalen der Naturphilosophie," Vol. I, 1907, pp. 58-93) has made a thorough analysis of the "concept of direction and its meaning for philosophy." The highest point of Goldscheid's exposition I find expressed in his words: "*What in the exact natural sciences the determination of direction is, value is in the spiritual sciences.*" The problem of value, as Goldscheid says (*Entwicklungstheorie, Entwicklungsökonomie, Menschenökonomie*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 43) has assumed three forms. In Marx it appears as an attempt to reverse all economic values, in Darwin as the postulate of the reversal of all biological values, and in Nietzsche as the tendency to reverse all psychical values.

Investigation of causes and investigation of values are the two scientific aids which the human spirit has conceived in order to trace the apparent chance in nature and spirit to the highest generic concepts or logical necessities. The causal inquiry, with its causal form of cause and effect, explains to us, on the ground of the known "mathematics" of nature, the strict conformity of the universe to law, whilst the investigation of values, with its inner causal form of end and means, unfolds the "logic of history." In the world of values and ends, however, we know no laws but only tendencies.

IV

Laws contain a 'must,' tendencies, only a 'should.' 'Must' suits mechanical causality which admits of no exceptions, 'should' suits teleological causality which gives rise to motives which in their contents and degree of strength have an individual colouring. When we must act, we act, according to external compulsion as *coacta necessitas* (Spinoza), whether in our biochemical processes, according to the compulsion of natural laws, or in our social actions, according to the laws of rights.

In both cases our actions are necessary consequences of externally imposed imperatives. It is different with 'should' which represents a being, or, more correctly, an action *in futurum*, which does not compel us from outside but is given through our own motives or the structure of the will. In 'must' we act heteronomously, in 'should' autonomously. In our mechanism and chemism, the regulator of which is natural law, as well as in our subordination to the law of right, which is regulated by the constitution of the State and institutions of rights, our will-action is strictly determined. There is no freedom here. Only in the moral world, where your individual consciousness is the dictator, there is freedom in the choice of motives, although here the strongest motive may release the will-action. But in the choice of the strongest motive for yourself your personality asserts itself. Freedom is nothing but personality. Nature knows only the race; history, however, has a meaning and place for personality. In nature laws rule for the race; in history ends, tendencies, and consequently, only convictions. There, we work with the thought, material of the mechanical causality of cause and effect, here, with that of the teleological causality of end and means, of motive and action. That thought-material brings decided order into the world of *being*, these only provisionally-guiding materials bring order into the kingdom of human *action*. The metaphysical question whether being is only a product of doing, as this has been maintained by the dynamic explanation of nature of Leibniz and Kant, and with great energy by Fichte and Schelling, is not taken into account here. For the question with which we are concerned, it suffices to point to these two order-series which we men have gained for ourselves over the animal world and have happily used for governing nature: (1) The mechanico-causal order-series with the hundred per cent. chance of fulfilment of predictions. With the help of this we make an inventory, arrange and classify, and with this we also

catalogue and master nature, whilst we formulate its laws. (2) The teleologico-causal order-series, with the feeling of expectation based upon the calculation of probability and statistics. With the help of this we ascertain the permanent ends of living beings and constant values of the human race. We rule, consequently, biologically the powerful kingdom of the phenomena of life, and sociologically the powerful province of universal history. To the mathematics of nature as the sciences of law reveal to us, we oppose a logic of history as the philosophers of history and sociologists construct it. *The first order-series makes it possible for us to bring the laws of nature, the second the tendencies of history, under the highest generic concepts.* Here, as there, the problem is to find the categories under which we subsume the forms of combination or functions of order of nature and history.

The essence of historical categories, Georg Simmel has traced to its root in the second edition of his *Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie* 1905. The unity of personality is for him an assumption without which the rationality and unity of order of historical dates would be impossible. It is an *a priori* theory which first makes history possible....The historical consciousness finds its material, the momentary occurrence as such, the pure, substantial, timeless meaning of that which is experienced, the subjective consciousness of those who act—as a sort of half-product in which *a priori* forms of conception are already active. The categories which build history out of this stuff, consist for him only in the dispositions or modified methods of application. They do not confront him with such boldness as the category of causality of the pure time-series (p. 26). Without directly mentioning the idiographic method of Rickert or the collectivistic method of Lamprecht, Simmel completes a synthesis of the category of universality and necessity with that of pure individuality. The singular in the isolated historical experiences is allowed to preserve its right. Certainly it happens

only once; only, this once it would not—as rational—have occurred, if it had not formed a timeless connexion, that is, a connexion conceived and evolved out of the psychological meaning and rôle of the elements."

Isolated impression-atoms would never combine themselves into a scientific world-picture, if the logical categories did not succeed in placing between them a connecting link. So far and so long as we do not possess these categories as ordering, unifying functions of the logical process of combination of isolated impression-atoms into the unity of consciousness, we can only have reality and not truth, only the casual and arbitrary and not the necessary and universal. The higher animals have sense-impressions, even sharper than we men have. What they lack is the power of grasping and regulating the connexions among the observed phenomena which the logical categories make possible. It is these principles of order which constitute the categorial thought peculiar to man, which first raise the isolated impression-atoms that we share with the beast, to the rank of science, which is the privilege of man, or rather, the civilised man. At the stage of the animistic mode of thinking which spread all over the world, there was even for men no science but pure empiricism. Thought arranges the connexions in the outer world through categories, and this order we call the system of nature; it arranges also in our head the connexions among the representations and this arrangement we call logical arrangement or necessity of thought. The historical category, lastly, which places the actions of men under principles of order, similar to the logical categories in thought, represents a third ordering function. If we do not wish to stop at historical animism, which appears when every particular historical occurrence is conceived as a thing which happens only once, as irrepeatable, as absolutely isolated and individual, we must create historical categories or *generic concepts of human action*, in which the singular is deprived of its temporal accidental character and

only the generic characteristics of universal-human collective actions are brought out. Historical categories, consequently, show themselves as generic concepts of timeless, universal-human actions, of which demography, moral statistics, mass-psychology and calculation of probability give us an approximate picture. To renounce historical categories or the unifying functions of human actions is to give up history as a science.

Surely, we shall not be able to claim for historical categories the strictly causal thought, such as Lamprecht and the collectivistic mode of describing history require. For it is not with laws, but at most with rules of human action, not with unconditional uniformity in the course of phenomena, but only with a certain rhythm of action, in short, with tendencies, that we have to do in historical categories. In his mechanism and chemism, man as part of the whole nature is, as we must always repeatedly emphasise, subject to mechanical causality. But as an *acting* being, he belongs not to the causal connexion of cause and effect which admits of no exception, but either to the logical bond of ground and consequence or the teleological one of end and means. However much every will-action may be the result of the strongest motive, every individual is sovereign in the choice of the motive which is strongest for his being. Certainly, character, temperament, heredity, spiritual impulses and the momentary state of consciousness determine in every individual what in a given moment works as the strongest motive which produces action. In the diversity of characters and temperaments among human individuals lies therefore the deviation from the typical, the personal departure from the racial characteristics. Consequently, human collective actions allow no causal-mechanical scheme, such as we have for the remaining natural phenomena, a scheme, that is, which is in strict conformity to laws. The teleological causality exhibited by actions shows in the most favourable cases noted in moral statistics which

register and inventory human collective actions, a partial agreement which may rise up to 99 p.c., but never a total conformity of 100 p.c., as natural sciences do. This individual departure from the actions favoured by the race is explained by this, that in the teleologico-causal relationship of end and means, the choice of several means to a common end is preserved for individual freedom, just as the teleologico-causal relationship of motive and action does not determine, with a strict necessity that admits of no exception, the strongest motive. But every individual has, according to his disposition and temperament, his strongest motive. The logical axiom: *causa aequat effectum*, is true only of the mechanico-causal, but not of the teleologico-causal order-series which has to do with human will-actions, with persons, with thinking individuals who find their determinations of will, acting not, as in the beasts, according to blind, mechanical instincts, but according to processes of reflexion, according to logical propositions, according to a balancing of pros and cons, till the strongest motive gives the push and produces the will-action.

These statements make it impossible for us to speak with Buckle, Taine, Breysig and Lamprecht of historical laws, although we take full cognizance of the motives of thought from which, according to this view, they are deduced. Also we require historical categories, in order to avoid the fetishism which rests content with the impossibility of explaining human group-actions, that is, with the bankruptcy of history as a science. And consequently, we see in all these attempts that have been made from the time of Augustin to that of Lamprecht, to conceive universal history according to its phases, stages, steps or "stadia," so many efforts to arrive at a conception of historical categories. Therefore we must put, in place of stadia or laws, *tendencies of history*. These tendencies I cannot even call "so-called historical laws" but can very well agree with Simon that they are in the same way an anticipation of the

exact knowledge of historical events, as the metaphysical conceptions are for world-occurrences in general....We combine appearances into abstract rules, which understood in a deeper sense, surely explain nothing but give only an orientation for the totality of historical life—laws certainly these are not, for a law has no limits to its validity. They are only "preparations for laws" (p. 86). To those great tendencies which govern the historical process belongs "the progress in consciousness of freedom" which proposition Hegel postulated in his own way as a characteristic of his interpretation of universal history. Lessing and Herder, Schiller and Kant, Fichte and Schelling conceived before Hegel this tendency to freedom as the deepest meaning of history. Herbert Spencer and Karl Lamprecht only follow their footsteps when the former coins the formula, "freedom of all," and the latter so characterises the stages of history that "the spiritual total evolution of what was originally the most perfect equality of all individuals of a human society (spiritual combination) proceeds by virtue of ascending spiritual capacity always to greater differentiation of spiritual individuals (spiritual freedom)." (*Die Kulturhistorische Methode, p. 28*).

V

However valuable may be the consensus of great thinkers and historians regarding the predominant tendency to freedom noticed in universal history, we see in this agreement as little universality as we see necessity in Quételet's statistical "law of great numbers." If, however, necessity and strict universality are regarded as indispensable logical presuppositions of an apodictic proposition or categorical judgment—law is nothing but a universal judgment—these tendencies of history make possible, it is true, plausible conjectures and thus problematic judgments about the form of the future, but no astronomical certainty in the prediction of historical occur-

rences. If unresisting *things* be our object, then we can take a measure of them and clothe the so-discovered formula in a universal, that is timeless judgment, and thus, in one which is true of the future. If, however, we have to do with personalities capable of resistance, gifted with freedom, moved by many impulses, crossing one another, as the process of history throughout exhibits, then we no longer succeed in obtaining *measures* but only *estimates*. Judgments based upon measures are true categorically, those resulting from estimates, only problematically. The mechanico-causal thought, with the help of which we make the inventory of nature and put it into the strict form of law, has precise measures and creates therefore a definite order. The teleologico-causal thought, on the other hand, with the help of which we obviously group the process of history, according to phases and stadia, according to cyclic rhythm (Vico) and periodicity, according to epochs and tendencies, in order that the chaos of accidental, singular, irrepeatable phenomena may be raised to the cosmos of a scientific conception, has to classify ends and values. The order produced through estimates is, however, no final order, but only a provisional order which no doubt is always more valuable than complete disorder. Thus we still guide ourselves every morning by weather prognoses, although we know at the same time that these are true in only about 82 p.c. cases. And in the same way we consult, in cases of illness, such specialists as have proved their worth as diagnosticians, although we know at the same time that their diagnoses have no higher grade of certainty regarding the future than those of the meteorologist. Diagnosticians and meteorologists pronounce their judgments by a consideration of groups of symptoms, that, is a combined series of facts. They do not *describe* what has already been found, like the exact descriptive scientist; they do not *explain* the connexions, like the theoretical natural scientist, but they *interpret* the signs of a whole series of facts or symptom-complexes. In interpretation the subjective factor

of the interpreter a wholly different effect produces in the judgment from what it does in description or explanation. In the descriptive and explanatory sciences, there are therefore universally valid judgments—laws—of a wholly impersonal or over-personal, that is, timeless nature. If the natural law is once established scientifically, the personality of the scientist ceases to play any rôle at all. This is true of the choleric no less than of the sanguine among the scientists. In every universal judgment, personality with its arbitrariness and whim, with its disposition and caprice, is wholly excluded. There is formed rather a scientific model which is stamped on all without any exception.

It is wholly different with the diagnostician who has only to do with interpretation. Here personality with its individual character decidedly influences the judgment. Science and technique are teachable; art is not so. The greatest diagnostician can, like the painter and sculptor, teach his pupils his technique but never his art of diagnosis. For this science there are required talents, for art genius. Talents proceed discursively, rising from the parts to the whole, geniuses create intuitively, descending from the whole to the parts. These *make* the path, those *describe* it. *Poeta non fit, nascitur.* But even a diagnostician must be born a diagnostician. One has it in one's nature, or one never learns it. For whenever description and explanation fail and presaging begins, the unlearnable, the genius, has the final word. When the *ratio sensitiva* or *cognitiva* is *au bout de son latin* we must take recourse to *ratio intuitiva.* This intellectual perception, however, is the privilege of the élite, of the upper ten of the whole human race who naturally have their grotesque forms, as all sciences and arts have (Quacks in medicine, pettifogging lawyers in jurisprudence, weather prophets in meteorology, graphology in psychology, cheiromancy, palmistry and fortune-telling with cards are grotesque forms of prophetism). The true genius is a lucky hit of the human race. Without falling into the Nietzschean genius-cult, which sees in all history only a

round-about process of nature for arriving at six or seven great men, one will have to grant genius the privileged position of the chosen and favoured in all departments of artistic creation.

VI.

Political prognoses are, above all, a privilege of specially happily placed and inspired heads, perhaps, a monopoly of political genius. Every political calculation, says Gustav Ratzenhofer (*Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, 1893, Vol. I, p. 51, and Vol. II, p. 123), begins with "an inspired inference." Although genius, continues Ratzenhofer (p. 53), finds more easily and more rapidly what is right, still the political calculus created by ordinary intelligence, a well thought-out political plan, will succeed more certainly than when a political genius depends light-heartedly upon pure inspiration. The "capacity for making predictions with regard to the effects of State actions," F. v. Holtzendorff represents (*Die Prinzipien der Politik*, p. 56) as the practical result of political knowledge and power. Consequently, he demands of every politician "an eye for future things." But even he must admit that political prophecies are absolutely out of the question.

Even the greatest political geniuses (Napoleon, Bismarck) have sometimes made false prophecies. And nevertheless it is true that *propheta non fit, nascitur*. Not the excellence of intention, thinks v. Holtzendorff (p. 78), but the actual occurrence of the foreseen consequences, is the political measure of value by which a statesman is to be judged. For all politics belongs to the series of "variable purposiveness," as contrasted with right which represents an "ethical minimum" (Jellinek) or the constant purposes or necessities of political life. These variable purposes the politician can only ascertain with the help of history. Prediction of the future presupposes great acquaintance with what has happened in the past. The uniformities in

the course of the historical process justify the conclusion that in approximately the same historical conditions and presuppositions—absolute sameness is excluded from the process of history—the future course of events will be in great measure the same as the past. On this rests statecraft which makes use of all branches of political sciences and history, in order that it may set up conjectural values regarding the future grouping of national interests, parties and political forms, and lastly, of international groups. Sciences are, as it were, the laboratory in which one learns the technique of combination, prognosis and calculation of political probability. But science can teach only the technique, the faculty of imitation, and not inspiration, the intuitive, the self-creative element. Statistics and calculation of probability, demography and folk-psychology, history and sociology give the born political genius the instruments and measures for quantitative calculation. But the combination of all these elements for the purpose of political predictions is a matter of creative imagination, of political genius. All monographs and essays of a whole century, thinks Holtzendorff (p. 32), would not suffice to produce a man capable of guiding a great State, if he had not skill, insight and determination, that great series of intellectual and moral capacities, without which the guidance of a State of some importance is not possible.

Surely, even the greatest political genius presupposes a certain constancy and uniformity in the course of the destiny of people in general and of individual historical occurrences in particular, as otherwise combinations, analogical inferences and inductive experiential conclusions (in Wundt, empeireme) would be logically invalid. If the celebrated expression of ridicule were correct, according to which His Majesty Chance rules history, which means that the historical condition of the world would have been different if Cleopatra had had another nose, then the greatest political genius could not make a problematic judgment regarding the future, and thus could not make a

political prognosis with logical authority. If out of a thousand shots in political prognosis, there was one which hit the mark, then surely chance, which Spinoza had branded in the realm of nature as an *asylum ignorantiae*, would have in history the final word. Our exposition, however, has established the fact that the rule of chance in history, so far as the unquestionable uniformities in collective actions and the social evolution of mankind is concerned, is confined within very narrow limits. Human collective actions (marriages, births, deaths, suicides, arson, mental diseases, thefts, crimes, etc.) show the social rhythm. The deviation of the individual from the racial type is numerically so very small that by setting up historical categories, that is, highest generic concepts of human actions, it can be eliminated, just as it is eliminated in the logical operation of the formation of the genus proximum and *differentia specifica*—an operation in which one skips over the characteristics of the species and confines oneself to those of the race. In the human actions of the species which are again divided into sub-species and varieties, diversity rules, and this diversity is conditioned by zones and climates, peoples and races, nationality and religion, social divisions and political forms of government, *in genera*, and temperament and character, impulse and the momentary group of feelings *in specie*. These actions of the species with their historical conditions, by which the divergence of the individual from the racial type of action is explained and by which his sphere of personal freedom is limited, can, when seen *sub specie aeternitatis*, be subsumed under historical categories, that is, under the typical, recurring, highest racial actions of the whole human race. In this logical perspective, historical chance, the unique and the arbitrary, the singular and individual, in short, the fetishistic character of historical events, loses its value. Historical chance appears, in contrast with the highest generic concepts of human actions, which represent a constant quantity, to be an *asylum ignorantiae* of history, just as the tile,

falling apparently by chance from the roof, obviously represents an *asylum ignorantiae*, so far as the explanation of nature is concerned. What appears casual to short-sighted perception may be very well grounded in, and become logically necessary for, the great world-connexions.

These historical categories the genial politician, who makes predictions in order to deliver problematic judgments regarding the future course of things and mould political tactics according to them, has to take into consideration in his calculation, in his political calculus of probability, as regulative factors of his combinations. He must know in great measure the course of history, in order to predict its future course and in order to be able to guide his actions by the insight which it gives. This foresight, this fine anticipation of the future on the basis of an estimate of what has already happened, is the beautiful privilege of the intuition of genius and politico-creative imagination, as Ernst Bernheim in his *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode* [3rd and 4th Edition, 1903, pp. 149 and 573ff] has beautifully expressed. For the politician the question is not of historical laws, as it is for the natural scientist, but of generalisations of experience (empeireme) and rules based on these. The great politician, like the sociologist, is the grammarian of history and he behaves towards individual human actions, just as the grammarian behaves towards individual words or sound-symbols of his speech. The grammarian discovers no language, but he finds it lying before him and arranges the thing lying before him in such a way that he draws from the facts which experience has proved to be true in the past, the rule which will hold good in the future. His norm which is meant to control future speech thus derives its authority from the experiential rule hitherto followed. Political prognosis is for the statesman who makes it for his own people or for whole groups of men, a norm, an *ought*, according to which he moulds his tactics to a large extent and his actions to a smaller extent. Such prognoses are not only

missible but are indispensable for the serious statesman. They form the machinery of his political existence; the connecting thread of his individual plans and handling of details. However much one may overstep the bounds of the certainty of one's predictions, the theory that political predictions are a game of chance or lottery is to be wholly rejected. This would be true of those weathercocks or *va banque* players in politics who have neither a guiding thought nor a proper programme. They are the knights of industry in politics. Serious statesmen, however, not only may, but must make political predictions and problematic judgments, or their whole life-work would tumble down for want of a support. Great statesmen, who are averse to all undefined plans and all navigation without a pilot, will have to master the problem of history and look upon politics as a science.

INDEX OF NAMES

A

*Abel, I, 180
Achelis, III, 485
Adams, B., I, 158
Adler, G., I, 45; II, 319-20, 322
Akiba, B. I, 46
Albert, F. I, 101
Alberti, L.B., II, 307
Albertus, Magnus, I, 46, 153
Albrecht, II, 382
Alexander of Hales, I, 65
Alfieri, II, 346
Alosso, A., I, 225
Ammon, I, 178
Ampère, II, 262
Anaxagoras, I, 168; II, 255; III, 445
Anaximander, I, 215; III, 442, 541
Anaximenes, III, 493
Anselm of Canterbury, III, 439
Aquinas, Th. I, 46, 151, 153, 154
Aristotle, I, 4, 5, 28, 52, 66, 68, 70, 78, 89, 93, 95 97, 103, 113, 119, 134, 158, 197, 206, 210, 213-7, 221, 227-31, 233; II, 240, 255-7, 262, 266, 267, 355, 389, 390; III, 428, 442, 471, 529, 530
Aristophanes, II, 323
Arnim, I, 140
Augustus, I, 154,
Augustin, II, 335; III, 444, 468, 513, 542, 579, 589
Aurelius, M. I, 82; III, 452
Avenarius, R., I, 5, 15, 54, 66, 73, 76, 94, 96, 105, 106, 109-112, 115, 128, 129, 133, 151, 209, 219, 226; II, 272, 273; III, 436, 437, 547
Avicenna, III, 404

B

Bacon, Fr., I, 4, 8, 45, 65, 83, 100, 129, 133, 160; II, 266, 331; III, 428, 496
Bacon, R., I, 45, 65, 84
Bacca, F., II, 130
Baer, R.E.von., I, 28, 89, 91, 105, 204, 219; II, 253, 258, 287, 291, 292, 295, 299, 300, 302, 303, 306; III, 481, 492, 495
Bahnsen, II, 238
Barth, III, 583
Bary, de, III, 518
Barzelotti, G., II, 392
Bastian, III, 484
Batchez, I, 223
Bauer II, 321
Baur, F.C., II, 363, 365-6, 375, 888, 390
Bayle, P., III, 533
Becker, II, 310
Becquerel, I, 120
Begnesco, G., II, 311
Bellamy, III, 452
Below, G., III, 580, 583
Beneke, I, 13; II, 299, 339, 361
Bentham, J., I, 45; II, 280
Bergmann, I, 128
Berkeley, I, 25, 38, 45, 53, 66, 83, 84, 115, 129, 130, 157; II, 245
Bern, I, 121
Bernard, C., I, 222, 220; III, 505
Bernheim, E., I, 61; III, 596
Bernoulli, I, 119
Bernstein, E., III, 462
Bersot II, 311
Bichat, I, 105
Birch-Pfeiffer, I, 182

* The letters I, II, III relate to the volume and the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., to the page.

Bismarck, I, 8, 187, 188; II, 280; III 454
Black, I, 112
Blondel, M., I, 62
Blondelet, I, 195
Blumenbach, I, 223; II, 257
Bluntschli I, 193; II, 303; III, 485
Bodin, J., II, 335, II, 529, 532-3, 579
Boeckh, II, 334, 363, 364, 366-7
Böhme, J., I, 153, 193
Boerhave, I, 223
Böhlau, H., I, 156
Bois-Reymond, Emil du, I, 119, 220, 219, 221, 223, 225; II, 247, 251, 365, III, 418, 505
Boland, I, 109
Bollardin, II, 343
Bölsche, I, 7
Boltzmann, I, 77, 131, 221; II, 252
Bonald, I, 211
Borgia, C., II, 312
Boscowicz, II, 262
Bourdeau, III, 576
Bossuet, II, 335; III, 579
Boutroux, E., I; 51; III, 512
Boyle, R., I, 217, 218
Bradley, 46, 65
Brahe, T.
Brandes, G., I, 176
Brandis, I, 68; II, 357, 363
Brentano, I, 6, 140; II, 245
Breuer, I, 115, 201
Breysig, K., III, 484, 580, 583, 589
Brooks, A., I, 158
Broughan, II, 311
Brown, I, 45
Brucke II, 266
Bruckmann, H.H., I, 160
Brunetière I, 146
Bruno, G., I, 53, 61, 114, 142, 192-3, 206, 214, 215; II, 240, 256, 296, 342; III, 450
Bücher, K., I, 108, 205
Büchner, II, 247
Buckle, H.T., I, 170, 181; III, 424, 574, 576-7, 589
Buffon, III, 410
Buhle, II, 364
Bulle, I, 161
Bunge, G., V., I, 213, 219, 221, 224-5 230; II, 257, 264; III, 485, 495
Bunsen, II, 368
Burckhardt, J., II, 307, 311
Burke, E., II, 334
Burne, J., I, 140
Busse I, 6, 20, 226; II, 245-6, 266, 269, 271
Bütschli, I, 200, 225

C

Cain, I, 180
Caird, I, 46, 65
Calderon, I, 33; II, 384
Calderoni, I, 80
Calé, W., II, 324
Calvin, III, 445
Campanella, I, 189; II, 250; III, 434, 452
Cantor, I, 201
Cardanus, I, 179, 189
Carlyle, I, 82, 156; II, 280-1, 283, 311, 342
Carpenter, II, 301
Castille, H., III, 543
Cavour, I, 8
Cellini, B., II, 307
Chamberlain, H.S., I, 13, 115, 139, 145, 160, 162, 184, II, 347, 355; III, 409, 421, 439, 487, 491
Chamisso, A. V., I, 140
Charles, VI, I, 160
Charpentier, I, 195
Chateaubriand, I, 211
Chowlson, I, 131; II, 239
Chrysippus, I, 97
Cicero, I, 154
Clausius, I, 12, 75, 78, 123, 221; III, 444, 516, 517
Clifford, I, 117, 118, 130, 219
Coellen, L., I, 135, 140-1, 143, 192, 194
Cohen, H., I, 5, 6, 13, 67, 81, 96, 108, 110, 114, 151, 198, 201, 213, 219, 229; II, 245, 246, 359, 382; III 413, 513, 582
Coleridge, I, 176, 222; II, 253, 304; III, 492, 495

Comte, A., I, 13, 165, 109, 112, 133, 223; II, 250, 281, 287-292, 293, 30 3, 315, 324, 332, 336, 350, 3 52-54, 359, 360; III, 433, 444, 466, 468, 470ff., 506, 513, 526, 528, 574, 576, 577, 579, 581
Condorcet, II, 335; III, 470, 576 ff.
Conrad, II, 236
Copernicus, I, 9, 14, 107
Cornelius, H., I, 109, 111, 219
Cossmann, P.N., I, 92, 97, 225; II, 261
Cournot, I, 201
Couturat, I, 119
Cratylos, I, 8
Cudworth, I, 223
Curtis, M.M., I, 51
Curtius, II, 375, 376
Cusa, Nikolaus of, II, 278, 304
Cusaner, I, 206
Cuvier, I, 105
Cyon, E.v., I, 75

D

Dalton, I, 105
Darwin, C., I, 8, 79, 105, 186, 215; II, 248, 251, 253, 255, 274ff; III, 489, 491 ff., 584
Darwin, E., I, 66, 105,
Democritus, I, 71, 96, 114, 179, 213-5, 217, 231, 233; II, 240, 250, 255, 527, 262; III, 404, 445
Dennert, E., II, 255
Descartes, I, 9, 10, 88, 97, 105, 119, 124, 130, 159, 168, 192, 197, 210, 220, 223; II, 241, 257, 266, 272, 331, 344; III, 427, 439, 485, 537
Dewey, J., I. 49, 55, 77, 83, 99
Dickens, I, 50; II, 346
Diderot, II, 453
Diels, H., I, 201; II, 340, 343, 367, 369, 374, 378
Dilthey, W., I, 8, 14, 88, 137, 138, 178, 189; II, 285, 326sq., 387; III, 577-8
Diogenes of Appollonia, III, 41
Dippe, A., I, 126
Drews, A., I, 2, 23, 132, 161; II, 244, 316
Driesch, I, 29, 66, 69, 92, 130, 193, 200-1, 210, 225-31; II, 251-5, 260; III, 435
Droysen, II, 334
Duhem, I, 77
Dühring, I, 23, 85, 109, 135, 157, 205, 272
Duncan, D., II, 299
Duns Scotus, I, 45, 64-6, 83, 151
Duprat, P., II, 311
Durkheim, E., III, 485
Dürr, E., I, 20, 22; II, 266
Duval, G., II, 311

E

Ebbinghaus, H., I, 12, 13, 212; II, 348, 358, 359
Eckermann, II, 317
Eckhardt, I, 147, 153; II, 269
Edwards, J., I, 45
Ehrenfels, Ch. V. I, 17
Eisler, R., I, 15, 46; III, 485
Eleutheropulos, III, 485
Eliot, G., II, 288-9
Emerson, R.W., I, 46, 82, 156
Empedocles, I, 215; II, 313; III, 493
Engelmann, I, 221
Engels, III, 462
Epictetus, I, 82
Epicurus, I, 12, 70, 88, 188
Erasmus of Rotterdam, III, 533
Erdmann, B., I, 4; II, 343, 378
Erdmann, J.E., II, 293, 357, 363, 368, 380
Erhardt, F., I, 6, 20, 128, 226, II, 245, 246, 266, 269, 271
Erich, II, 121
Eucken, R., I, 2, 54, 108, 128, 132, 217, 218; II, 267, 338, 358-9
Euclid, I. 144
Euler, III, 409
Euripides, II, 323
Ewald, I, 140, 192

F

Falckenberg, I, 173
Fechner, G., I, 48, 104, 128, 198, 199, 205, 232; II, 258-9, 269, 271, 338; III, 446
Feuerbach, L., 1, 99, 101, 102; II, 320-2, 350-4, 388; III, 407, 431, 434, 438, 553
Fichte, I, 2, 11, 16, 54, 63, 64, 84, 89, 92, 99, 104, 109, 132, 137, 139, 140-1, 146, 175, 191, 194, 196, 206-7, 220; II, 267, 270, 280-1, 299, 300, 305, 320, 321, 340; III, 417, 421, 423, 442, 446, 449, 451, 468, 477, 482 528, 539, 542, 550, 572, 579, 581, 585, 590
Ficinus, II, 240
Fick, I, 138, 224
Fischer, K., I, 132; II, 267, 285, 293, 314, 363, 368, 368, 370, 380, 382
Flechsig, I, 223; III, 399
Flint, R., II, 335; III, 468
Fouillée, A., II, 284
Fouqué I, 146
Fourier III, 489
Francis, R. H., II, 232
Franck, S., III, 429
Franklin, B., I, 45
Frederick II, II, 368
Freudenthal, II, 363
Friedmann, H., II, 254
Friedrich, Empress, II, 375
Fries I, 13
Frischeisen-Köhler, M., I, 3, 99; II, 326
Frohschammer, III, 429
Fronde, II, 225
Förster-Nietzsche, Frau II, 316

G

Galileo, I, 4, 9, 73, 89; II, 224, 255-8, 332
Gall, II, 295-6
Gassendi, I, 140
Gaupp, O., II, 285; III, 501
Gebhardt III, 443
Geulincx, I, 19; II, 268; III, 447
Gierke, O., II, 260
Gillmann, J., II, 304
Gobineau, I, 171, 178, 181; III, 487, 491
Goedeckemeyer, I, 32
Goebring, I, 109
Goering, I, 109; II, 272, 382
Goerres, I, 140, 177
Goethe I, 36, 58, 78, 87, 105, 135, 137, 138, 140, 145, 159, 165, 169, 188, 192, 196; II, 281-3, 304, 308, 315, 317, 324, 341, 342, 345, 346, 348; III, 406, 513, 576
Goldscheid, R., II, 231; III, 485, 584
Goldschmidt, L., I, 21
Goldschmidt, V., I, 201, 205; II, 254
Gomperz, H. I, 12, 58, 212
Gomperz, Th., II, 363, 366, 390; III, 491
Gottl, Fr., III, 579, 580, 588
Gramzow, O. III, 475, 481
Green T. H., I, 46, 65
Grelling, I, 22
Grillparzer, F., III, 444
Grimm, J., II. 334
Groethuysen II, 326
Groos, K., II, 347
Grotius, H., III, 530
Gueux, I. 59, 162
Gubrauer, 532
Guizot, II, 334
Gumplowicz, I, 170; III, 475, 485, 491, 574, 576
Guyau, J. M., II, 284

H

Haeckel, E., I, 7, 101, 105, 113, 114, 120, 131
Haecker, W., III, 571
Hales, A. V., I, 45
Haller, L. V., I, 177, 181; II, 257; III, 542
Halpern, J., II, 339

Hamann, O., I, 12, 82, 224; II, 254
Harden, I, 164
Hardenberg, I, 137
Harms, II, 371
Harris, W. T., I, 46; II, 305
Harrison, I, 55
Hartley, I, 96
Hartmann, E. V., I, 2, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 92, 97, 104, 126-8, 200, 211, 223, 226, 227, 229, 230, 232; II, 235, 299, 305, 338; III, 430, 451
Hauff, I, 140
Haym, R., I, 140, 172; II, 342
Hayn, I, 192
Hegel, I, 2, 11, 25, 26, 36-42, 62, 63, 71, 74, 83, 89, 93, 104, 109, 113, 118, 131-2, 140, 220; II, 241-2, 244, 250, 267, 292, 295, 304, 305, 312, 321, 339, 342-3, 352, 354, 357, 363-7, 382-3, 318-8, 391-2; III, 413, 417, 421, 427, 429, 439, 442, 446, 467-8, 472ff., 512, 541, 560, 575-6, 581, 590
Heidenhain, R., II, 225
Hell, I, 128
Helm, G., I, 117, 123-4, 199, 219; II, 262
Helmholtz, H., I, 47, 108, 123, 219, 223; II, 338, 365, 367, 369, 376, 382; III, 405, 243, 569
Helmont, V., I, 61, 62, 92, 161, 170; II, 375
Helvetius, II, 310, 322; III, 576
Heraclitus, I, 53, 72, 117, 142, 153, 179; II, 250; III, 442, 450, 476, 490-1, 573
Herbart, I, 104, 106, 119; II, 259, 263, 266-8, 271, 299, 392; III, 405, 446
Herder I, 140; II, 304, 334, 236; III, 425, 435, 468, 491, 206, 524, 528, 574, 576, 590
Hering, I, 75, 77, 179, 209
Hermann, C., I, 63, 108
Hermann, D., II, 371, 373-4
Hermann, K. Fr., II, 366
Hermann, S., II, 382
Hermann, W., II, 382
Hertwig, O., III, 495, 520
Hertz, F., I, 163, 169; II, 262
Hess, II, 320
Heubaum, II, 326
Hilty, I, 82
Hintze, O., III, 583
Hippolytos, III, 490
Hittorff, I, 123
Hobbes, I, 13, 83, 88, 96-7, 109, 114, 130, 230; II, 255-8, 322, 331; III, 423, 474, 491, 574
Höffding, H., I, 72, 113; II, 363, 387
Hoffmannsthal, H. V., I, 140
Höfler, A., 1, 115, 127
Hofmann, I, 140
Holbach, de, III, 423, 445, 574
Hölderlin, I, 140; II, 341, 346, 361
Hollitscher, II, 316
Holtzendorf, V., Fr., III, 593-4
Homer, II, 314
Hönigswald, I, 128
Horvicz, I, 12, 58, 64, 212
Houssay, F., I, 201
Huch, R., I, 140, 192
Hueppe I, 161
Hume, D., I, 4, 5, 13, 15, 16, 44, 53, 55, 57, 66, 80-3 93-4, 96, 109, 110, 112, 115, 129, 130, 133-4, 206, 210, 212, 219; II, 245, 331, 386; III, 396, 399, 400, 403-8, 419-23, 436, 438, 439, 543, 548
Husserl, E., I, 4, 12, 13, 87, 108, 134; III, 479, 583
Huxley, I, 47; II, 286
Huyghens, II, 262
Huysmans, I, 137, 156
Hyrtl, I, 213

I

Ibsen, H., I, 140, 147, 190, 22, 313; III, 414
Iffland, I, 183

J

Jacob, F., II, 306
Jacobi, Fr., I, 12, 82, 137, 169, 196
James, W., I, 38, 44, 46-52, 59-61, 63-5, 67, 70-1, 73-4, 83, 87-8, 90, 95, 98, 109, 112, 115, 118, 133, 151, 209; 212; II, 244; III, 548, 582
Jehova, II, 251
Jellinek, III, 593
Jerusalem, W., I, 46, 50, 52, 88; III, 539
Joachimi, M., I, 130, 136, 139-43, 192, 208
Joël K., I, 138-40, 152, 161-2, 173, 192
Jones, B., I, 140
Jost, L., III, 520
Jungius, J., II, 364

K

Kaftan, J., II, 382
Kant, I, 1-6, 8, 11-15, 18, 21-24, 44, 57-9, 66, 74-5, 82, 87-9, 93, 96, 102-4, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 120, 128, 130-1, 134, 137, 140, 145-6, 165, 168, 185, 192, 195-6, 201, 202, 206, 208, 210, 218, 221-2, 224; II, 245, 246, 250, 258, 262, 267-9, 271, 273, 280-2, 294-6, 298-9, 313, 315-6, 331-2, 342-4, 352-3, 355-7, 360, 371, 375, 282, 384-6, 388; III, 399, 400, 409, 415-7, 419-23, 430, 436, 438, 450, 468, 475, 479, 482, 505, 513-5, 524, 528, 537, 539, 543, 550, 555, 564, 572-3, 575, 579, 581, 585, 590
Kappstein, T., II, 245
Kassowitz, I, 228
Kaufmann, II, 272
Kepler, I, 9, 137; II, 332; III, 572
Keyserling, H. G., I, 106, 139, 192-3, 195, 213; II, 307, 320, 322, 324, 355; III, 409
Khaldun, I, III, 579
Kiel, I, 194
Kiesow, I, 49
Kirchhoff, II, 368
Kirchmann, V., II, 266
Klein, H., III, 469
Kleinpeter, I, 110-1, 219
Klinckhardt, W., I, 47
Koch, M., I, 161
Koch, Robert, I, 75, 120
Koestlin, J., II, 382
Koigen, D., I, 92
Kölliker, I, 224; II, 251
König, E., II, 261
Krapotkin, II, 330
Kreibig, I, 17
Kronecker, I, 201
Kronenberg, I, 21
Krumbacher, K., I, 161
Külpe, O., I, 6, 104, 128, II, 245, 252, 266, 272-3, 359.

L

Laas, E., I, 55, 80, 105, 109, 151; II, 272
Lagarde, de, I, 173, 177
Lagrange, I, 105
La Harpe, J. F., II, 311
Lalande, I, 49, 62, 80, 105
Lamarck, I, 66, 105
Lamprecht, K., III, 484, 580-1, 583, 588, 589, 590
Lang, W., II, 381
Lange, F. A., I, 101, 108, 118; II, 247, 382; III, 417
Laplace, I, 105; III, 505
Lapouge, I, 178
Lassalle, F., II, 321; III, 537
Lasson, I, 27
Lasswitz, K., I, 232-3; II, 382
Latham, II, 276
Laugel, A., II, 290
Lavoisier, I, 105, 126; III, 569
Lawrow, II, 284
Lazarus, III, 468, ff
Le Bon, ,I 178; III, 579
Leeuwenhoek, I, 76; II, 259
Lehmann, R., I, 165, 173

Leibnitz, I, 8, 11, 54, 61, 63, 66, 75, 81, 85, 89, 92, 95-7, 105, 113-4, 119-20, 124, 129-31, 134, 142-3, 152, 199, 200, 202, 207, 210, 214, 220, 229, 230, 233; 22, 237, 240, 244, 246, 255-7, 259, 260, 262, 263, 268, 271, 289, 294, 295, 304, 315, 331, 341, 344; III. 406, 413, 482, 512, 527, 531, 572, 585
Leicht, A., III, 469
Leiden, II, 343
Lenard, I, 123, 195
Léon X, I, 51
Lessing, G. E., I, 196; II, 341, 361, 371; III, 435, 444, 513, 524, 528-9, 532, 535, 581, 590
Lessing, Th. I, 12
Letourneau, II, 284
Leukip, I, 214
Leusse, de, I, 178
Levy-Brühl, III, 455
Lewes, G. H., II, 279, 288-9, 291-8
Lezius, Fr., I, 161
Lichtenberg, I, 187
Liebermann, M., I, 140
Liebig, J. V., I, 224; II, 367
Liebmann, O., I, 13, 108, 224; II, 382
Lilienfeld, V., III, 485.
Lipps, Th., I, 2, 6, 13, 82, 91, 106, 108-9, 128-32; II, 358, 361; III, 434.
Lipsius, R. A., II, 382; III, 437.
Littré, III, 577.
Livingstone, E., II, 280.
Lobeck, I, 209.
Locke, J., I, 45, 53, 66, 73, 83, 129-30; II, 296, 381; III, 403, 529, 533-5.
Lockyer, Normen Sir, I, 201.
Loel, J., I, 228; III; 398-9.
Loenweuhok, I, 120.
Lombrosso, II, 345.
Lott, II, 300.
Louis, XIV, I, 177.
Lotze, I, 12, 91, 92, 104, 119, 128, 223; II, 247, 257-9, 267-8, 271, 299, 337, 370, 386; III, 406, 446
Lovejoy, A. O., I, 50, 65, 80
Lubbock, J., I, 484, 523
Lucretius, II, 313
Ludemann, II, 324
Luther. M., I, 147, 153, II, 251
Lyell, Ch., I, 66; II, 276-7

M

Macchiavelli, I, 12; II, 322; III, 424, 574.
Mach, E., I, 5, 47, 54-5, 66, 73, 76-7, 80, 92-6, 110-2, 115, 117-9, 128, 130-1, 133-4, 151, 209, 218-9, 226; II, 245, 246, 251-2, 261-2, 272, 306, 309, 338, 352, 358, 385-6; III 398, 407, 416, 419, 436, 496, 537, 547-8, 551, 569, 582.
Mackay, J. H., II, 319
Maeterlink, I, 140, 141, 146, 147, 156, 194, 209
Maimon, II, 270
Maistre, de I, 211; II, 352
Malebranche, I, 19, 45, 130; II, 268
Malpighi, I, 76, 120; II, 259
Malthus, II, 491
Mandeville, I, 32; II, 329; III, 576
Manther, F. R., II, 238, 323
Marie, J., II, 284
Marx, E., I, 121
Marx, K., I, 105-6, 121, 127, 170 177; II, 319, 321, 382; III, 462 489, 491, 502, 576-7, 584
Martineau, II, 288, 292
Maupertius, II, 282
Mauthner, T., I, 157, II, 323
Mayer, R., I, 119, 129
McLennan, III, 484
Meinong, I, 6: II, 359
Melancthon, I, 101, 130; II, 364
Mendelssohn, M., I, 196
Mnger, K., III, 578
Menzel, I, 187
Menzer, II, 326
Meyer, R. M., I, 173; III 468, 369
Michailowsky, II, 284
Michelet, I, 27
Mill, J., I, 45

Mill, J. S., I, 4, 45, 50, 54, 66, 82, 83, 93, 112, 130, 133; II, 280-5: 290, 296-8, 336, 350, 352-3; III, 405, 513, 577.
Milton, III, 439.
Minor, J., I, 156.
Misch, II, 326.
Moleschott, J., I, 108; II, 247.
Mommsen, Th., II, 337, 364, 365, 368.
Montesquieu, 335.
Montgomery, E., I, 227.
Montpellier, I, 223.
Moor, F., II, 323.
More, Th., III, 452.
Morgan, E. H., I, 227; III, 484.
Morley, J., II, 311.
Morris, I, 156.
Mosso, A., I, 225.
Müller, A., I, 173, 177.
Muller, J., I, 223.
Müller-Freienfels, R., I, 52.
Mundella, III, 464.
Münsterberg, H., I, 2, 16, 46, 86, 87, 92, 108, 119, 132, 232; III, 579, 583.
Munk, I, 223.

N

Nägeli, I, 224.
Natorp, P., I, 5, 81, 151; II, 343, 379, 382, 383.
Nelson, I. 22.
Neumeister, I, 201, 227.
Newton, I, 105, 158, 218; II, 332; III, 416, 446, 537, 569.
Niebuhr, II, 334, 364, 366, 367.
Nietzsche, Fr., I, 12, 48, 52, 64, 78, 83, 104, 106, 115, 130, 135, 138; 140, 152, 156, 161, 166, 163, 173, 176, 177, 181, 184, 185, 189, 209, 211-9; II, 235, 238, 250, 310, 342, 357, 390; III, 443, 448, 495, 518, 528, 542, 543, 548, 584.
Nohl, H., II, 343.
Nostitz, V., III, 463.
Novalis, I, 140, 191; II, 341, 355, 361.
Nütkemann, II, 339.

O

Obermayer, I, 126.
Occam, William, I, 45, 151.
Oehler, R., II, 315, 316.
Oettingen, V., III, 484.
Oken, L., I, 129, 204; II, 287, 295, 300, 304, 306, 350.
Ostwald, W., I, 2, 12, 76, 77, 88, 92, 101, 162, 195, 199, 204, 219, 227, 231; II, 251, 252, 260, 262, 306, 323, 338, 354, 358, 359; III, 398, 477, 483, 485, 495, 516, 517.

P

Palágyi, M., I, 55.
Papini, I, 51, 98.
Paracelsus, I, 170, 223; II, 257.
Parmenides, 72, 74, 142, 201; III, 404, 442.
Parodi, D., I, 51.
Pascal, I, 15.
Pasteur, I, 75.
Pastor, J., II, 311.
Paul, G., 1, 121.
Paulsen, Fr., I, 13, 69, 104; II, 277, 358, 382.
Pauly, A., I, 232.
Peabody I, 45, 47.
Peirce, C. S., I, 49, 54, 56, 57, 61, 62, 64, 70, 83, 109, 110, 111, 129, 151.
Petzoldt, I, 219.
Pico, I, 156.
Philolaos. III, 494.
Plato, I, 4, 11, 44, 53, 55, 61, 63, 67, 69, 87, 89, 108, 110, 113, 114, 119, 134, 151, 168, 189, 192, 201, 216; II, 240, 245, 250, 266, 267, 314, 355, 360, 366; III, 413, 428, 442, 450.

Ploetz, I, 178.
Plotinus, I, 156, 168; II, 240; III, 439.
Plutarch, I, 77.
Pöhlmann, II, 323.
Poincaré, I, 6.
Polus II, 321.
Polybius, I, 61, 63.
Poncelet, I, 124.
Popper, II, 309, 310, 311.
Pötzl, O., I, 167.
Priestley, I, 96.
Protagoras, I, 42, 44, 55,63, 71, 80, 81. 85, 86, 96, 109, 110, 112, 115, 133, 151, 165; II, 245, 321, 386.
Proudhon, S., II, 320, 322.
Pufendorf, III, 529, 535.
Pythagoras, I, 142, 201, 213, 229.

Q

Quételet, III, 484, 590.

R

Ranke, I, 187; II, 336, 365, 368.
Ratzel, Tr., II, 252.
Ratzenhofer, G., I, 63, 226; II, 272; III, 467, 468, 473, 522, 576, 593.
Raupach, I, 183.
Rehmke, I, 6, 110, 219; II, 245.
Reibmeyer, I, 178.
Reid, I, 45, 132.
Reinhold, I, 202 II, 392.
Reinke, J., I, 3, 11, 66, 69, 76, 92, 129, 230, 231; II, 251, 252, 254, 260, 306, 338, 358.
Rembrandt, I, 173, 177.
Renan, E., III, 417, 513.
Renard, II, 311.
Reuchlin, II, 364.
Ribot, Th., I, 12, 58, 212; III, 483.
Riley, J. W., I, 47.
Richter, R., I, 32, 90; II, 316, 317, 321; III, 402, 406.
Rickert, H., I, 2, 4, 92, 132; II, 326, 349, 359; III, 506, 579, 583, 586.
Riehl, Alois, I, 4, 5, 6, 13, 15, 37, 82, 104, 114, II, 358, 359, 382.
Rindfleisch, I, 224.
Ritschl, Albrecht, II, 382.
Ritter, II, 293, 363, 365.
Rocholl, III, 468, 514.
Röntgen, I, 120, 123, 195.
Roosevelt, Theodor, I, 159.
Rosenkranz, II, 342.
Rousseau, J. J., I, 103, 161, 167, 181, 190, 209, 212, II, 281, III, 453, 459, 507, 525, 580.
Royce, Josiah, I, 32, 46.
Rühlmann, I, 117.
Ruge, II, 321.
Ruskin, I, 156.
Ruysbrock, I, 153, 156.

S

Schemann, I, 178.
Schiller, F.C.S., I, 42, 49, 55, 56, 59, 61, 66, 71, 76, 80-4, 87, 95, 96, 101, 133.
Schiller, F. v., I, 135, 137, 138, 140, 145, II, 281, II, 315, III, 427, 435, 468, 513, III, 523, 579, 581, 590.
Schlegel, A. W., I, 137.
Schlegel, Fr. V., I, 92, 135-7, 139-42, 145, 146, 156, 175, 191, 204, 208, 219, 220; 11, 321, 345; 111, 495.
Schleiden, I, 223.
Schleiermacher, I, 79, 210; II, 338-42, 347, 351-2, 357, 363, 365-7, 382, 388; 111, 427, 429, 431.
Schlosser, II, 348.
Schmidt, 1, 108, 109.
Schmidt, Fr. J., 1, 2, 108, 109, H, 346, 347.
Schmoller, G., II, 335, 349.
Schnehen, W., 1, 127.
Schneider, K. C., 1, 227.

Schopenhauer, A., 1, 4, 11, 48, 83, 84, 104, 129, 130, 146, 156, 165, 168, 173, 176, 179, 181, 185, 211, 231, 232; II, 235, 236, 238, 283, 299, 300, 305, 314, 320, 390; III, 424, 430, 431, 521, 556, 573, 574.
Schubert-Soldern, v., II, 245, 272.
Schultz, H., II, 382.
Schuppe, I, 6, 110, 219; II, 245, 272, 359; III, 579, 583.
Schwann, I, 75, I, 120.
Schwegler, II, 363, 374.
Seliger, J., III, 469.
Semon, R., I, 75, 77; II, 325, III, 546.
Shakespeare, I, 53, II, 346.
Sighele, III, 579.
Sigwart, C. G., II, 218, 343, 374, 379; III, 579, 583.
Simmel, G., I, 13, 54; II, 324, 359; III, 485, 583, 586.
Sinnreich, J., I, 23; II, 269.
Skribanowitz, Th., I, 14.
Smith, A., I, 45, 84, 210, 212.
Smith, W., II, 305.
Socrates, I, 53, 67, 70, 133, 146, 179; II, 367, 390, 450, 521.
Spann, O., II, 349; III, 578.
Spencer, H., I, 2, 8, 45, 48, 54, 66, 83, 105, 112, 118, 130, 133, 135, 157, 158, 193, 200, 201, 205, 210, 212, 215, 222, 223; II, 249, 251, 253, 258, 274, 336, 338, 350, 352, 359; III, 406, 415, 418, 423, 426, 433, 436, 439, 444, 450, 470, 474, 477, 478, 483, 484, 489, 490, 491ff, 513, 528, 546, 548, 576, 590.
Spinoza, I, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 28, 33, 74, 81, 83, 88, 89, 91, 95, 96, 97, 102, 105, 113, 114, 119, 124, 130, 133, 134, 142, 143, 146, 152, 156, 163, 164, 168, 196, 200, 204, 206, 214, 217; 218, 220, 230, 233; II, 241, 242, 244, 246, 250, 251, 255, 231, 262, 268, 285, 286, 289; III, 401, 406, 414, 423, 499, 430, 439, 441, 445, 477, 482, 483, 609, 529, 533, 556, 560, 572, 573, 584, 595.
Spurzheim, I, 223; II, 295, 296.
Stadler, II, 382.
Staël, Fr. v., II, 337.
Stahl, I, 181, 223; III, 542.
Stallo, J. B., I, 110, 118, 130, 219; II, 338, 354.
Staudinger, II, 382.
Steffens, I, 129, 204.
Stein, H. V., I, 67, 151.
Stein, Ludwig, I, 23, 61, 72, 76, 82, 88, 155, 167, 178, 194, 211.
Steinmetz, III, 484.
Steinthal, III, 468, 470.
Stephen, Leslie, II, 299.
Stern, I, 109.
Stern, L. W., I, 22, 26, 91, 109, 226.
Stewart, I, 45.
Stirner, II, 310, 313, 319-23; III, 542-3.
Stoa, I, 70, 97.
Stolberg, I, 140, 146.
Strauss, D. Fr., II, 237, 300, 301, 311, 321, 351, 366, 368, 374, 388; III, 529, 535.
Strindberg, I, 147.
St. Simon, III, 489, 579, 589.
Stumpf, K., I, 3, 99, 119, 120, 131; II, 385; III, 407.
Sulla, III, 560.
Suso, I, 153, 156.
Süvers, II, 339.
Swammerdam, I, 76, 120; II, 259.

T

Tacitus, I, 172.
Taggart, J. Ellis Mc, I, 51, 80.
Taine, H., I, 107, 170; III, 424, 445, 513, 514, 574, 589.
Tarde, G., III, 516.
Tauler, I, 153.
Telesio, B., I, 210; III, 405.
Temple, Sir William, I, 65.
Tennemann, II, 364.
Thales, II, 342.

Thomasius, C., I, 130 ; II, 364.
Thomson, S. J., I, 123, 195.
Thucydides, I, 12, 61-2.
Tieck, I, 137, 140, 175.
Tocco, Felice, II, 391.
Tocqueville, II, 334.
Toland, II, 322.
Tolstoi, L. G., I, 140, 147, 181, 190; II, 313 ; III, 444.
Tönnies, III, 583.
Treitschke, I, 173, 177.
Trendelenberg, I, 67, 68, 92 ; II, 266-8, 338, 340, 386.
Tröltsch, E., III, 402, 557.
Turgot, II, 335 ; III, 576, 579, 581.
Tycho, III, 572.
Tylor, I, 193 ; III, 484.
Tyndal, J., I, 220 ; II, 262.

U

Uexküll, J v., I, 200 ; III, 449.

V

Vaihinger, II, 315, 382.
Vailati, G., I, 87.
Vaux, C. D., II, 315,
Verworn, M., I, 110, 111, 120, 225, 226.
Vico II, 335 ; III, 468, 470, 576, 579, 591.
Vierkandt I, 180, III, 484.
Vinci, Leonardo da, I, 9, 192 ; II, 258, 307, 332.
Virchow, R., II, 247, 365 ; III, 418.
Visher, Fr. Th., II, 366, 369, 374, 379, 382, 390.
Vogt, K. I, 108, II, 247.
Volkelt, I, 165, 173 ; II, 382.
Voltaire, I, 186, II, 274, 377ff, III, 403, 489.
Vorländer, II, 382.
Vries, H., II, 254-5.

W

Wackenroder, I, 140.
Wagner, Adolf, I, 232.
Wagner, Richard I, 166, 173, 185, 206 ; II, 347.
Wagner. Rudolf, I, 223, II, 247.
Wahle, R., I, 228, ; III, 398, 399.
Wallace, II, 275, 276, 277.
Wallenatein, III, 572.
Walzel, O. F., I, 140, 146, 192.
Ward, III, 519.
Ward, L. F., III, 474, 485.
Wassmann, I, 227.
Watson, S. B., II, 304.
Weber, H., II, 266.
Weber, M., III, 580, 583.
Weierstrass, I, 57.
Weismann, II, 225, 227.
Welcker, II, 364.
Wentscher, II, 245, 246, 266.
Werder I, 27.
Werner, I, 140.
Whitman, I, 156.
Wiesner, J. v., I, 78 115, 116, 127 ; 194; II, 252.
Wigand, A, II, 255.
Wilde, O. II, 156, 158.
William of Occam, I, 83.
Willmann, O., I. 1.
Willy, II, 316.
Wilser, L., I, 165, 178, 186.
Wilson, II, 296.
Windelband, W., I, 2, 4, 12, 92, 108, 132 ; II, 244, 267, 549, 359, 363-5, 367, 392 ; III, 506, 570.
Windthorst, I, 187.
Winkelmann, II, 334.
Winter, K., I, 132.
Witasek. I, 17.
Wobbermin, I, 79.
Wolf, Fr. A., II, 364. 366.
Wolf, J., III. 462.
Wolff, Ch, I, 130.
Wolff, G., I. 201, 226.
Woltman, I, 178.
Worms, R., III, 485.

Wundt, W., I, 6, 12, 20, 58, 91, 104, 127, 128, 129, 180, 209, 221, 222, 223 ; II, 238, 250, 251, 259, 261, 294, 331, 358, 359 ; III, 433, 466, 468, 469, 477, 483, 485, 578, 580, 583, 594.
Wyneken I, 205.

X

Xenophanes, I, 99, 201 ; II, 313 ; III 404.
Xenophon, I, 67, 217 ; III 448.

Y

Youmans, E. L., II, 280.

Z

Zeising, I, 205.
Zeller, A., II, 370.
Zeller, Eduard I, 108, 201, 216, II, 337, 339, 340, 343, 344, 345, 346, 357, 363 seq. ; III 419.
Ziegler, Th., I, 12, 58, 212.
Ziehen, I, 110, III, 226.

INDEX OF TOPICS

N. B.—The numbers 1, 2, 3, etc., relate to the pages, whereas the Roman numerals, I. II, III, etc., relate to the volume.

A

"Absolute hostility is the prime force in politics," III, 473.
Activity, doctrine of, I, 54.
Adhering interest, III, 479.
"Amor dei intellectualis," I, 146, 200.
Anthropogeography, III, 466.
Anthropomorphic tendency: fundamental I, 100, 106.
Anthropomorphism: Author's, III, 438.
: Chamberlain's I, 192.
: Feuerbach's, III, 428.
: as the spiritual fate of the human race, I, 128.
Apriori construction of history, III, 468.
Appearance and function: Stump's contract, III, 407.
Art and Nature, II, 348.
Aristocracy of skill, III, 460.
Aristotelianism, Trendelenburg's, II, 267.
Authority—and anarchy: their opposition, III, 541, III, 541; and its reconciliation, III, 542.
, Augustin's rigid principle of, III, 542.
, author's vindication of. III, 557.
, biological necessity of, III, 554.
, changeable forms of, III, 540, 553.
, definition of, III, 539.
, essence of, III, 558.
, evolutionistic process of, III, 560.
, and individuality: their opposition, III, 541.
, as a necessity of end, III, 543.
, as a psychological category, III, 544.
, psychological genesis of, III, 545.
, psychological need of, III, 540, 546.
, as a rational concept, III, 560.
, as a socio-psychical problem, III, 538.
, as a sociological category, III, 555.
, as shifted from the individual to the collective, III, 562.
, Troeltsch's view of, III, 557.
Automaton, spiritual I, 220.

B

" Blue flower " I, 141.
Belief—and knowledge III, 421 sq.
————, primacy of belief over knowledge I, 11, 210.
————, limits of, III, 400.
————, and truth, relation between the two in Kant I, 210.

C

Causa Sui, I, 28.
Centre doctrine of Schlegel I, 136, 141.
Certainty, three kinds of (Renan) III, 396.
Chain-reflexes, theory of, I, 228, III, 398.
Chance, James's doctrine of, I 69.
————, Darwin's theory of, II, 255.
Classicism, Origin of the name I, 154.
" Communis Notitiae," I, 76.
Consciousness—in general, I, 94.
"————————, of the ego," I, 116.
————————, " Edge of consciousness " I, 106.
————————, " Nirvana " of, I, 71.
Consequences, logic of, I, 57, 84.
————————. morality of, I, 56. 84.
Constancy,
————, of the Ego, I, 94.
" Constants " I, 229.
Correlationists, I, 6.
————————, as masked idealists, II, 272.
Correlativism of Busse, II, 266, 270.
————————, in general, I, 23.
————————, as the offshoot of Hartmann's philosophy. II. 245.
Cosmogony—poetic, II, 243.
" Culture-history movement," II, 340 sq.
Culture, its special vice, III, 525.
Culture-system, Essence of, I, 189, 190.

D

" Daimonion," Socratic, I, 165.
Degradation theory, III, 462.
Destiny— different expressions for it, III, 572.
— transformation of personal destiny into logical destiny, III, 572.
Determinism, dilemma of, I, 69.
Development theory v.s. theory of creation, II, 274.

Dilthey and Comte II, 352.
——— and contemporary German Philosophy, II, 356.
——— and the Hegelian philosophy of history, II, 352.
——— and Wundt II, 358.
" Dominant " (Reinke) I, 69, I, 229, 230.
Dynamism, II, 262.

E

Economical solidarity, III, 528.
Ego-centric philosophy of hobby, III, 486.
" Einlegen " I. 129.
" Einfühlen, I, 129.
Emanationism, Neoplatonic, I, 149.
" Emancipation through timeless bliss," I, 41.
End, unity of, (Mach), I, 92.
——, System of ends, I, 88.
——, Cosmic ends, I, 218.
Energy, conservation of, I, 123.
———, exchange of, I, 125.
———, Nerve-energy, I, 123.
———, spiritual, I, 123.
Energism, I, 117 sq.
———, criticism of, I, 126.
———, logical importance of. I, 124.
———, v.s. Materialism, I, 118.
———, mechanistic, I, 123.
———, Ostwald's, I, 123 sq., II, 251, III, 516.
Entelechy of Aristotle, I, 31, 66, 69, 76, 92, 194, 213, 222, 227-8; II, 259.
, of Driesch I, 69, 227, 228.
Entropy of Clausius I, 75.
Epistemology, as a fundamental philosophical discipline, II, 384.
Ethics, naturalistic III 423.
Evolution of mankind from bestiality to solidarity and toleration, III, 524.
Evolution and reciprocity, III, 520.
Evolutionism of Herbert Spencer I, 76, 149; II, 274 sq.
———, logical, I, 89.
Pure Experience, I, 42
——— Critique of, II, 353.
Experience and poetry, II, 346.
Extravagance as the chief charactristic of romanticism, I, 168.

F

Faith vs. knowledge, III, 403.
Feeling, thinkers of, I, 72.

Feeling, representative, (Spencer), III, 546.
Fichte and the principle of authority III, 550.
———, Author's criticism of Fichte's view, III, 551.
———, as a romanticist II, 321.
Fitness theory, I, 225.
Four consistent world-views, 113-15.

G

Genius cult as a characteristic of romanticism, I, 175.
"Germans"—Chamberlain's conception of, I, 181.
God, Idea of, (Feuerbach's), III, 428.
—— concept of God not derivable from feeling-values, III, 431.
———————, derivable only from the understanding III, 433.

H

Happiness—Overpersonal, I, 39.
Hartmann—not a champion of life-force, II, 256.
———————, relation to Hegel, Schopenhauer and Schelling, II, 241.
Hartmann's theory, central problem of, II, 246.
———————————, its opposition to Darwininism II, 254-5.
———————————, its opposition to mechanism II, 253.
———————————, sketch of, II, 242.
Heptaplomenes, III 532.
Historical categories (Simmel) III, 586.
———————————, as concepts of human action, III, 587.
Historical laws, (Condorcet's), III, 577.
———————————, author's reason for doubting the existence of, III, 589.
Historical predictions, their nature, III, 566-9.
———————————, only probable, never certain, III, 425, 569.
———————————, as resting upon belief, III, 571.
Historical uniformities, III, 580.
———————————, Lamprecht and Breysig's views of, III, 581.
Historicism, II, 363, 371.
History, as creator of circumstances, III, 515.
———, drama of, (Chamberlain), I, 183.
———, and freedom, III. 514.
———, as showing not laws, but tendencies, III, 527.
———, as a teacher of toleration, II, 334, III, 526.
———, teleological interpretation of, III, 575.
History of the world, the theme of, I 149.
"Homo mensura" I 80, 95.
Human collective actions, causes of the uniformity of, III, 576.
———————————, Schelling's view of the origin of, III, 575.
Humanism, representative of, I, 49, 55.
Hume, as a positivist I 15.

I

I, as a teleological unity in Mach, I, 207.
Idealism,—ethical, I, 16, 17, 132.
————, rebirth of, I, 2.
Ideographic series, III, 579.
"*Idola tribus*" I, 100, 128.
Immanence philosophy, I, 6, 14, 110; II, 272.
Imperative, categorical, I, 60.
Individualism, Stirner's, II, 319 sq.
Individuality, Keyserling on, II, 324.
————, as opposed to personality, II, 324.
"Inherent interest" I, 63; III, 484.
Inner disposition, I, 167.
Introjection, I, 106, 129; II, 326; III, 437.
Introspection, historical and philosophical, II, 350.
————, as the basal principle of philosophy, II, 327.

J

James's relation to scepticism, I, 90.
James, as a voluntarist or activist, I, 58.

K

Kant's——"Copernican discovery" I, 103.
——"transcendental unity of apperception" I, 74, 94, 116, 201; III, 406, 436.
doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" II, 270.
"Critique of Practical Reason" I, 59.
Knowledge, Theory of: its definition, III, 395.
———————: its fundamental propositions, II, 385.
———————: Zeller's view of, II, 385.

L

Laws, as conceptual abbreviations, I, 73.
—contain a 'must,' tendencies only a 'should', III, 584.
Laws of nature, Mach's definition of, III, 416.
————, as the anticipations of nature, III, 422.
Legal socialism, III, 465.
Life, Aristotle's definition of, I, 216.
——, as a free act, I, 207.

Life, Kant's definition of, I, 221, 222.
——, as a mode of energy, III, 480.
——, problem of, I, 204.
Life-force, historical account of, II, 257.
————, Lotze's, II, 247.
Local signs, theory of, II, 268.
Logic, biological, I, 87.
———, instrumental, I, 55, 70.
———, as the product of selection, I, 79.
Logical macrocosm, I, 157.

M

Man, not originally social, but made so by history, III, 530.
Mathematical axioms as overpersonal truths, III, 411.
Mathematics of Nature, I, 9, 11, 42, 213 ; II, 254.
Mechanism *vs.* organicism, I, 218.
————, cosmic, I, 218.
Metabiosis, definition of, III, 519.
Metaphysical necessity, I, 104.
————perception (Coellen), I, 142.
Metaphysics, of being, I, 128.
————, as "dumb" II, 354.
————, inductive, I, 128.
————, of Keyserling, I, 201.
Method, biological, I, 152
———, geometric, I, 152.
———, nomothetic and idiographic, I, 18, 37.
———, melioristic, I, 78.
"Milieu", I, 107.
"Mindstuff theory", I, 48.
"Mneme", I, 95, III, 328.
Monism, energistic, I, 116.
———, Ostwald's, I, 3.
———, philosophical, I, 4.
"Moral holidays," I, 74.
Morals, physics of, I, 59.
———, metaphysics of, I, 60.
Movement, Origin of, I, 214.
Mutation doctrine, (De Vries) II, 254.
Myth, primeval, I, 193.
Mythology, scientific, I, 38, 128.

N

Natural Selection (Darwin), II, 275, 278.
Naturalism, Haeckelian, I, 3.

Naturalism, *vs.* teleologism, I, 215.
Nature,—— laws of : Mach's definition of, III, 416.
——— mythology, I, 16, 110.
Nature-philosophers, I, 76.
Nature-philosophy, energistic, I, 133.
———————, influence of Leibniz upon, I, 120.
———————, metaphenomenal, I, 115.
———————, new *vs.* old, I, 132.
———————, scholastic *vs.* scientific, I, 131.
———————, Schellingian, II, 254 ; Spencerian, II, 306.
———————, Speculative *vs.* critical, I, 104.
———————, Speculative *vs.* psychological, I, 132.
Nature—shows mechanical causality, whereas history shows teleological causality, III, 585.
————, Spiritualisation of, I, 102.
Neo-humanism, I, 82.
Neo-Kantianism *vs.* materialism, I, 108.
Neo-positivistic movement, I, 47 sq.
Neo-rationalism, II, 273.
Neo-romanticism—Chamberlain's : its logical error, I, 180.
———————, its negative and positive sides, I, 147.
———————, philosophical, I, 142.
See also under *Romanticism.*
Neo-Schellingianism, I, 25,
Neo-vitalism, I, 25, of Driesch, I, 226, 228.
———————, history of, I, 224.
———————, and mechaniem, I, 220.
———————, a kind of romanticism of Science, I, 231.
Neovitalists, I, 66.
Nietzsche and Chamberlain, I, 176.
Nietzsche, as a genius of irreverence, II, 312.
————, three periods in the thought of, II, 316.
————, as poet-philosopher, II, 313 ff.
Nirvana, Buddhistic, I, 181.
————, logical, I, 78.
Nominalism vs. Realism, I, 45,46.

O

Occasionalism, of Geulincx and Malebranche, I, 19 ; II, 268.
———————, of Lotze, II, 268, III, 406.
Ontologism, voluntaristic, I, 34.
Ordo ordinans, I, 40, 89.
Organicists, I, 219.
Organicists in Sociology, III, 485.
Ostwald's definition of purposive action, III, 517.

P

Paulogism, Hegelian, II, 240.
Pantelism, I, 30, 91.
Pantheism, Organico-aesthetic, III, 450.
"Pantheon of eternal thoughts," I, 71, 115.
Parallelism, psycho-physical, II, 269.
———, Spinozistic II, 268 ; III, 406.
Personalism, critical, I, 30,
Pessimism and optimism in religion, III, 441 ff.
Phenomenalism, metaphysics-free (Mach), I, 110, II, 251, 272.
Philosophers, academic vs. dialettante, I, 130.
———, of belief, I, 72.
———, knowledge-philosophers, I, 72.
———, object-philosophers, I, 6.
"Philosophising past one another," I, 7.
Philosophy : definition of, II, 363.
———, as the doctrine of the world-view, II, 360.
———, eternal crux of, I, 70.
———, feeling-philosophy, I, 12, 82.
———, history of philosophy treated as a science II, 391.
———, of identity, II, 271.
———, as "moving not past the Sciences but through them," I, 23.
———, of norms, I, 18, 24, 37, 92.
———, and poetry : their relation, II, 317 sq.
———, rebirth of, I, 3, 44, 99, 120.
———, and science, II, 252.
———, of values, I, 26, 31-4, 36, 92.
Plato's kingdom of Ideas, I, 78.
Politics as a Science, III, 597.
Positive Monism, III, 467.
Possible, Aristotelian doctrine of the, I, 69.
Possible worlds, the best of, II, 244.
Power to believe, I, 83.
——— to work, I, 73, 83, 94.
Pragmatic belief, I, 59.
——— method, I, 61, 63.
———, and Aristotle, I, 66.
———, of treating history, I, 61, 63.
——— Sanction, I, 60.
Pragmatism, I, 44 sq.
———, critique of, I, 86.
——— defends Hume against Kant, I, 82.
———, definition of, I, 51, 52.
———, History of, I, 52 sq. ; James's view, I, 56, and its criticism, I, 56.
——— Kant's meaning of, I, 60.
——— Leibnizian, I, 54.
——— Meaning of, I, 54.

Pragmatism, Origin of the name, I, 49.
———— and positivism : difference, one of colouring only, I, 80-81.
———— and solipsism, I, 74.
———— Socrates as the model of a pragmatist, I, 68.
Pre-established harmony, II, 268.
Primacy of practical reason, I, 70, II, 332.
Primitive force, III, 484.
Psychological dualism, III, 494
————, microcosm, I, 157.
————, standpoint of Stein, I, 152.
Psychology, mechanical, II, 271.
————, pluralistic : II, 271.
Psychomonists, I, 110, 111, 226.

Q

"Qualitates Occultae" I, 9,91, 228; II, 258.

R

Race as social destiny. I, 170.
——its validity as a criterion of truth, I, 166.
Race as an important characteristic of history, I, 178.
Radicalism, aristocratic, I, 176.
"*Ratio Intuitiva*," I, 142, 146, 148.
Ratzenhofer : his three stages, III, 467.
———— ——, as an energist and a voluntarist, III, 481.
Reality-standpoint I, 12, 13, 20, 22-3; II, 266, 273.
"Reflective concepts, Amphiboly of", I, 19, II, 268.
Reflex movement, in the domain of will, III, 551.
Religion, anthropomorphic, I, 102.
————, author's standpoint in, III, 434.
————, Brahmanic-Buddhistic, I, 149.
————, and confessions, III, 419.
————, Iranian-Persian, I, 149.
————, nature of, III, 418.
————, philosophy of, III, 415.
————, as "not a private but *the* most private thing" III, 410.
————, psychology of, III, 413 : Hume's view, III, 403.
————, "timeless religion" III, 411.
Religious truth, characteristic of, III, 401.
————————, individuality of, III, 410.
————————, *vs.* Scientific truth, III, 409.
Religious evolution—nature of, III, 435.
Revelation, inner, III, 403.
Romantic reaction, meaning of, I, 137 sq.

Romanticism, Catholicising force of I, 146.
———, Chamberlain's, I, 161 sq. Stein's criticism of, I, 171, 179.
———, characteristics of, I, 138, 174, 209.
———, false conception of, I, 135.
———, forms of, in poetry, art, and religion, I, 175.
———, forms of, in social life, I, 148.
———, in art, I, 148.
———, influence of the Roman Church upon, I, 147.
———, Joel's conception of, I, 138-9.
———, Keyserling's, I, 195.
———, Marie Joachimi's view of, I, 142.
———, mysticism and romanticism, I, 154.
———, naïve and sentimental, I, 135.
———, need of, I, 159.
———, psychological origin of, I, 195
———, Author's psychological view of, I, 143-4.
———, psychology of, I, 160.
———, as the tone of modern philosophy, I, 156.
———, and classicism : I, 140.
———, as the presupposition of classicism, I, 139.
———, as religious classicism, I, 147.
———, Coellen's view of, I, 141.
———, dangers of, I, 148, 174.
———, difference between r and c, a psychological one, I, 151, 156-7.
———, Author's view of I, 158, Chamberlain's view of, I, 145.
———, golden mean between r and c, I, 155.
———, historical types of, I, 153.
———, in literary style, I, 154-5.
———, in philosophy, I, 150.
Romanticism and classicism, from the point of view of the problem of universals, I, 151
———, in religion, I, 147.
———, in the same person, I, 137.
———, as succeeding each other, I, 135.
———, as two types of world-view, I, 149.
Romanticists, æsthetico-organic optimism of the, I, 142.
———, as born aristocrats of imagination, I, 138.
———, conception of poetry and philosophy of the, I, 136.
———, *vs.* intellectualists. I, 212.
———, of thought (Hegel), feeling or fancy (Schelling), and will (Fichte) I, 140, 211.

S

Scholastic philosophy, II, 330.
Science, as 'not the last word, but the last word but one,' III, 417.
———, modern science and Leibniz, I, 119-20.
———, requires talents, whereas art requires genius, III, 592.
———, "as systematic anthropomorphism," I, 192.

Sciences, of culture, II, 326.
——-—, mental, II, 326.
" Sensation-complex," I, 111-2.
Social dynamics, III, 474.
——— optimism, III, 457.
Solipsism, sociological, II, 324.
Soul-substance, II, 271.
Spencer, Carlyle's relation to, II, 280, and Comte, II, 287.
———, G. H. Lewes on, II, 279.
———, Huxley on, II, 286.
———, and Ionian nature-philosophers, III, 493.
———, and Leibniz, II, 295.
———, Lyell and Darwin, II, 277.
———, and Schilling, II, 303 sq. ; and Spinoza, II, 285.
———, and Von Baer, II, 301 sq.
Spencer's attitude towards Carlyle, II, 281 ff.
———attitude towards Comte, II, 289 ff.
———attitude towards Strikes, III, 500.
———Contempt for German Philosophy, II, 300.
———doctrine of evolutionism : its essence, III, 492, 498-9.
——— horror of Communism, III, 500.
———optimism, III, 503.
———philosophy : its essence, II, 275, 302.
———precursors : Hegel and Oken, II, 292.
Spencer's relation to Darwin, II, 276.
———German philosophy, II, 294.
———Guyan, II, 284.
———kant, II, 296 ff.
Spencer's Scientific in dependence of the positivism of Comte and the absolute adherence of German nature-philosophy, II, 292.
Spinoza and Leibniz, II, 261.
Spiritual double nature of man, I, 58.
Subjectivisim, epistemological, I, 25.
Sui generis, I, 200.
Superman, doctrine of the, II, 238.
Survival of the fittest-(Darwin), II, 255, 275, 278.
Switzerland as a political microcosm, III, 455.
Symbiosis, definition of, III, 518.
———different forms of, III, 519.

T

"Tat twam asi." I, 38.
Teleological laws, I, 89.
———unities, I, 25.
Teleologism in Aristotle, I, 69.
———vs. Mechanism, II, 255.
Teleomechanism, I, 30, 91.

Teleology—Author's criticism of, I, 88, 97, 98.
————empirical, I, 225.
————immanent, I, 88.
————as supplementing mechanism, II, 258.
and mechanism : their opposition I, 98 ; its reconciliation, II, 256.
Telephilism, I, 28.
Telephobia, I, 91, 219, 234.
Telos, the apriori of pragmatism, I, 96.
Theory of knowledge : its definition, III, 395.
Things and persons : Stern's distinction of, I, 29.
Thought-Economy, I, 31, 112.
Toleration, definition of, III, 508.
————, as grounded in "universal interest," III, 522.
————, history of, III, 532-33.
————, limits of, II, 534-5.
————, Locke's view of, III, 534.
————, in different professions, III, 531.
————, as possible only in the kingdom of History, III, 512.
————of the State, III, 509.
————as a striving for social equilibrium, III, 521.
Totality-thinking, I, 2.
Transcendental, I, 23, II, 235 ff., 246 ff., 266.
————, unity of apperception, I, 74.
Transvaluation of social values, III, 461.
True and good as identical, I, 73.
Truth, definition of (Richter's), III, 402.
————double, III, 404.
————biological basis of, I, 72.
————, finality of, I, 78.
————, genetic theory of, I, 71, 89.
————, as a teleological process of adaptation, I, 80.
————, as what gives satisfaction, I, 77.
————, as a working value, I, 71.
Truths, eternal, I, 9, 10.
————, logical *vs.* psychological, III, 404.

U

Unconscious, the "Omniscient," II, 244.
————, philosophy of the, III, 236, 238.
Understanding, thinkers of the, I, 72.
Unity, "generic unity of objects," I, 74.
————of the universe, I, 198.
Universalia ante rem, I, 151.
Universalia post rem, I, 73, 151.
Universalism, æsthetico-optimistic, I, 137.
Universe, the riddle of the, I, 7.

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"Unmoved movable," I, 28.
Utility, I, 73.

V

Validity in logic: different grades of, III, 395 sq.
Value-will, I, 35.
Values, culture values, I, 25, 39.
———metaphysical systems of, I, 32, 36.
———pure values, I 39: table of pure values, I, 37.
———values of reality *vs.* values of necessity, III, 397.
———triple values: the system of, I, 36.
Veræ causæ, I, 9.
Verités de fait, I, 32, 53, 71; II, 329.
Verités éternelles, I, 32, 35, 65, 71, 152; II, 329.
Verités de raison, II, 53.
Vitalism, Aristotle's, I, 216.
———Hartmann's attitude towards, II, 249, 252.
———Revival of, II, 260 sq.
Vitalists, error of the, I, 223.
"Voir pour prévoir" Comte's, I, 87, 94, 133.
Voluntarism, I, 12.
———Wundt's, II, 251.
Voluntaristic logic, I, 38.
———ontologism, I, 34.
Voltaire as the "genius of irreverence," II, 312.
———as the "great individual of modern times," III, 307.
———as the "literary world-soul of the whole age," II, 308.
———as "the Pope of free thinkers," II, 309.

W

War as the father and king of all things or beings, III, 490.
Will-atoms: System of the identity of, I, 38.
Will—to believe, I, 57, 61, 78.
———to consciousness, II, 235.
———to equalisation, II, 12.
———to humanity, I, 12.
———to live, I, 83; II, 235.
———to norm, I, 12.
———to power, I, 64, 83; II, 235.
———to think, I, 83.
———to value, I, 12.
———to the world, I, 12, 33, 40.
World-will, I, 35, 40.
Working values, I, 71.

World as act, I, 11, 207, 229.
———inner, I, 40 ; outer, I, 39.
World-mathematics, I, 202.
The World of 'ignorabimus' and the world of 'ignoramus,' III, 418.
World-view, I, 114.
———, electromagnetic, I, 122.
———, organic, I, 193.

Z

Zeller, central preblem of, II, 370, 382.
———, and the history-of-philosophy movement, II, 364, 377.
———, as man, II, 376.
———, personality of, II, 374.
———, as philosopher of the middle line, II, 390.
———, and the philosophy of the Greeks, II, 365.
———, as teacher and thinker, II, 372, 380.
Zeller—epistemological standpoint of, II, 387.
Zeller's relation to Lotze and Trendelenburg, II, 386.
———do. to Riehl and Windelband, II, 392.